

evidence of the former chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff.

As we know from the memoirs of Poincaré, the "ray of hope" (for the world - B. Sh.) still remained on the evening of July 31.

But already on the morning of August 1, Joffre, in a personal letter to Minister of War Messimy, once again points out the danger lurking in hidden German mobilization. The chief of the general staff wrote: "The great inconveniences pointed out yesterday, caused by the slowdown in the movement of advanced units, will be even more pronounced if we continue to delay the order for general mobilization. German preparations are proceeding according to a predetermined plan..."

After pointing out some data on this preparation, Joffre continues: "We can assume that on August 4, even without the announcement of mobilization, the German army will be finally mobilized, gaining 48 hours, and maybe 3 days before us."

The chief of the general staff knew the weaknesses of the government, namely, the fear that Germany would win in combat readiness, and now boldly played on them.

While the Secretary of War was reading the Chief of Staff's report, the following was happening in the Foreign Office. At about 11 o'clock in the morning, the German ambassador appeared there and groped for the ground about the possibility of Khran-Puz's neutrality. Having received an answer from Viviani that "France will take into account its own interests," Shen departed, warning that he would call at about 6 pm, that is, at the hour when the 18-hour ultimatum expired.

187

with W

"Despite the softened nature of today's speech by the German ambassador," Izvolsky wrote to Sazonov, "the French government is extremely concerned about Germany's emergency preparations on the border with the French, for it is convinced that under the cover of the "kriegspustand" — martial law — a real mobilization, which will put them in a disadvantageous position. On the other hand, for political reasons, concerning both Italy and, mainly, England, it is very important for France that her mobilization should not precede the German one, but be a response to it. This question is currently being discussed in the Council of Ministers at the Elysee Palace and it is very likely that it will decide the general mobilization.

"We could not foresee on Saturday morning (August 1 — B. Sh.), writes Poincaré, "that events would play out with such terrifying speed. However, in the face of the danger threatening Europe, the government of the republic thought only of how to postpone the order for mobilization as long as possible.

What the "government of the republic" was really thinking about can be seen from the cited telegram from Izvolsky.

"The Council of Ministers, having met in the morning," continues Poincaré, "decided that this order would be given by telegraph", that is, in other words, the president received freedom of action.

"As a result of a telegram received here from Paleolog," Izvolsky reports in a second report, "that the German ambassador informed you (Sazonov—B. Sh.) of Germany's decision to announce a general mobilization today, the president of the republic signed a mobilization decree."

It was no longer possible to postpone mobilization for fear of being late compared to Berlin.

The Council of Ministers, which met in the morning, apparently met until 3 o'clock in the afternoon, and Joffr's note was brought there by the assistant to the chief of the general staff. General Ebener was invited to the council meeting. Former Minister of War Messimi says: "At about 3 o'clock in the afternoon I had in my hands this tragic document (decree on mobilization - B. Sh.), this fatal piece of paper signed by Poincaré, Viviani, Angagner (Minister of the Navy) and me. I will never forget this hour. At 0330 General Ebener, Assistant Chief of the General Staff, sent by Joffr, wishes to receive this document. I pass it on to him. In a quarter of an hour he is already on the telegram in the Rue Grenelle.

"Viviani feels remorse, hurries to the Minister of War and asks to delay the order. The negotiations which he had just carried on with the German ambassador seem to cast a ray of hope for a favorable outcome. The Minister of War, after telephonic conversations with Ebener, replied that the mobilization order had already been transmitted and that its execution had already begun. Nozdno, - the mechanism has already set in motion We shook hands.

Such is the description of the announcement of mobilization in the words of the Minister of War, who now sheds tears of emotion at the memory of the "Fatal Piece of Paper" that plunged France into a victorious war. It is no wonder that Viviani felt rather unwell, for the order for a general

188

E[

Fuancare was signed 2 hours earlier than the one signed by Wilhelm. Geoffre's efforts were crowned with success, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs might have had to prove to Italy and England that the Pempas were the first to sign the order. But in those days, of course, the clock no longer played a role. But now, for the sake of history, the former accomplices of the crime need to cry, shed tears of tenderness, flaunt those difficult experiences, which, they say, then fell to their lot.

The official French History of the War says: "The order for mobilization was signed by the Minister of War at 3:30 pm and transmitted at 3:55 pm on the main telegraph of the rue Grenelle. The telegram reads: "Very urgent circular. general mobilization. The first nine mobilization of August 1914. The telegram was immediately sent to its destination. In the evening, the mobilization order was published and announced throughout the country.

"As far as the railways are concerned," Istoriya continues, the order to mobilize was sent to all lines at 4:50 p.m., and everywhere they began to carry out the plan.

Although the order for mobilization has been issued, nevertheless the Minister of War considers it necessary to confirm by telegraph at 5 p.m. the orders given to the forward units on July 30 and 31:

"In order to preserve our right to help your English neighbors, it is important that our patrols and detachments do not cross the line indicated in telegram No. 129 of July 30, and respond only to open attacks."

At 10:20 p.m., this demand is confirmed in a more categorical form: "The Minister of War confirms the order of the President of the Republic, for serious diplomatic reasons, not to cross the demarcation line indicated on July 30 at all. No patrol, no siding or post shall be east of the indicated line. The one who crosses over will be brought before a military court and only in the event of an open attack can the order be canceled.

"It is important, for reasons of a diplomatic nature, to avoid, pending a new order, taking measures that bear the character of distrust towards Italy."

Such were the orders issued as early as the morning of August 1 by the commander of the frontier corps © Italy, later confirmed by the Minister of War. But in the evening, a message was received from the ambassador from Rome about the neutrality of Italy.

Orders are given to watch the coast, to open fire on enemy airplays, and, finally, on the same day, Poincaré signs a decree on a state of siege throughout France and Algeria.

On August 1, Izvolsky sent a telegram addressed to Sazonov to St. Petersburg with the following report from the military agent.

"Urgent. Particularly secret. From a military agent. A general mobilization was announced at 3:40 p.m. The military minister expressed his wishes: 1) to influence Serbia, asking him to go on the offensive as soon as possible; 2) to receive daily information about the German corps directed against us; 3) be notified of the start date of our action against

189

and in ii

Germany. The most desirable direction for the French for our strike continues to be Warsaw-Posen. According to the information received from Denmark, supposedly L XUN, XX, UT reserve guards and P corps were assigned against us. The General Staff promised not to answer this except by agreement with us. On the telegram in St. Petersburg it is marked: "Personally handed over to the chief of the general staff, N. A. Bazili."

Thus, not yet aware of Germany's declaration of war on Russia, the Minister of War of France was already considering the fact that not only Russia, but also France, was in a state of war.

Meanwhile, we heard that Viviani still had a "ray of hope" for a peaceful outcome. This "ray" was brought in by the German ambassador, who visited Viviani at 7 p.m. when the 18-hour period expired, given by Berlin to Paris to reveal its position in the upcoming Russian-German war.

Izvolsky informs Sazonov about this visit to the German ambassador as follows: "The German ambassador has just visited Viviani for the second time, but did not send him any new message, referring to the impossibility of deciphering the telegrams he received. Viviani, informing him of the state of

in his mobilization decree, in response to the German mobilization, expressed his surprise that Germany had embarked on such a measure at a moment when a friendly exchange of thoughts between Russia, Austria and the powers was still going on; he added that mobilization still does not predetermine wars and that, just as the Russian ambassador remained in Vienna, and the Austrian in St. Petersburg, there was no reason for the departure of Baron Shen, who, however, did not renew this threat.

The clock ran ... and at night the telegram again transmitted the dispatch of the Russian ambassador to Sazonov: "I received your telegram about the declaration of war on us by Germany at 11 o'clock. I immediately communicated it personally to the President of the Republic, who immediately called a Council of Ministers. Poincaré declared to me in the most categorical manner that both he himself and the whole Council of Ministers were firmly determined to carry out in the most exact manner the obligations imposed on France by the treaty of alliance. But this raises a number of very complex issues, both political and strategic. The government, by virtue of the constitution, requires a decree of parliament to declare war, which requires at least two days to convene. Although Poincaré has no doubts about this decision, he would prefer to avoid a public debate on the application of the alliance treaty; therefore, and for reasons chiefly concerning Anglip, it would be better if a declaration of war! will follow not from France, but from Germany. Further, it should be borne in mind that today is only the first day of the French mobilization and that it is more beneficial for both allies that France should start military operations when the mobilization is more advanced. However, Poincaré pointed out that Germany would not wait for France to declare war on her and, after not allowing her to complete her mobilization, would suddenly attack her. Immediately after the discussion of these questions by the Council of Ministers, Poincaré summons me to inform me of its result.

Poincaré himself describes his conversation with Izvolsky as follows: "In the evening

190

566666555 30908

At half past twelve, Izvolsky, very excited, appeared at the Elpsey Palace and informed me of Germany's declaration of war on Russia. He had orders to ask me what France intended to do. "The government," I answered him, "will make a decision on this matter. I have no doubt that the OP will be ready to demand from the Chamber of Deputies the fulfillment of the obligations that the union places on us. But do not insist that the Khran-Pubian parliament immediately declare war on Germany. On the one hand, we are interested in having our mobilization delayed as long as possible until the start of the henceforth inevitable hostilities; on the other hand, it would be better if we did not have to fulfill our alliance obligations and declare war. If Hermapia declares it to us herself, the people of Hranduz will rise up with even greater enthusiasm to defend their lands and their freedom."

"The Ambassador," continues Poincaré, "recognized the validity of my remarks. The council of ministers, immediately convened, met at three and a quarter in the morning. He unanimously approved the answer I gave to Izvolsky and asked me to confirm it to him. I went out at the same time with Viviani to repeat to the ambassador on behalf of the government what I personally told him, and it was decided that we would wait for events before fulfilling our union obligation.

If the reader compares the content of the testimonies of these two friends of the war, he himself will draw the appropriate conclusions about the alleged veracity of Poincaré's recollections.

"Especially secret" Izvolsky informing Sazonov about the conversation with Poincaré: "3 o'clock o'clock. I have just returned from the President of the Republic, who told me that the Council of Ministers has once again confirmed the decision to carry out in the fullest possible way the obligations imposed on France by the treaty of alliance. The Council recognized that the interests of both Allies required that France, if possible, complete her mobilization before the opening of hostilities, which would take 10 days. By the end of the day, they will be summoned to the chamber! Poincaré continues to fear that Germany will immediately attack France in order to make it difficult for her to complete the mobilization. The foregoing requires the preservation of the strictest taipa. The General Staff promised not to answer this except by agreement with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The telegram is marked: "Personal handed over to the Chief of the General Staff, I. A. Bazili."

This is how Paris experienced the decisive day of August 1 and reacted to Germany's declaration of war on Russia. The government of the republic firmly decided to fight, but it was necessary to call Germany to the war, which completely succeeded.

London continued military training. In his memoirs, Churchill relates that, having received the assurance of support from the opposition part of the Cabinet, he, Churchill, at his own peril and risk, sent a telegram stating that the order to mobilize the Fleet would probably be issued on August 1 and the next day. be ready for it. In the cabinet, however, Churchill entered a proposal to mobilize the Navy, but so far it has been rejected.

Having learned on the evening of August 1 that Germany had declared war on Russia, Churchill immediately went to the Prime Minister, where he found Gray

191

and other ministers. Churchill resolutely declared that it was necessary to announce the mobilization of the Navy, and he assumed this responsibility without the consent of the cabinet. On the face of the silent prime minister, he read agreement to this. As Churchill left the room with Gray, Gray said: "I can tell you that I have also taken an important step. I declared to Cambon that we would not allow the German Fleet to pass into the canal. "I went to the Admiralty," writes Churchill, "and immediately gave the order to mobilize." The minister's order was approved by the cabinet the same day, and the king's decree was issued.

The "important step" that Gray took was forced from him by Cambon, who had a conversation with the Anghian minister that morning. To the remark of the French ambassador that he should report to Paris the indecisiveness of the English government, Gray remarked: "We cannot at the present time propose to Parliament to send an army to the mainland." Then Cambon decreed to Gray on the defenselessness of the coast of France and the existing Anglo-French covenant. Gray could no longer refuse this and made a personal statement, just mentioned above.

On the same day, Gray recognized as evasive Germany's response to Belgian neutrality and declared to Lichnowski that the violation of Belgium's neutrality might excite the public mood of England.

In essence, it would be possible to lower the curtain on this, stopping the maintenance of a kind of "Daily Record", since virtually all states were already in a state of war and it was only a matter of formalizing what happened.

However, we will continue our story in order to reveal the further work of the General Staff, because the declaration of war does not interrupt the policy in which the General Staff continues to take part.

? AUGUST

Fraction's response put Berlyan in a difficult situation. Again it was necessary to look for pretexts for declaring war. Diplomats already set to work on August 1 and composed a document. However, it was not sent, since the justifications for the wars given in it were unsuccessful.

On the night of August 1-2, the question of declaring war on Paris was not resolved.

"The excited exchange of opinions between Bethmap and Moltke," Tirpitz said, "continued on August 2 in the Kaiser's castle in my presence. Moltke did not attach any importance to the formal declaration of war by France. He pointed to a whole series of hostile acts on the part of the French, of which he had information; we were actually in a state of war, and it was impossible to stop the development of events. I repeatedly pointed out that it was incomprehensible to me why, in general, we had to declare war on France; the army could have marched to the Franpouzskaya Grapitsa anyway.'

"Canilaire was of the mind that without declaring war on France, he could not present Belgium with a demand for a pass. This basis has remained incomprehensible to me."

192

PONY OI UKS OOO

Tirpatz speaks out against the passage through Belgium and says: "It was by no means within the competence of the General Staff to independently discuss the question of the political consequences of strategically necessary steps. But Bethmann's recognition of "injustice" in relation to Belgium gave the enemies, moreover, even more confirmation of their slander directed against us, and further development of events in the most disastrous way confused the legal consciousness of our people.

"When the chancellor left the meeting," continues Tirpitz, "Moltke began to complain to the Kaiser about the 'deplorable' state of the political leadership, which was completely unprepared for the situation that had arisen, and now, when the avalanche has moved, everything still thinks only of legal rights."

The admiral, he said, supported the chief of staff. "However," writes Tirpitz, "it was not my business to advise the Kaiser on this matter." But he still gave advice, offering to replace Yagov Ginze.

"The moral innocence of our government can only be proved by an open reference to its diplomatic incapacity," Tirpil concludes his story.

So on August 2 in Berlin they did not come to a clear formulation of the war, because

there were no diplomats, and the general staff had information of a rather petty nature. The chief of the general staff considered himself de facto in a state of war, while the diplomats had to fill their mouths. There was only one thing left - to use the data of the General Staff.

This did not end Batman's trials. "The Reich Chancellor, at the request of the military authorities," writes Kautsky, "had to crack another hard nut: to justify the invasion of Belgium."

Nowadays, of course, one cannot say that such an exercise was unexpected for German diplomacy. That, in order to carry out the war plan, France had to go through Belgium, the chancellor knew this long before the war. So, at least, this is what Ludendorff v. in his book Warfare and Politics.

The "History" of the State Archives says that "Moltke, taking into account the upcoming operations, insisted on the need to receive a Belgian answer about the passage of German troops before 2 o'clock in the afternoon on August 3."

The violation of the neutrality of Belgium was connected not only with the war against France, but also with the performance of England. It was clear. The Hohenzollern diplomats faced a difficult task.

However, none other than the Chief of the German General Staff came to their aid, offering his services. "The army was in command, and the civilians of the polity must obey. Only the thankless mission fell to the share of the latter - justification of treachery before public opinion. In the Belgian question, however, the Reich Chancellor performed only the noble role of a postman. That is how Kautsky thinks about the mouth.

On July 26, Moltke himself drafted a draft letter to the Belgian government: this draft was received by the Foreign Office on July 29. Editorial corrections were made in the Ministry, and then on the same day the document was sent to the German envoy in Brussels. -

13 The brain of the army. ext. 3.193

PR - AS Pi

The document read: "The imperial government has reliable information about the planned concentration of French military forces in the Meuse-Givet-Namur section. They leave no doubt about France's intentions (after uniting with one British expeditionary corps) to advance through Belgian territory against "Hermapia".

Later it was pointed out that Germany would be able to worries that Belgium does not. repulse this "French (English) campaign" herself and guarantee Germany against any threat. |

"To prevent an enemy offensive is for Germany the law of self-preservation," and therefore she is forced, "in her turn, to. repulse to enter Belgian territory. Then there was an enumeration of all the benefits for Belgium in return for joining. "If Belgium comes out against the German troops," the document warned, "then "Germany, unfortunately, will be forced to consider the kingdom as her enemy."

After new persuasions from the Belgian government and. promises, at the end of Moltke. wrote: "An unequivocal answer to the mouth of the letter must follow within a day after delivery; otherwise, immediately

hostilities are covered."

As mentioned above, the letter was generally approved by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and only editorial changes were made: 1) was. The reference to the British offensive has been crossed out, because they hoped for their neutrality; 2) the concluding part was softened by the fact that nothing was said about the opening of hostilities,

Kautsky comes to the conclusion that "the General Staff was able to skillfully fabricate in reserve complaints about French or French-English hostile actions, allegedly making war or violation of neutrality inevitable, before such actions were even only hostile, and then on the basis of these complaints make claims as soon as necessary.

Jagow, sending this letter to the envoy on July 29, i.e., when, as if, there was still no talk of the war in Berlin, he wrote: "The appendix to this document ... hide it securely sealed and open it only when you will be telegraphed authorized from here."

August 2 became the day when the document lying under a bushel had to be put into effect, and on the same day Jagow telegraphed by mouth, indicating: "Today at 8 o'clock in the evening, German time, the instructions contained in it must be carried out." Giving additional instructions to make changes in the document, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs wrote: "At the same time. a response should be required within 12 hours, not within 24, i.e. until 8 a.m. tomorrow. I ask you to assure the Belgian government most emphatically that, despite the promise, there is no doubt about the correctness of our news about the French plan.

The Belgian reply should arrive here by 2 p.m. German time tomorrow. Therefore, deign to ... immediately telegram here the answer and, after receiving it, send it to the members of the imperial embassy immediately through the military attache by car to Aachen to General Emmich - Union Hotel.

194

ZOO AOOOOOOIINIIV -`UK- IIIIIIIIIIOOOOOOOOOIIVIN

The Belgian Government must be under the impression that all the instructions in this case came to you only today. I leave it to you then to inspire the Belgian government that it can withdraw its troops to Antwerp, and we, if Belgium so desired, can take over the protection of Brussels from internal disturbances.

We will not dwell on this issue further. As is known, on July 31 Belgium mobilized, refused the document of the Chief of the German General Staff, handed over by diplomats, and on August 3 the German cavalry had already crossed the Belgian border.

Having received a letter from Conrad, the chief of the German General Staff on August 2 sent a reply to Vienna by courier.

"Starting with gratitude for the friendly letter, which "during difficult hours" brought "great joy", Moltke continues:

"For me, all the difficulties that you had

in recent days, but I could not, with all my efforts, speed up the activities of the diplomats and inform you as soon as possible about our mobilization. :

Well, it's all up and running now. We have moved against Frandia and Russia and will soon begin operations.

I know that you are also making every effort to remove obstacles. The only goal that should always be borne in mind is to defeat the deadly enemy of Austria-Ventria - Russia. All the forces necessary for this must be used. Serbia should be restrained by unknown

reading powers."

The letter ended with an indication of the junction in Upper Snlesia, the appointment of Freytag hon-LoringoFchen as Berlin's representative at headquarters, and the hope of great success from comradely joint work.

At the same time, under the signature of the chief of staff, information was reported to Vienna about the German troops in the east and assumptions about their use.

Following the courier with letters to Moltke, we will hasten to Vienna, where legally war was declared only on Serbia.

Of course, war with Russia was a decided matter, but for the time being it was necessary to refrain from declaring it. It was equally unprofitable to break off diplomatic relations with France. But the most important thing is to clarify as soon as possible the position of Italy, Rumania and other Balkan states, to draw them into the war on the side of the tripartite alliance.

At ten o'clock in the morning the chief of the general staff arrived at Berchtold's. The conversation turned to Italy and Romania. At the minister's direction, the Italian ambassador in Vienna declared that Italy "at the very least" would be neutral. But this neutrality, according to Conrad, should be clarified as soon as possible, since the monarch does not know whom to see in the Italians - an ally, a neutral, or even an enemy.

With regard to Rumania, Konrad asked for clarity as soon as possible: whether she would be neutral, whether she would take the side of Austria, or whether she would remain armed neutrality. In the opinion of the chief of staff, the joint action of Romania and Bulgaria on the side of the tripartite alliance would be a great achievement.

Having learned from Berchtold that Germany had declared war on Russia around 7 p.m. on August 1, Konrad advised him to convey to Berlin: "We

195

CHO UK PIIIIIOOIIIOONiV

we will go close with you, but it is in our interests to put off the Russian uprising against us as long as possible so that we can calmly complete our concentration. On the night of August 1-2, Russian patrols crossed the German border, this is not reported from our border 06, and it is desirable for me to possibly delay the declaration of war.

At Forgach's instruction that it might be "the biggest for 48 hours," Conrad thought to himself that that would be fine too.

Berchtold pointed out further than Conrad that there was no hope for Japan, for

she, according to the Japanese ambassador, is consolidating inside, but is very interested in what is happening in Euxine. The participation of the Turks in the war would be very desirable. Montenegro is afraid of the Austro-Hungarian attack.

The chief of staff advised Berchtold to "keep Montenegro in this fear", and "on the Austrian side nothing will be done against her until she herself attacks."

True to himself, Conrad, upon returning to his office, immediately wrote a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, that it would be good if Eschi Frap-Joseph wrote a letter to Karl the Romanian, promising Bessarabia and Negotin for Romania's participation in the war on the side of the tripartite alliance. district of Serbia.

Berchtold immediately replied that Bessarabia had already been offered to Karl Wilhelm, and Chernin would make a presentation about the Negotinsky district. A telegram from the Austrian ambassador from Berlin spoke of such steps by Germany, with the addition that an assurance had been given in Bucharest that Bulgaria and Turkey would not take any hostile action against Rumania in her joint action with Austria against Russia. Jagow asked Vienna to support Rumania's promise to Bessarabia. "It's decided," Berchtold's hand wrote on the telegram.

Meanwhile, Chernin's reports from Bucharest spoke of the probable neutrality of Romania and the doubtfulness of her acting on the side of the trio.
union.

As we know, Francp-Josich sent a letter to Rome with a proposal and hopes for Italy to act on the side of the tripartite alliance.

On August 2, an answer came from Rome from the king that Italy had always sought to preserve peace, would take all measures so that it would be restored again, would treat her allies cordially and fulfill the treaty in accordance with her vital interests.

"The letter of Victor Emmanuel," Konrad writes in his memoirs, "is a historical document for the failure of the Erenthal and, like her, German policy."

In the depths of his soul, the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff gloated. |

In St. Petersburg, they were busy with other things. There was no doubt in the mouth that France would support Russia. The diplomats waited impatiently for the clarification of Britain's position. The military people were busy with prayers, mobilization, ceremonial "exits" and were keenly interested in the question of who would be the commander-in-chief: whether Nikolai himself, Nikolai Nikolaevich or Sukhomlinov. By evening, doubts were resolved by the appointment of Nikolai Nikolaevich.

196

other

"We spent the day of August 2 in very great anxiety," writes Poincaré, explaining this by the uncertain position of England and the crossing of the German troops across the frontier, about which Viviani "delivered a motivated protest to Shen."

The French "History of War", speaking in various passages of advanced

German units across the border and the occupation of Luxembourg, indicates that, "despite all this, the Minister of War, not wanting to give the movements of the French troops an aggressive character, orders to take the same measures on the Belgian border that were taken on July 30 - mepkoy.

A telegram sent to the Commander of the First Sector says: "In view of the present diplomatic situation, it is extremely important not to create any incidents on the Franco-Belgian frontier, and therefore 'don't come closer' to it." The same order was sent to the troops stationed against Luxembourg.

Another matter was the German border, where, according to JoFhr, the given order for a 10-kilometer zone was fraught with consequences. On the morning of August 2, Joffffer writes to the Minister of War: "We had to leave the positions that mattered in our deployment. We will have to return them again, which will not be without loss. The commander-in-chief believes that this should be done now, but without penetrating into German territory, unless, of course, we are called to this by a German attack.

True, later it was necessary to give up, "and not without losses", a territory much larger than the 10-kilometer zone, but on August 2, Jofer's letter, taking into account the mood of the government in Paris, had its effect.

At about 2 p.m., the French government gave Joffre freedom of action, stating: "The French government considers that the violation of the border carried out in several places by the German troops makes it possible to shine the previous prohibition on approaching the border closer than 10 km. The French government gives the commander-in-chief complete freedom to carry out his proposals, even if this leads to a crossing of the frontier.

War has not yet been declared. Having received freedom of action, Joffre at 5:30 p.m., announcing by telephone about the abolition of the 10-kilometer zone, however, "for moral and diplomatic reasons", wants to "give the Germans full responsibility for military actions" and orders: "From now until of the new order, the troops should only push back the part of the enemy that crossed the border, but not pursue it and not cross the border themselves. |

On the same day in the morning Poincaré received a letter from London dated August 1st. Georg wrote that he was making every effort to find conditions for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. "As regards the behavior of my country, events are moving so rapidly that it is absolutely impossible to foresee their future development." A "strong friend" promised Poincaré to negotiate with the Khranpuz ambassador.

Germany has declared war on Russia, "but what will England do?" asks Poincaré. "The king said nothing of it, and Sir Edward

197

innnnnnnnnnnnii aaa) Gray could not yet answer Paul Cambon with positive certainty. Germany demanded that London declare neutrality; she did not receive it; the English government remained the master of its conduct; British squadrons were mobilized, and Sir Edward Gray expected his colleagues to announce that they would prevent the passage of German squadrons through the strait.

"That was the first step," continues Poincaré.

"On Sunday afternoon, Viviani received a teletype from Paul Cambon informing us that, after the morning meeting of the Council of Ministers, Sir Edward Gray made the following statement to our ambassador: "I am authorized to give assurance that if the German Navy penetrates the English Channel or crosses the North Sea, in order to start military operations against the "Kran-Puz merchant fleet, the British Navy will provide all possible protection to the French with all its might."

"This statement was not yet a promise of full cooperation, and England was so peacefully disposed that she did not dare - you know this - to intervene in the conflict with all her might before she saw the neutrality of Belgium violated by Germany." However, it can already be said that England has decided on war.

, But we also know what a subtle game Poincaré played in order to drag England into it—it was, of course, not about the "peaceful mood" of the British government, but about a pretext that would give a pretext to rouse the English masses to war. We had to languidly wait for the further course of events on both banks of the Channel.

AUGUST 3RD.

This languor was put to an end on the afternoon of August 3 in Berlin.

Having received information from the General Staff about violations by the French patrols and pilots of the inviolability of the border, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at 1:45 a.m. on August 3 composed the text of the declaration of war against France and forwarded it to Paris.

At 6:45 pm in Paris, Shen announced that Germany considered itself at war with France. |

By this time, as we know, the German cavalry was crossing the Belgian border, and Emmich's infantry brigades were moving towards Liège to attack him. |

Military actions were to finally clarify the position of England and from now on one could hardly hope for her neutrality.

However, Betman did not lose hope for this. The Crown Prince in his memoirs describes his "last conversation" with the Chancellor on August 3, which "has deeply and indelibly etched itself into my memory, for it made a tremendous impression on me even then."

When asked by the chancellor "whether the army will do its job", the crown prince replied; "Everything that the army can do will be done, but I cannot but point out to Your Excellency that we are entering the war under the most unfavorable political circumstances ... Russia, France, England are on the side of the opponents, Italy and Romania at best, they are neutral, but this is also unlikely."

198

SHCHOOOOO\$YU SHCHMMMMMMMPuoooooooooooooooooooooooooooo

"That cannot be," Bethmann objected, "England will probably remain neutral."

"Your Excellency," continued the Crown Prince, "in a few days will receive a message about the declaration of war by England. The only thing left for us is to find allies. In my opinion, everything must be done to encourage Turkey and Bulgaria as soon as possible to conclude union treaties.

"I would consider the mouth the greatest misfortune for Germany," remarked the Kaptzler.

"I stared at him with an uncomprehending look," continues the crown prince, "until I caught the meaning of his words from the connection with the previous one. Proceeding from his ideology, incomprehensible to anyone, the chancellor concluded that we were in danger of losing the friendship and neutrality of England because of such alliances, yes, friendship and readiness for neutrality, which only existed. V. his head. When I understood the Chancellor, our conversation was over."

The situation with Italy was no better. On August 3, a German representative sent on a special mission to Rome reported: "Today at 9 o'clock in the morning I gave instructions to the King of Italy, according to which the immediate mobilization of the army and Navy was required, as the implementation of allied assistance established by the treaty."

"The king replied that he was personally with us with all his heart ... but the tactlessness of Austria, which is completely tolerated by the Italian national feeling, has so outraged public opinion against her over the past two weeks that a joint active action with Austria would at the moment cause a real storm. The ministry does not want to take the risk of an uprising. He, the king, unfortunately, has no power, but only influence ... Since the people identify Austrian politics with German policy, due to Austrian tactlessness, Italy, unfortunately, turns out to be unreliable in relation to Germany. The king is very upset about this. He once again tried to influence the ministry and notify him of success.

This "tactless Austria", which did not make concessions in favor of Italy, dragged into the war with Russia and France, now deprived Germany of active assistance to Italy. It was necessary to press in Vienna.

There, from early morning, in the office of the chief of staff, Berchtold was engaged in an academic calculation of future enemies and friends. Both interlocutors ranked Montenegro among the enemies and decided by all means to achieve the active participation of Romania on the side of the tripartite alliance. Romania feared the performance of Bulgaria. In Konrad's opinion, if nothing comes of it with Rumania, Bulgaria should be drawn in by launching it into Serbia. Türkiye should develop its operations also against Serbia and possibly against Greece. As for Italy, the chief of staff was resolutely against compensating her, advising the minister to stop all sorts of negotiations with her.

"What did I say to the emperor in 1907! Konrad remembered. - Our future is in the Balkans, our obstacle is Italy; with Italy, first of all, it is necessary to settle accounts. This did not happen!"

The newly arrived Minister Buryan expressed fear for the emigres, for, with the departure of the XI corps from there, unrest of the population could flare up in it.

ME UDS PONY

her Romanians, and the large estates of the Hungarian magnates would be in danger.

On the mouth, the chief of staff pointed out that the protection of internal security should be organized differently, and not by the forces of the HP Corps, because now everything is at stake.

Berchtold said that Sweden might intervene in the war and operate in Finland. Aiglia, in his opinion, will wait, on whose side will be a major success; a military agent reported from London that the Irish question seemed to cool the bellicose mood of the British.

According to reports from other military attachés, Türkiye plans to announce mobilization on August 2. Sweden calls for a Landsturm. Greece remains neutral. Romania rejected the Russian proposal with two corps from Iasi to advance against Austria-Hungary.

On the same day, Conrad, having received a letter from Moltke, sent a reply to Berlin by return courier, and, in addition, considerations about actions on the Russian front.

In the letter, the chief of staff of the monarchy again assured his friend of fidelity to the union. If until now Vienna has not declared war on Russia, this is due to the desire to calmly complete the strategic deployment in Galicia, which was greatly complicated by the beginning of transportation to the Serbian Front. Examining this issue in detail, Koprad ends his letter with a request to Moltke to exert all his influence, so that Romania will act as actively as possible on the side of the tripartite alliance, which "in military terms is of paramount importance to us."

Petersburg lived the military life of the first days of the war.

On the Hranka-German border, mutual transitions of forward units continued. On the morning of August 3, Jofffer again confirmed his order not to cross the border, given to them on August 2, and only the Sorda mounted corps was given freedom of advance to the east of Mézières, if the corps commander saw fit.

Along with the declaration of war by Germany on the evening of that day, August 3 brought comforting news to Paris. The Italian ambassador "officially notified the declaration of the neutrality of his country."

"The whole day," writes Poincaré, "passed without the French government being definitely aware of Aoglia's intentions. Sir Edward Gray only informed Viviani that at a meeting on Tuesday, the French government could say to the House: "In the event that a German squadron appears in the strait or in the North Sea, in order to round the British Isles, attack the French coast or the French the navy, the English squadron will offer the Khranpuz Fleet its full protection, so that from that moment England and Germany will be at war.

"This was a new step, and England had already promised us her cooperation, but promised conditionally, and if Germany had not sought to attack us from the sea, England might not have intervened."

In London, Gray's speech in the House of Commons with the statement that "sincerely

friendship" with France obliges England to protect the Khranpuz shores, and the explanations about Germany's ultimatum to Belgium were met,

200

with and

in the words of Poincaré, "the applause of the whole assembly."

"At a meeting of the British ministers held on Saturday (August 1—B.S.) in the evening, it was decided to send instructions to the British ambassador in Berlin on Tuesday (August 4—B.S.) in the morning to invite the German government to take back its ultimatum and respect Belgian neutrality."

"If Germany refuses to do this," said Sir Edward Gray to Paul Cambon, "it will mean war."

We already know that the order to the German ambassador in Brussels to present an ultimatum at 8 o'clock in the evening followed only on the morning of August 2, while in Lopdop the decision was made on August 1 in the evening, i.e. 12 hours earlier than the telegram was sent from Berlin to Belgium. Jagow wrote naively to the ambassador: "The Belgian government should get the impression that all the instructions on this matter came to you only today" (August 2 - B.Sh.), not suspecting that, according to these instructions, already on August 1, the Council of Ministers in London took a very definite decision, waiting only for the actual speech in Brussels by the German diplomat. Such was London's awareness of the German diplomatic secrets "hidden safely sealed" in Brussois!

In London, events were really growing... When the Mivistrian cabinet met on August 3, it already faced the fact that Luxembourg was occupied by German troops and Germany presented an ultimatum to Belgium. The majority of the Cabinet already considered war inevitable.

The cabinet approved the theses for Grey's speech in Parliament on the same day with a statement on the external position, the mobilization of the Navy was approved and the mobilization of the army due to follow was approved. There was no talk of sending an ultimatum or declaring war on Germany, much less sending an expeditionary corps.

Parliament approved Gray's ideas by a majority.

To Churchill's question: "What will happen next?" Gray replied: "Now we will send them an ultimatum and demand that traffic through Belgium be stopped in 24 hours."

It was a mere formality, for it was clear that it was no longer possible to stop the advance of the German armies.

4 AUGUST

We know that in Berlin they still hoped to draw Italy into the war. However, on August 4, the specially authorized ambassador reported from Rome that the king received him again this morning and declared his impotence to influence the government, whose views were shared by the majority of deputies. Even Giolitti, who is friendly to the tripartite alliance, speaks of the need for Italy to observe neutrality.

"The government is ready for all sorts of accidents," the king said, and the staff deciphered this as a threat to Austria.

Upon receiving this report, Wilhelm was furious. Giolitti was scolded by "amazing sleaze", and Victor-Emmanuel - "scoundrel".

201

ZENON US II

From now on, it was not only impossible to count on the active assistance of Italy, but there was a danger of her going into the camp of enemies.

On the same day, England declared war, with which all the "houses of cards" of Berlin politicians collapsed.

"When Bethmann," writes the crown prince, "first revealed the true face of England, he confessed, deeply shocked, that now all his politics had collapsed like a house of cards."

Mobilization in Germany was in full swing.

We pass by all sorts of solemn meetings, divine services and the like, which usually take place on the days of the beginning of wars!, fanning its flame.

In Vienna, the day passed more calmly.

On the morning of August 4, Konrad again met with Berchtold. The interlocutors were chewing on old questions about the position of Italy, Rumania and the 06 declaration of war on France and Rossip.

It was desirable to delay the declaration of war on Franzip, in order to allow the Austrian Navy to get ready.

Rumania is reportedly mobilizing to defend its neutrality. Germany, wishing to draw Romania into the war, does not particularly count on Bulgaria. Conrad advised one thing: do not sit between two chairs.

Berchtold noted that the German ambassador believed that Italy should offer Trentino, to which the chief of staff bitterly retorted: "And we just have to face Italy with a hat in our hands."

Returning to his room, Konrad received the head of the operational bureau and the representative of the naval command at the headquarters of Rear Admiral Resp. The conversation turned to maritime matters. Resp, noting the fall of Italy, found the position of the Fleet of the monarchy in the Adriatic Sea not safe, under the threat of the Anglo-French Fleet, the protection of the coast of Austria by him was fake and believed that it would be most expedient to withdraw the Fleet to the Black Sea.

If we recall, then this question is not new and was once actively put forward by Berlin, which saw in this an opportunity to destroy the Russian Black Sea Fleet, create a threat to the coasts of Russia and thereby divert its forces to protect the coast, and then, having secured the flanks of Romania and Bulgaria, make it easier for them taking the side of the Triple Alliance powers.

The chief of staff did not quite share the rear admiral's views on the situation.

fleet and decided to seek the opinion of the commander of the fleet, like a linden, the most competent in this.

Then Konrad, together with Resp, went to Berchtold, in order to listen to his opinion. The minister seized on this plan and immediately sent a telegram to Constantinople about the passage of Austrian ships into the Black Sea, and a proposal went to Berlin to take part in the planned expedition for the ships "Beben" and "Breslau", located in the Mediterranean Sea.

Related to this issue was the declaration of war. Conrad believed that a sea voyage needed 3 days, and therefore the declaration of hostilities should also be delayed for such a period. |

We will have to deal with the campaign in the Black Sea of the Austro-Hungarian Fleet below, and therefore we will stop the reader's attention on it.

202

a] 7 "TPPPteeEe @=b>>®@sv,

Now everyone knows how much trouble the Russians brought in the Black Sea only "Goeben". The appearance of the Austrian Fleet there, it must be said, not bad, would undoubtedly greatly shake the dominance of the Russian Fleet at sea, if it would not make it completely problematic.

Let's not guess what would have come out of this expedition, but rather let's listen to how such an attempt was taken care of by the Russian side. .

Danilov writes: "On August 1, we received news that the two German cruisers "Goeben" and "Breslau" ... entered the Dardanelles and headed for Constantinople, where they anchored at the entrance to the Bosphorus ... Tso - the appearance of the latter at the entrance to Boskhor was a clear violation , by Germany
Turkey's neutrality was a Fact of great importance for us.

"If we were ready for great sacrifices, bordering even on the danger of Turkish hordes invading our Caucasian territory, in order to ensure success on the main western land front, then, on the other hand, we must! in order to retain the complete dominance of our navy in the Black Sea.

This dominance gave us the opportunity to unimpededly withdraw all ground forces from the vast Black Sea coast, maintain water communications between various points on such a coast, and exert political influence on all those states whose maritime borders adjoined the Black Sea. By itself, the Turkish fleet ... could not, of course, violate our naval dominance ... but with the arrival in the Bosphorus of two German cruisers, which possessed excellent sea qualities and powerful long-range artillery, the situation changed significantly. And although our Black Sea squadron continued to consider itself stronger than the Turkish Fleet, reinforced by non-medical cruisers, the tasks of this squadron nevertheless became much more complicated.

The example of "Goeben" and "Breslau" could have a contagious effect on the plans of the Austrian Navy. In Constantinople, where the arrival of German cruisers caused a great uproar, rumors were stubbornly maintained that two more warships, this time Austrian, would soon join the Turkish Navy, which, as diplomats said, could completely turn the head of the Turkish government. Our maritime department also does not

the possibility of an attempt on the part of Austria, in the event of the collapse of Turpia, to send a part of the Austrian Fleet to the region of the straits was denied, and in this case the predominance of the enemy Fleet over our Black Sea squadron could easily be realized.

Although in the Mediterranean there were squadrons allied to us: France and England, they were busy securing the sea borders of their own possessions and covering the sea transportation of the French colonial troops from Africa to the metropolis. Because of this, the named fleets were forced to limit themselves to the most minimal measures in relation to the observation of the Austrian Navy. And only Italy, acting on the side of the powers of consent, could finally block the exit of Austrian ships from the Adriatic with its fleet. But the Roman cabinet was not yet ready for active action.

Meanwhile, the installation of a joint Fleet hostile to the powers near the Black Sea could be a very sensitive blow not only

203

i oh ani

for Russia, but also for its allies. The appearance of this Fleet in the Black Sea might even have strengthened the currents in Rumania and Bulgaria, which were unfavorable to the powers, and whose governments were slow to reveal their intentions.

This is how the enemies regarded the possible sabotage of the Austrian Fleet in the Black Sea, proposed by the Resp.

In the evening, the chief of the general staff of the monarchy found it necessary to write a letter to Berchtold, inspired by Conrad's conversation with the German ambassador on his return home from the Foreign Office.

On the basis of the ambassador's words, Konrad became convinced that Germany was not particularly inclined to drag Bulgaria into the war. In addition to his verbal statement, the chief of staff wrote that no matter how important the participation of Romania in the war on the side of Austria, the offensive of the Bulgarians against the Serbs and Montenegrins, from a military point of view, is of great importance, and this should be achieved as soon as possible. If Germany is indifferent to what happens in the Balkans, then for us this is a decisive matter.

"It is worth considering," wrote Konrad, "what would happen if we had a military failure there in the coming days. The whole political situation would change dramatically to our disadvantages.

"It is necessary to act quickly, and not hesitate, succumbing to German views," the chief of staff advised and asked.

"I ask you to immediately assure Romania that from our side she will meet only friendship and that with a happy outcome of the war she will receive Bessarabia and the Serbian regions, if only she actively comes out on our side."

Concerning the question of declaring war, Konrad asks Berchtold not to do anything without talking to him, since "this act is in close internal connection with military considerations."

"A premature declaration of war on France may lead to the appearance of French courts in the Adriatic."

"I'm a little concerned about the declaration of war on Russia that should follow in the next few days."

Following this letter, Konrad sent the following - about the possibility of buying the neutrality of Montenegro. Conrad considered the implementation of this opportunity a great success and offered to offer the Montenegrins Scutari for this.

However, according to a military agent from Rome, instead of neutrality, Montenegro sent 5,000 people to the city of Lovcen, and Italy made it a condition not to occupy this mountain with Austrian troops.

As is known, the Chief of the Austrian General Staff sent a telegram to Cadorna proposing military negotiations on the basis of a tripartite alliance.

On August 4, Cadorna replied: "The conference is pointless, since the council of ministers of Itahia has decided on neutrality. If Austria-Hungary does not occupy Lovcen and does not upset the balance in the Adriatic, then Italy will never oppose Austria-Hungary.

In Italy itself, the press was excitedly talking about the politics of Vienna, the Navy and the army were partially mobilized.

So sadly ended the attempt of the chief of staff of the monarchy to come to the aid of the Viennese diplomats. Repeatedly expressed the opinion that

204

A

the agreement of the general staffs is not valid, Conrad was now convinced of this in practice, having received not only a sharp answer, but also conditions, from whom ... from Itahia, whom he hated with all the powers of his impulsive soul.

It must be said that the "descendants of Machiavelli" were not averse to bargaining with the powers of consent, valuing their active action on their side dearly. One of the Italian diplomats, formulating the conditions under which Italy could take the side of the Entente, stated that the completion of the national unification of Italy required the annexation of the district of Nice along the Var river, the island of Corsica and the Adriatic coast up to Istria inclusive. The price was high, and none of the powers of the Entente went for it, content with the neutrality of Rome.

ÿ August The focus of all political events was London, where the issue of England's entry into the war was being decided.

Concerned that Apglia took only two steps on the path of war and hesitated with the third, i.e. on the morning of August 5, Poincaré again wrote a letter to King George with a promise to help the land army, in which, in addition to thanks for the help at sea, he pointed out "the urgency in establishing cooperation to protect the territory of Belgium, as well as the territory of France ". "Until now," said Nuancare, "we are not aware that Your Majesty's government has finally determined its intentions regarding the cooperation of the ground forces."

France did not need the details of the use of the expeditionary corps, for those had already been established by both governments by an agreement signed in February 1914. Paris needed only

to know if this agreement is being put into effect.

Petersburg experienced something similar. Buchanan writes: "During the first three days of the war, my position was not pleasant. Restless crowds gathered in front of the embassy, demanding news from London, and in a far from friendly tone asked if Russia could count on our support. I reassured them as best I could with vague statements."

Considering that these "restless crowds" on August 4 carried out a pogrom of the German embassy, then we can agree that Buchanan's position was not pleasant "...

However, as we know, on the same day, August 4, the fluctuations were limited in London.

We will not convey to the reader Churchill's personal experiences that day in anticipation of a declaration of war on Germany.

There is no doubt that the building was, on the whole, upbeat in London, as in other capitals in the days of the declaration of war; and English restraint had to find an outlet.

"From now on, we are allies," Gray said to the Russian ambassador on August 4, and at one o'clock on the morning of August 5, Buchanan received a telegram: "War with Germany, act," which brought the ambassador "tremendous relief" and was accepted by him as "good news".

On August 4, the main grouping of enemies was finally determined, which began hostilities, gradually and rather slowly drawing other states into them.

205

WOD B

5TH OF AUGUST

"From the moment Belgium decided to resist," writes Kautsky, "and England entered the war, Germany's position became desperate.
nym".

With this in mind, Moltke, Chief of the German General Staff, transmitted a memorandum to the Chancellor on August 5, which read as follows:

"The declaration of war by England, which, according to reliable information, was conceived from the very beginning of the conflict, forces us to exhaust all means that can contribute to victory. In this serious situation in which the fatherland finds itself, it becomes our duty to use all means. The brutal policy pursued by our adversaries against us gives us the right to a ruthless course of action.

The uprising in Poland is prepared; it falls on a prepared night, since even now our troops meet in Poland almost as friends. So, for example, in Wloplavsk, opi was met with bread and salt.

America's mood towards Germany is friendly. American public opinion is outraged at their shameful treatment. This mood should be used whenever possible. The most influential persons in the German colony in America should be called upon to influence and

henceforth on the press in our favour. It is possible that the United States, under our influence, will decide to move its fleet against England, for which Canada smiles at them as a reward for victory.

The uprising in India and Egypt, as well as in the Caucasus, has, as I already pointed out in my letter of the 2nd S./M. for No. TR, of the greatest importance. Through an agreement with Turkey, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be able to implement this idea and stir up the fanaticism of Islam."

For this "revolutionization of the world," the idea of which was given by Wilhelm himself, Kautsky takes up arms against the General Staff. In his mouth, he sees: "new evidence that the leader of the Zerman policy is now the chief general of the staff, and not the ReichsCaniler, who should carry out the instructions of the perbolo."

"All means" and "actions in the most reckless manner" recommended by Moltke infuriate the hardened Menshevik, who believes that the General Staff "took the path of premeditated stupidities, which militarily were worth nothing, since they could be easily assimilated by the enemy, and which subsequently really often fell like a double burden on the head of the army and the German people.

In the heat of his anger, Kautsky also brings here revolutionary Russia, which, allegedly, was promoted by "the German capitalist, large-scale, agrarian and militaristic monarchy."

In our times, frankly, everyone is well aware of the powerful means of propaganda for demoralizing the enemy, and no one, except for a Menshevik who has lost his mind, will say that these "nonsense in military terms are worth nothing." Modern wars are not decided by weapons alone, and politics is the judge, and in this sense the steps of the German headquarters should not be denigrated. Another question is who was the first to think about this - Moltke or Bethmann; but that these "nonsense" should be pushed

206

[Shi

in order to achieve the goals that imperialist Germany set for herself—of this there is no doubt.

In Vienna, interests were centered around: 1) declaring war on Russia; 2) determining their position towards France and England; 3) clarifying the position of Romania, Bulgaria and Italy; 4) sea trip to the Black Sea.

At about 12 o'clock in the afternoon the official Berchtold Forgacz visited the Chief of the General Staff with a ball to orientate him in the course of the diplomatic life of the past day. Forgach announced that at 12 o'clock on August 6 the declaration of war would be delivered to the Austrian ambassador in St. Petersburg and the Russian ambassador in Vienna, and that hostilities might begin on August 6. As for France, no official declaration of war will be sent to her, but only the ambassador is recalled. They will try to maintain diplomatic relations with England. |

A military agent from Rome reported that the Italian Fleet was concentrated in Brindisi with the aim of sailing to the Adriatic, and the French Fleet was concentrated in Toulon.

With the departure of Forgach, Conrad immediately, at 12:45 noon, wrote a letter to Berchtold, in which, pointing to the alleged break with France, which would undoubtedly entail the opening of hostilities on her part and an attack on the Austrian Navy, he asked "urgently, as far as possible, to avoid declaring war on France, "for the Austrian Navy," is in a critical situation. "Likewise," Nisal Koprad, "we should do the same with England. On the other hand, we must consider, as enemies, storage and English ships, if they appear in our territorial waters.

The "campaign" to the Black Sea continued to excite Vepa, and then Berlin. Requested about the possibility of its implementation by the commander of the Fleet, referring. 1) the lack of coal bases and the impossibility of dragging a large coal caravan, 2) the unfinished mobilization of the Fleet - he considered such an enterprise unfeasible.

Upon learning of this, the Minister of Foreign Affairs immediately reacted to this. letter to the chief of the general staff. Berchtold wrote: "I am uncomfortably shocked by the news that Gaus (Commander of the Fleet — B.Sh.) puts such obstacles to your genial plan. Its execution would be of the greatest importance for the final position of Rumania and Bulgaria, both of which are afraid of the appearance of the Russian Fleet off their coasts. If Odessa had been bombed, Bessarabia would have been free. The governments of both these countries are hesitating and are playing a war game to force us to take certain steps. Gaus, given the difficulties, forgets. that op and in the Adriatic will also be attacked by enemy forces.

Such was the political significance of this "campaign" in the Black Sea, which agitated even such a little receptive person as Berchtold.

The position of the Austrian Navy was also becoming more difficult on the other side. By. On the report of the ambassador from Lopdop, Gray told him that England would not open hostilities against Austria until the latter was at war with Francia. At the same time, a military agent reported from AFhin. that the French and British squadrons in the Mediterranean joined together, with the aim of attacking the Austrian Fleet.

207

ii i

Austria was not yet at war with France, but she was an ally of Germany, whose cruisers, the Goeben and the Breslau, were in a difficult situation in the Mediterranean and could come under the protection of the Austrian Navy or into the territorial waters of the monarchy. Foreseeing this, in a conversation with the head of the naval department, Koprad believed that in such cases the Germans would have to provide assistance.

At 5:15 p.m., a telephonogram was received from the German General Staff, which requested that the Austrian Fleet, in sufficient strength, be sent to the southern part of the Adriatic in order to help the cruisers pass into the Adriatic Sea, the southern entrance to which is threatened by the Maltese squadron of the British.

Konrad requested the opinion of the commander of the fleet, who, pointing to the campaign of the Fleet over a long distance - 580 miles, refused it, advising the German cruisers, using the speed of their course, to get out themselves

from the trap.

The German military agents and naval attaches who visited Konrad tried to convince him of the need for the Austrian squadron to come to the aid of the Goeben, referring to the existing naval convention. However, the chief of staff did not bow to the requests of the allies and refused, pointing out that: 1) the maritime convention was concluded between the three states, and now the Italian Navy has disappeared, that is, the convention itself is collapsing, 2) "Gebepe" aims not a connection with the fleet of the monarchy, but a campaign in Constantinople and 3) only today it became known that the cruisers were in Messina.

We noted above that the campaign interested Berchtold so much that he began to communicate directly with the head of the naval department, bypassing Koprak. It could be said with certainty that the chief of the general staff could not leave this unanswered, considering such an intrusion into the operational leadership abnormal.

"It has happened," Konrad wrote to Berchtold, "that directives of an operational nature are being sent from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, namely, the attitude towards the British about the Goeben, bypassing the headquarters, directly to the naval department.

I take the liberty of drawing your attention to the fact that all such directives must be included in the headquarters to which the Fleet is subject.

The Marine Department, as well as the Commander of the Fleet, is forbidden in such cases to communicate directly with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

As regards the present case, when the German ships are attacked by the English, if this happens in the sight of the Austro-Wepper ships, it is absolutely impossible that the latter should remain mere spectators.

Such behavior would be unethical, not chivalrous, as well as contrary to the existing maritime convention.

Admiral Gaus was given instructions in this spirit.

On the evening of August 5, the Chief of Staff, in a letter to Berchtold, asked that all possible measures be taken to force Bulgaria to oppose Serbia, for the abandonment of the monarchy by Rumania and Italy makes a Bulgarian action urgently necessary.

This is how the chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff ended his day restlessly. Heavy thoughts darkened the forehead of a politician in military uniform...

208

a: aeeewwakweee

AUGUST 6

The delay in declaring war on France at the Foreign Office in Wepe raised doubts about the integrity of allied Germany, which was at war with France. Therefore, on the morning of August 6, an official of Berchtold Goyos visited the Chief of the General Staff, wishing to save him up for an immediate declaration of war on Paris, motivating this by the fact that the Austrian ambassador should be in Paris when allied Germany was already conducting hostilities.

After consulting with his deputy and chief of the operational bureau on the mobilization of the Fleet and coastal fortresses, Konrad at 11:45 a.m. sent an answer to the Minister of Foreign Affairs by letter.

Pointing out that in order to calmly mobilize the Fleet and fortresses, it is necessary to delay the declaration of war on France, since otherwise a strong French Fleet will immediately appear in the Adriatic, Conrad wrote: "If the Austrian ambassador, in a state of war between Germany and France, continues to stay in Paris, the same is happening in Serbia, where the German ambassador is still stationed, although we are already at war with Serbia."

"I leave it to you to judge what to put higher - whether the necessary diplomatic steps to declare war or the combat capability of our Navy."

Noting that the declaration of war on France will lead to a response declaration of war on the monarchy by England, and, consequently, the appearance of the English Fleet in the Adriatic, the chief of staff continues: "The calm mobilization of our Fleet is of essential interest only for us, but for the whole war in general, as well as for Germany."

"I believe that if we explain this in detail to Germany, she will see for herself that there are no substantial grounds for prematurely declaring war on France and England."

"Will Germany declare war on Serbia and Montenegro?" asks Konrad in turn. |

"Finally," he concludes the letter, "I must draw your attention to the fact that the appearance of the Franco-English Fleet in the Adriatic, where its actions will be developed in the direction of Cattaro or Ragusa, would have an extremely harmful effect on our military and political situation in relation to - Shenia of Montenegro."

As for Russia, from 12 o'clock in the afternoon, when the declaration of war followed, Conrad already took it into account, having timely warned the corresponding army commanders about this.

Meanwhile, from Berlin they continued to ask for the assistance of the Fleet to the German cruisers blockaded in Messina by the English fleet, asking when the Austrian squadron would go south for this purpose.

Konrad requested the Fleet Commander, adding: "The operation is politically desirable; whether an operation is possible from a purely military side - it is up to you to decide and report on the decision made. If yes, then go ahead."

Gaus replied: "The operation to assist the" Goeben "is impossible"; after that, the order was sent to Gaus: "Do not perform the operation."

14 The brain of the army. Nn. 3.909

annunciation

Negotiations with Italy did not stop. Berchtold himself came to Konrad to discuss with him the Italian proposals, which consisted in the fact that Italy demanded concessions from the Trient region, without promising for this: speaking on the side of Austria. The minister pointed out that Germany was persuading

willing to make this concession.

"Reject everything," the chief of staff advised decisively, "for this. absolutely impossible."

"What impression would this concession make in Tyrol? Konrad continues. - And if even Romania demands Semigradie? I believe that. Italians need to be told that this issue will be settled after the war!

To Berchtold's remark that they would not agree to this, the chief of staff replied: "I am afraid that if we make this concession, then the following demands will follow. For Trieste, the least of Italy must be demanded to speak on our side.

At this point, the conversation was dug up. Now, in his memoirs, Conrad cites other motives for refusing to agree to the cession of Trieste, namely: 1) Italy sought to get a fortified Austrian nettle without a fight, after which she could freely continue her invasion into the depths of Austria; 2) the concession would have had a bad moral effect on the country and the Tyrolean units, which were a very combat-ready part of the army; 3) German diplomacy, having failed in its Italian policy, now sought to improve its business at the expense of Austria.

In Rumania there was a marked rise in excitement against Austria. Türkiye still: only talked about its mobilization. Bulgaria was waiting for the first success of the Austrian troops. Nakopets, Montenegro On August 5, at about 6 o'clock in the evening, the Austrian envoy gave the order to march on his army. left Cetinje.

On the Russian border, not a single shot was still heard when before. the chief of the general staff had already raised the question of the results of the war © Russia.

At about 7 pm, the all-imperial minister KhFnapsov visited him: Bilinsky is a Pole. Having informed Koprak that on August 7 a meeting of the Council of Ministers would take place regarding the cession of Trieste to Italy, Bilinsky turned to the Polish question, to the need to establish the lines now leading in it in the event of a happy end to the war.

Conrad thought that the future was still rather vague, but his interlocutor continued to develop his views. In his opinion, congressional Poland, i.e., the former "Kingdom of Poland", should go to Austria, the Baltic provinces to Germany, and it would be very bad if all this remained, as before, with Russia.

To the remark of the chief of staff that such an addition to the territory. would entail a change in the constitution of the monarchy itself, Bilipsky replied: "Of course, a change in the constitution! Greater Poland, the Alpine region, etc."

Thus, already before the start of the war, the building of the Habsburg monarchy was destined not only for major repairs, but also for major restructuring, and the result is known to all: it collapsed to the ground...

With this we end our Daily Record.

OOS PI

Cannons were already roaring on the borders of the states of Europe, and the war in most of them was not only actually there, but also legally fixed by the relevant documents.

But is the essence of the documents? If we carried our narrative up to the moment when these documents appeared in life, then we did it only because the bourgeois classes tried to kill the masses according to all the rules of international law, "according to all the legends of antiquity", with the observance of "honesty", as now say the researchers from their ranks. How much this "decency" was needed by the working masses going into battle is another question. There were also skeptics, though not from the camp of neat and sleek diplomats who, like Chief of the General Staff Moltke, considered the fact of declaring war an unnecessary step. But such individuals were isolated and not trusted. The war demanded the crackle and thunder not only of guns and windmills, but also of human speech...

And

ZOO - UDS PIIOOIIIIIOO,

CHAPTER V DEPARTURE OF THE HIGH COMMAND TO THE FRONT

The opening of hostilities and politics. — The nature of Conrad's communications with Berchtold. - The role of Tissa. - Declaration of war on France and England on August 12 in Vienna. "Help the Goeben." - Campaign of the Austrian Navy in the Black Sea. — Persistent pushes To this end by the German Naval Staff and Wilhelm. - Refusal of the campaign in Vienna and the explanation of this by Conrad. - Igalia's demands for the transfer of Trentino to her. — Meeting on 7 August at Conrad's "intimate" circle. — Italy's promises of territorial compensation from France. — Conrad plans the defense of the Italian border and objects to leaving an army corps there. - Conrad's conversation with an Austrian diplomat leaving for Rome. - Tissa asks to show "German helmets" at the Italian border. Wilhelm advises to cede Trentino to Italy. - Moltke is also for a concession and settlement with Italy in the future. — Konrad is resolutely against any concessions to the Italians. Romanian fluctuations. — The advances of the Romanian General Staff and the answer of Conrad. — His diplomatic instruction to Bucharest. - Conrad's calculations for Bulgaria and the discrepancy in this with Berlin. — Conrad's threats to Bulgaria. — His conversation on August 14 with a Bulgarian military agent. — Loneliness of Germany and Austria. — Polish question. - Wilhelm Vienna's advice on the development of revolutionary propaganda. — Conrad's correspondence with Moltke. — Letter to Moltke dated 5 August. - A difficult war and the need to pass through Belgium. "The solution is on land, but the war will cost the German Navy. "Mobilization goes like clockwork." - Moltke's advice to Konrad to concentrate forces against Russia and defeat her in the Pripyat swamps. - Dog Italy. — Conrad's reply on 10 August. - "While we are all boiling." — Letter from Conrad to Moltke, dated August 8, for help against Italy. - Reply to August Moltke. — Moltke proposes that Italy be "covered up." Germany cannot help with troops. — Moltke's promises to induce Bulgaria to take action against Serbia. - "You can't be a doctrinaire", you need to save allies. - Took Conrad away on August 13th. — Vienna is resolutely against concessions to Italy. — Austria sends help to Germany with artillery. — Fluctuations of Romania. - Conrad's proposal to hit the USH with the German army in the direction of Sedlec. - "Hard times". - Conrad's departure on August 15 to Przemyśl. — Departure of Moltke on 16 August for Koblenz.

- Attack "Liege and Wilhelm. - August 10 Falkenhayn agrees to replace Moltke. - August 14 departure of the Russian headquarters in Baranovichi.

War is a means of politics, and with the opening of hostilities, politics does not stop, but has its continuation in the very course of the war. True, such an understanding of the relationship between politics and strategy was not fully grasped before the war of 1914: it was believed that with the declaration of war in the relations of the warring states, "the pen is replaced by the sword." If we adhere to such a narrow interpretation of the interaction between politics and strategy, then on August 6 we could end our story about the joint work of diplomacy and the General Staff.

We do not stop at such milestones and should have introduced the reader into the history of the entire world war. However, this would lead us very

212

ZINOVYEV

far. We have set ourselves the task of tracing the interaction of politics and strategy during the years of peace, and therefore we are forced to interrupt our story and dig it up on the day of departure of the headquarters of the Habsburg monarchy in the theater of operations.

We consider it our duty to once again warn the reader of our work that the day we have chosen does not at all mark a break in the joint work of politics and strategy in achieving the goals of the war, but is accepted by us only as a conditional line that has broken direct contact in this work.

Before leaving for the theater of operations, the chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff was in the closest personal contact both with Berchtold himself and with other officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There was hardly a day when Konrad did not visit Berchtold or, on the contrary, the latter did not visit him. But such personal conversations of these two "men" of the monarchy were accompanied by correspondence, which was conducted, mainly, by Koprak for motives already known to us: in an effort to leave a trace of the views expressed by him in history. It should be noted that the military storm forced the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to listen more attentively to the wishes of the Chief of the General Staff, and made him insistent in his demands.

The presence at the head of the Hungarian government of such a decisive and imperious figure as Tissa complicated the position of the chief of staff, for Tissa considered it necessary to get close to the questions of the war and gave one or another advice related to military measures, which we will discuss below.

If on August 6 the question of declaring war on Russia was finished, the date of declaring war on France and England continued to preoccupy the Chief of the General Staff. We heard the motives for this in his letter and will not repeat here. Following Conrad's advice, Berchtold did not aggravate diplomatic relations with France, but the very course of events led to this. On the one hand, the ambassador from Berlin reported that the chancellor had agreed to the delay in declaring war on Paris, but he believed that such a thing should still follow after the mobilization of the fleet, that is, no later than August 19th. On the other hand, already on August 8, the ambassador reported from Paris that the French government, allegedly informed from reliable sources, of the transfer of an Austrian army to the French border

army corps, strongly protested against such actions of Vienna, which was not at war with France.

Konrad immediately informed Berchtold that the news of Paris was false: the corps were sent to the Russian Front, and at the request of Moltke, only A heavy 30.5 cm howitzer batteries were allocated to the Khrappus Front, which were completing their mobilization and would be ready for dispatch only on August 6.

On the same day, Berchtold gave an assurance to Paris that the information about the dispatch of Austrian troops to the French Front was not true. However, on August 10, the refutation of the second request of the French had to be repeated again.

On the same day, August 10, the Austrian ambassador, at the suggestion of the French government, left Paris. At the same time, Paris recalled its ambassador from Vienna.

213

BY AIOIIIIIOYON - UAS - MOIIIIIIIOIIINNNIONINIO

On the night of August 12-13, a declaration of war between England and France was published in Vienna.

Thus, we. We must note that the Chief of the General Staff succeeded in delaying the legal declaration of war for 10 days and allowing this period for a calm mobilization of the Fleet.

The latter, along with this, had to think: 1) about helping the "Goeben" and 2) about a campaign in the Black Sea.

At about 9 o'clock in the morning on August 7, Conrad received a message from the commander of the Flot that the Goeben had broken through the blockade of the English squadron and was heading for the southern part of the Adriatic Sea. The commander of the fleet with the 1st division of dreadnoughts and cruisers went out to meet him in order to take the German cruiser under protection within the territorial waters of Austria. At about 1 o'clock in the afternoon the second news came that the "Goeben" was leaving safely for Constantinople.

Reporting this, the German naval headquarters believed that it would be highly valuable from the political and military side if the Goeben were followed to the Dardanelles and the entire Austrian Navy.

Berchtold, who visited Konrad, announced that Turkey agreed to allow Austrian ships to enter the Black Sea, which in turn was communicated to Gaus by Koprad.

The success of the Goeben and Breslau expedition for Berlin was proof that such an operation was feasible for the Austrian fleet as well.

In his reports of August 8 and 9, Konrad, the representative of Austria at the German headquarters, Stürgk, reported that in a conversation with him, Wilhelm, talking about a campaign in the Black Sea, said: "The Austro-Hungarian Fleet, regardless of whether it was mobilized or no, he was supposed to immediately sail to Kopstantinopol and through the Bosphorus to the Black Sea; find the Russian Fleet and destroy it; take Odessa together with the German cruisers; sow panic in southern Russia and, in this way, facilitate the landing of Turkish troops. Nobody threatens our coastal fortresses in the Adriatic Sea and the time for such an operation is the most favorable."

Berlan's pressure continued. On August 12, the chief of the naval department was visited by the chief of the general staff, together with a representative of the German naval headquarters, who again began to prove, referring to the opinion of the German leading circles, the need for the Fleet to go to the Black Sea.

"Admiral Gaus rejects this," replied Koprad, "I, as a specialist in naval matters, cannot say anything else." At the same time, the chief of staff drew the attention of his interlocutors that Italy was very unkind. The hope and withdrawal of the Austrian Navy from the Adriatic would be dangerous for the monarchs. The interlocutors proposed a compromise - to send only part of the Fleet to the Black Sea, to which Konrad replied: "His commander does not agree to the fragmentation of the Fleet. Personally, I am convinced that even a weak Fleet would be enough to paralyze the Russian Fleet. The representative of the German Naval Staff also found that for operations against the Russian Fleet it would be enough to give the Goeben a couple of good Austrian cruisers. As a summary of the conversation, Konrad promised to ask Gaus again.

As is known, the Austrian Fleet did not go to the Black Sea, and to all the regrets about the mouth, the Chief of the General Staff had only one answer:

214

SEE, UKS BEER

"Gaus is not ready. What can I do with the Fleet if it doesn't consider itself ready!?".

This, of course, is not the place to go into a detailed analysis of the feasibility of such an operation and its benefits for the middle powers. If we recall Danilov's judgment, quoted by us, about the possibility of such an operation and its significance for Russia, then, perhaps, we must agree with the persistence of Berlin, who proved the expediency of the campaign and all the disadvantages of leaving the Fleet in the Adriatic. Until the end of the war, the Austrian Navy did not play a special role even at sea and then perished along with the Habsburg monarchy. And the Fleet was not bad! We do not want to conclude that it is not always useful to blindly listen to a specialist such as Gaus was. Let us only recall that even Kuzma Prutkov warned that "a specialist is like Flux, because he is one-sided." But this advice was disobeyed not only by Konrad, but by all the chiefs of the general staff, for Flux, in the form of the Fleet, was a malignant abscess on the armed forces of many states that entered the world war.

Italy's demand for the transfer of the Trient region to her greatly worried the chief of the general staff. The "intimate circle" of the General Staff, which gathered with him on August 7 (deputy head of the headquarters, heads of the operational and intelligence bureaus), came to the conclusion that if you made a concession to the Italians, then only for their active support of the tripartite alliance, meaning after a successful war take away all that is now given.

Information from Rome spoke of growing excitement against Austria, of the expansion of the mobilization of the army and Navy, and of the offer by France to Italy of half of Tunisia, Trient, Trieste and Dalmatia, if only Italy would take the side of the tripartite agreement.

The chief of staff now took into account all sorts of surprises on the part of

Italy, as he wrote on August 8 to Berchtold, and decided to organize a defense against it, completely diverting the main forces from the Russian theater of operations. The forces were to be taken at the expense of the Landsturm, and then Konrad turned to General Moltke for help.

Konrad refused all Berchtold's proposals to leave one of the field corps on the Italian frontier.

On August 12, an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was going to intercede for the ill ambassador in Rome, visited Konrad and asked him to avoid everything that could cause an action by Italy, and, in particular, to take special military measures on the frontier. Konrad did not agree with the latter, firmly stating that it was impossible to leave the border defenseless, and that appropriate measures would be taken.

"Can I say in Rome," the diplomat asked, "that we will withdraw all our forces from the Tyrol?" -

"No," replied the chief of staff, "you don't say that. Wait until the Germans have solved the operation against Frappia, then the Italians will have to think about the formation of a Front against Germany. Tell the Italians that if they oppose us, then Germany will oppose them on our side."

Tisza also counted heavily on Germany's help, who, in a letter to Konrad dated August 10, believed that Germany's allied honor should

215

a] dYajuzhshui<_____

force her to show "German helmets" on the border with Italy, and asked Moltke to fill this issue.

How Moltke himself felt about this, we will hear from the following correspondence between him and Konrad. As for the Berlin diplomats and Wilhelm himself, they had previously advised Vienna to make concessions to Italy in this. In a conversation with a representative of the monarchy on August 8, Wilhelm spoke again for the return of Trient, and Moltke said that the Austrians "would have done the best if they had covered the rear at the cost of Trient." "At the end of the war with Russia, the Austrians could challenge Italy to a duel, and Germany in this case would be on the side of the monarchy." The duel, apparently, would be rather peculiar.

How

Responding to this report in Berlin on August 11, the chief of staff wrote: "We have nothing to think about the voluntary transfer of the region to Italy; this would not be of much use either, since our opponents offer Italy not only South Tyrol, Trieste, Istria and Dalmatia, but even part of Tunisia; we cannot enter into this competition; moreover, such a concession would only show the enemies the weakness of the monarchy."

"If Italy comes out against us, then she will meet, it is true, unorganized, but worthy resistance, because we will not retreat before an important goal in the north."

Knowing that Berlin was most afraid of Vienna dispersing its forces and leaving the rear of the Germans open, Konrad wrote that, taking on the task, Austria would fulfill it unconditionally, without vouching, of course, for final success.

The last days before leaving for the Front, the Chief of the General Staff paid great attention to the organization of the defense against Italy, which was also approved by Frann-Josich on August 15.

Another ally, heavily counted on in Berlin and Vienna, Romania, continued to be in a state of vacillation. Neither Moltke nor the Chief of the Austrian General Staff lost hope for her performance. The reports from Bucharest showed no definite delay on the part of the Rumanian government and spoke of a massive newspaper campaign launched in the country by the Triple Entente Powers against Germany and Austria. Konrad considered it his duty in a letter to Berchtold dated August 11 to point to the mouth and ask that the same measures be taken on the Austrian side. |

On August 7, a military agent from Bucharest reported that the Romanian king was hesitant and was waiting for the first victory of the Austro-German arms or the first border conflict with Russia in order to speak. The king asked where the right wing of the Austrian armies would advance.

The chief of staff ordered to answer: "If participation in the war of Romania is ensured, then it is necessary to send a Romanian officer of the general staff to Vienna, where he will be oriented."

On August 9, a military agent from Bucharest informed Conrad that he was the chief of the Romanian general staff. asks: is it acceptable for Vepa to deploy the Romanians on the Iasi-Botosani timeline.

"Quite acceptable," Konrad replied at once. "It is necessary to send an officer of the Romanian General Staff to Vienna. Does Romy want

216

yy dd

does she want to grow up on the side of Germanip and Austria-Hungary, does she want to be a vassal of Russia? Put this question in leading circles. Romania must make a decision quickly."

Such was the directive of a purely diplomatic nature to the military agent in Bucharest, sent without the consent of Berchtold, with the hope that Rumania would finally decide to go to war.

In Bucharest, the council of ministers was constantly sitting, without making a definite decision, because there was no confidence in the loyalty of the new Bulgaria. at

In addition, in Romania they were greatly afraid of the Russian offensive through. Moldova, and by August 15 in Vienna it turned out that the head of the Romanian. The General Staff expects to concentrate the army in northern Moldavia only on the 20th day. |

Clever Austrian staff in Constantinople Pallavicini believed that. Romania will remain neutral for the time being.

No luck with Bulgaria either. This strap was in the same swing as Romania. On the one hand, it was tempting to oppose Serbia, but on the other hand, there was no certainty in the victory of the middle states, and there was fear of retribution if Bulgaria accepted

participation in the war on their side.

Berlin also hoped to draw Bulgaria into the war, but use it. it is not against the Serbs, but in the main theater together with Turkey against. Russia.

Having learned on August 9 from a German military agent about such assumptions. Moltke, Chief of the Austrian General Staff sounded the alarm. First of all, he asked the agent to telegraph to Berlin that "it is urgent: it is necessary to send a Bulgarian strike from Zaichar and Pirot to Kraguevap."

He himself immediately telegraphed to Moltke: "I ask for the most energetic influence on Bulgaria, so that she first of all launches a strong blow from the Zaichar-Pirot line on Kragujevac and Aranjelavac."

A similar telegram was sent to the Austrian military agent in Sofia, adding that this blow was more important than joint actions with Rumania and Turkey.

In the need for a quick and decisive offensive by the Bulgarians against Serbia, Konrad also convinced the Bulgarian military agent who visited him.

However, Bulgaria approached this issue with caution, and on August 11, the Austrian ambassador reported from Sofia that they expected a quick offensive by the Austro-Hungarian troops against Serbia, as well as a decision in the French theater of operations. As long as Serbia is not weakened, do not come to count on the intervention of the Bulgarians.

Having received this report from the ambassador from Berchtold, Konrad wrote to the minister on August 12: "I ask you to tell Bulgaria: 1) now is the most favorable moment for all time to get rid of Serbia; 2) if this does not happen now, then one can foresee the inheritance of a powerful Serbia; 3) if Bulgaria now comes out immediately together with the pami, then after success, it can count on a significant reward; 4) if she

217

... /y/ dd...

he will not do this, then let him know that we will not lift a finger for Bulgaria.

We need to decide quickly."

We do not know whether these categorical demands were communicated by Berchtold to Sofia, but we know that hesitations continued there, intensified by August 14 by the demand presented by Russia to Bulgaria: to reveal their Physical Ponomy - to observe neutrality and, in the event of Turtspi speaking out, to turn with weapons "against her. Petersburg promised support and territorial increments in the future, or, otherwise, threatened to deal with this "vassal" later (as Konrad regarded the position of Bulgaria in this case).

The result of such alarms in Sokhia was the appearance on 14 August of the chief of the Austrian General Staff of a Bulgarian military agent.

"Last time you were with me with the intention of asking if we would

march against Serbia," Conrad told the visitor. - I answered you that you, as a soldier, should know that you should not speak about this ahead of time. But now I say that our offensive against Serbia has slowed down."

"May I," the military agent asked, "telegraph this to the Chief of Staff?"

"Yes," Conrad replied. - If Bulgaria does not make decisions quickly, then it will be more difficult for the ego, because at the present time is the most favorable moment to deal with Serbia. Our interests are in the Adriatic Sea, yours are in the Aegean, and I cannot imagine that there would be any other state between us. If you! don't go fast, you'll be late. We are already far ahead."

It seemed that Conrad's efforts would be crowned with success, but the very next day Challavachini, known to us, reported that both Romania and Turkey, Bulgaria and Greece decided not to act until the success of one or another of the hostile groups was determined.

So hope was gradually lost. The chief of the general staff undertook the Balkans on the side of the powers of the triple alliance, which had now turned into a dual one.

In the face of enemies, Germany and Austria remained alone, the struggle became difficult, and meanwhile, in carefree Vepe, they dreamed of the victorious results of the war.

We reported above that the general imperial minister, Finapsov, had already developed before the chief of the general staff his views on changing the constitution of Austria-Hungary, caused by the Polish question.

This question was already starting to make demands.

On August 12, a meeting was held at Berchtold's, consisting of Bilineky, Leo (chairman of the Polish club) and Konrad on the question of the future borders of Poland and Ukraine, and a proposal was made to make Ukraine independent with an eastern border along the river. Goryn.

Konrad felt it was not timely for such talk, and he remarked to the assembled: "We should wait until we get Poland."

To this Bilinsky objected that he should already now for the public

218

RR [shi

to make a definite decision, which would be important for the Formation

Polish legions.

The meeting touched upon the delimitation of spheres of influence and administration in Poland between Austria and Germany, and civil administration should be entirely in the hands of Austria.

The chief of staff, not calmed down, objected: "If this can be achieved with Germany, then I welcome, but, however, first of all, there are still Russians in Poland."

This did not discourage the meetings, but the conversation turned to changes in the future constitution of the monarchy. Koprad pointed out that no matter what changes take place, the armed forces must be united. Bilinsky, on the other hand, put forward the need for the formation of a new Polish landwehr.

"I can only express my regrets," Konrad answered briskly. "Another War Ministry more! Chaos"

Later, in his memoirs, Konrad wrote: "I have always been distrustful of the Polish revival," and the very way the Polish patriots, who worked for this purpose in different camps, only aggravated these thoughts of the chief of the general staff.

As for the requirements for the formation of Polish legions, Konrad sees in them jealousy for the Ukrainian legion formed by Austria. All these legions were always small in number, although Landsturmists were sent to them. As a rule, they fought well in a small war, left much to be desired in terms of discipline, and played an exclusively political role.

Such are the opinions of the chief of the Austrian staff about the core of the real Polish army.

On August 14, Goyos appeared from Berchtold to Konrad and conveyed that it had been decided not to form any Polish legions, but to send Polish volunteers to lapdshturmy. However, after some time these legions were created.

Above, it was pointed out that Berlin continued to put pressure on Vienna in repudiation of the cession of border areas to Italy, the search for the Fleet in the Black Sea and the concentration of all military efforts of the monarchy against Russia.

Wilhelm himself gave this or that advice to the representatives of the monarchy in Berlin. On August 8, the military representative of the Habsburgs under Wilhelm reported that in a conversation with him the Kaiser had raised the issue of revolutionary propaganda. Wilhelm advised, similar to the measures taken in Berlin and Austria, to widely develop activities for the revolutionization of Poland and Ukraine, using proclamations, emissaries and a large amount of money.

Now we will allow the attention of the reader of our work to be stopped by the intimate correspondence of the two chiefs of the general staffs of the allied armies, which continued until their departure for the theater of operations. In fact, both comrades-in-arms summed up their past work, which led to the world fire.

We know that Zee on August 3, the peak of the Austro-Hungarian general

219

Headquarters sent two letters to Moltke, to which the latter replied on 5 August. The letter was delivered to Konrad on August 9 by the German military agent.

Giving thanks for the letters and sent cards for the pilots. Moltke wrote: "Your assurance that Austria-Hungary will conduct the war in complete unity with its ally only confirms my previous opinion about. This is something I never doubted."

"The war became difficult for us when England took the side of the assassins and the Russian knout. However, with the help of God, we will be able to carry it out successfully. Our advance in Belgium, of course, is cruel, but it is vital for us, and whoever once embarked on this road must bear the consequences.

Pointing out that for a quick decision against France it was impossible: to attack the fortresses, but it was necessary to bypass them, Moltke says that for this purpose the movement through Belgium was adopted with the attack of Liège. There are also favorable news from the Russian Front: the Russians are retreating and, it seems, purge all of Russian Poland.

"This war," continued the chief of the German General Staff, "which has engulfed almost all of Europe in fire, will in all likelihood cost us our fleet, but its solution will be blown on land. Our mood. the people are upbeat. Everyone knows that the question is about the existence of Germany, and for this he is ready to bring everything that only he has. The whole country—men, women, and children—are mobilized. Against perfidious Russia. Strong anger. "Our mobilization is going like clockwork." So far, there has not been a single request from the field. As soon as concentration ends happily, battles will follow that will be decisive in the course of the history of this century. It gives me joy to be in this struggle hand in hand with you.

This letter was followed by three postscripts, in which Moltke spoke: 1) about the treachery of Italy, and Moltke hoped that after the victory Austria would settle accounts with this state; 2) about the possible support by Romania of the German policy and about her fears of a premature Russian offensive; Romania frees the Bulgarians for action against the Serbs and makes it possible to save part of the Austrian forces; 3) that, in all likelihood, Turkey will declare war on Russia in the coming days, and then it is desirable to involve it, with the main forces, in actions in the European theater.

In a word, hope! The use of the Balkans inspired the Chief of the German General Staff no less than Conrad himself, and he advised the latter:

"Concentrate all your forces against Russia. "Dog Italy" will not dare to fall on you from the rear. Let the Bulgarians fight the Serbs and give the freedom to this bastard to destroy each other. Now there can only be one goal: Russia!! Drive this executioner into the Pripyat swamps and drown him there."

As can be seen, embitterment was also characteristic of the calm Moltke, and not only of Wilhelm alone. Both Berlin bullies were not shy in expressing themselves not only about their enemies, but even about future allies.

220

and I...

True, the latter had hardly a more flattering opinion of their masters on the banks of the Spree.

On August 10, Konrad replied to Moltke, beginning his letter with gratitude for receiving the same from the Chief of the German General Staff and "indicating that the latter's views fully correspond to those of

Conrad.

The solution for Austria must be on the Russian front, where the main forces are concentrated for this. But in the Balkans it is necessary to achieve rapid success, and this could be if Bulgaria immediately entered the war. However, according to Conrad, she hesitates and leaves Austria-Hungary alone to "pull the chestnuts out of the fire." Conrad came to the conclusion that there was no "husband" in the mouth country who would make a firm decision. Italy will not divert forces from the Russian theater, and second-line troops are left against her.

"It is clear to us that this war, together with Germany, is a war not on the stomach, but to the death. Everything is in full swing with us, God forbid to jinx it. We hope it will continue to be the same."

Prior to this letter to Moltke on August 10, the Chief of the Austrian General Staff was forced on August 8 to write to Berlin with a letter to his friend about helping troops against Italy, and then about diplomatic pressure on that country so that it would at least remain neutral.

On August 9, Moltke replied to this letter to Konrad, and the answer was received in Vienna only on August 12.

Outraged by the treachery of Italy, Moltke nevertheless advised nothing more than to "smear the mouth of this hungry predatory beast." In the opinion of the Chief of the German General Staff, Austria cannot fight on two fronts, and first it is necessary to achieve success against Russia, and then "to settle scores with Italy." Berlin is trying to influence Rome, but this "beast" wants to "eat", and what the results will be, it's hard to say.

"Dear friend," Moltke wrote, "we ourselves are in a very difficult position against four enemies, and therefore are not in a position to provide assistance with troops, even though we would like to. We have used human resources to the extreme and are already relying on the Landsturm. We must reach a solution in the West, for this is a matter of life for us. You yourselves know how much I would gladly help you, but nothing comes of it."

Referring to Konrad's desire that Berlin should induce Bulgaria to act, the chief of the German General Staff pointed out that "he has no way to mouth, but he will make a proposal to the Foreign Office: Bulgaria should immediately move against Serbia and thereby effectively liberate Austria". The use of the Bulgarians against the Russians, according to Moltke, is not feasible, since Romania will not agree to this. Greece is unlikely to come out on the side of Serbian. Turkey must make it clear to Greece that she will not touch her as long as Greece remains neutral. In Romania, the mood is improving, "Austria must do everything to keep this very useful ally" and, above all, improve relations with the Romanians in Hungary. "In such

221

R.

times, - wrote Moltke, - such as we are now experiencing, one cannot be a doctrinaire and it is necessary to use every means in order to preserve allies."

Reporting on the progress in Russian and French chronicle, Moltke

ended the letter with a "thousand thanks" for sending the heavy artillery.

The next day, August 13, the head of the Austrian general. Headquarters replied to Moltke, thanking him for the letter and congratulating him on his success. on the fronts.

Then Conrad "allows himself. briefly discuss the issues raised in the letter.

Italy. Conrad is not sure how far the impudence of this state will go, and therefore one has to be ready for anything. But he anticipates that. in Austria, no one, starting with Franz-Joseph himself, thinks it possible to buy Italy by ceding the border regions, and Conrad himself considers such actions, as they would show the weakness of Austria, even harmful. Recalling that Austria is concentrating the main forces against Russia, and against Italy takes only such measures that would not turn her performance into an easy walk, Conrad points out that if you do not have to rely on the help of German troops, then he also considers the solidarity of Austria and Germany in the speech against Italy, and the monarchy proved this solidarity by sending howitzer batteries to the Kharpuz Front. The Berlin friend received a good hint of a refusal of real help.

Bulgaria. It goes without saying that Austria has long been trying to induce Bulgaria to move against Serbia, and if Conrad turned to Berlin for assistance, it was only in the hope that Berlin's influence would be more significant in Sofia. There they hesitate in choosing between Austria-Hungary and Russia. Arguments that Bulgaria does not act because the Austrians! they do not march in Serbia, they are completely unfounded, since (Konrad. reported this strictly confidentially) the Austrian troops had already invaded Serbia. and are fighting successfully.

Romania is going through a moment of great importance: whether to be a civilized state, acting together with Austria and Germany, or to become a vassal of Russia. Rumania hesitates, but if she wants to come out on the side of the tripartite alliance, she must declare this and concentrate on it. his army in northern Moldova. Influence in this sense of Germany would be very desirable. "We are taking all measures, as well as in Hungary, so as not to excite the Romanians."

Turkey. The mobilization and concentration of the Turkish army, it seemed, should have been faster, just as it was assumed in the past. Turkey's action would be chain only when it would follow quickly in order to force the Russians to devote part of the troops against the Turks. It is highly desirable that Turkey declare war on Egypt as soon as possible and close the Suez Canal.

Italy. Does Italy intend to allow the appearance on the Continent of 6 English divisions without a naval battle? It was good to sink transports with these troops.

322

itp ii no. ii ppiiiiniya

Russia. At the present time, the advanced Russian units that have crossed the border are driven back, and, conversely, the Austrian units are on enemy territory. However, in the rear, Russia is concentrating significant masses.

Konrad believes that the Russians are deploying: one strong army in Podolia .. east of the 3bruch, against which the Romanians should have acted; the central group in the Dubno region; a group between the Bug and Viskha and in the rear - a strong group near Brest.

Further pointing out that during the offensive of the Austrians to the east of the Vistula, a strike by the German army and Sedle is desirable, Konrad says that the success of this offensive also lies in the success of covering the rear of Germany during its offensive against France and England.

"A difficult time," Konrad concludes the letter, "but we will get through it in close unity."

This is how the chief of the Austrian General Staff summed up the military situation in a letter to his colleague.

Despite Berlin's refusal to help troops on the Italian highway, Conrad still on August 15 again telegraphed to Moltke about this if Italy came out actively,

We stopped the reader's attention on these last pages of the novel. two chiefs of staff, but in the future, friends exchanged only - telegram, and a month later one of them left the service, having tested. the bitterness of failure in the fields of Marpa.

On August 15, the Chief of the Austrian General Staff came with the last report to Franco-Josich, during which they approved: measures for the defense of the Italian border and ordered to avoid everything that could push Italy into action.

Entering his office at the headquarters for the last time, Conrad. went to hang out with his relatives, and then, by the time, went to the station, where a special convoy was already standing ready to be sent to Przemyśl.

rates.

"After the arrival of the commander-in-chief," Konrad writes in his memoirs, "everyone settled down. There was a solemn silence ... "

"We, who were in high positions of leadership, knew very well that we were going not to the" easy, pleasure war ", but to the last one. decisive battle for the power and existence of the old monarchy. We were serious and with unwavering determination."

"At 2 hours 22 minutes 1 am the rate train departed from the northern station."

We will not follow the train that was taking the Chief of the Austrian General Staff to the east, but rather transfer to Berlip, where also at that time a train was standing at the station ready to leave for the western theater of military operations at the German headquarters.

On August 16, at 7:55 am, the high command of the German armies left Berlin for Koblenz.

"In Koblevents," Quartermaster General Stein writes in his memoirs, "we settled in a hotel opposite which there was an inscription saying that old Moltke lived there in 1870. His nephew took it as a good omen."

From the lips of the "nephew peak" himself, we also heard that mobplizadia shv

22\$

and nk -{-(

' the concentration of the German armies proceeded quite according to plan, and the chief of staff was calm about this part of his work. The other is the political area, where he had to experience more than one bitter moment of disappointment and join the struggle. From Moltke's memoirs we know of his first encounter with Wilhelm about the existing hopes for British neutrality and how strongly this had an effect on the nervous system of the Chief of the General Staff.

Fate prepared new trials for him.

"The attack of Liège," writes Moltke, "was scheduled for August 5th. On the evening of that day, a report came from there that the operation had failed. In any case, our troops failed to penetrate the city. I reported this to the Kaiser. He told me, "That's what I assumed. By speaking out against Belgium, they put the war with England on my neck. When in the next few days information was received about the capture of the city by the Pamy, I was kissed.

Wilhelm's disillusionment with England's "neutrality" was so great that the chief of the general staff, whom the Kaiser considered the main culprit, had to again experience the disfavor of the supreme leader of the army. If we take into account the Junker psychology of Moltke, it will become clear that no matter how Wilhelm kissed him later, on August 6, his nervous system experienced a second shock, which did not bode well, no matter in which building in the theater of military operations the famous uncle's atlemian was placed. |

The "History" of the state archive says: "The mental upheavals that the general (Moltke - B.Sh.) experienced in the days before and during the mobilization had, in any case, from the very beginning a harmful effect on his health. At the beginning of the war he was 66 years old.

Apparently, the state of health of the chief of the general staff, even before leaving for Koblenz, attracted the attention of the leading military circles of Berlin, because, as Zweil testifies in a book known to us, the following entry appears in Falkengine's diary under August 10: "Linker (head of Wilhelm's military cabinet - V Sh.) thought he had reason to ask me if Moltke refused, whether I would accept his post. Naturally, I could only answer yes.

Thus, on August 10, a successor to the unlucky "nephew" was ready, who a month later replaced him as chief of the general staff.

The crisis of the German General Staff began even before the departure from Berlin ...

A few days earlier, namely, on August 14 at 11 o'clock in the evening, 0 station New Petergokh, the Russian headquarters left for Baranovichi.

"It was a wonderful, still quite summer evening," writes Danilov. "Gradually, departing people and those who were seeing them off began to gather at the station. There were few of the latter - only the closest ones ... After a short prayer, everyone began to silently say goodbye and disperse to the places assigned to each on the train. Another minute, and the train quietly, noiselessly began to depart at a deep

the solemn silence of the mourners. In the darkness on the landing stage, we could see from the cars the raised hands of those who remained,

994

Pinan x NIE making the sign of the cross after the departing train. Everyone on this train was probably thinking about what lies ahead for our homeland and what his personal return will be! .. And is everyone destined to return to the abandoned capital to peaceful living conditions! .. "

With different moods, people departed who considered themselves the creators of history, but turned out, in reality, to playthings in the hands of the ruling and striving to expand their power, greedy capitalism.

The chief of the German general staff left with a shattered soul, his comrade-in-arms Konrad rode with firmness of spirit and thought, and with the usual "priestly Orthodoxy" the Russian general staff went to the arena of the world struggle.

All three "brains of the army" experienced the blows of the struggle and, unable to cope with the tasks set by it within the framework of the struggle of states, and not just armies, ended it with a paralyzed state, and then death.

Chill emanates from the pages of our "novel" that the reader has just read, and we regret that we seduced him into conversations with the dead, with people of the past, the gloomy and difficult past ... The fate of the singer of bitterness and sadness that we have loaded on our shoulders. Only the realization that in the cruel blows of history we will draw enormous benefits for a new life, forced us to take on this task ...

15 The brain of the army. Nn. 3.

POOEEEEIIIIAIOINNII W PI

CHAPTER V FOREIGN POLICY AND WAR

The value of the experience of the imperialist war. — The value of theory for criticism. - Clausewitz - "specialist". — Clausewitz's theory of foreign policy and war. - Deviations Moltke: (senior). - Perversion of Moltke (senior) Clausewitz. - "Spirit of war". — Followers of Moltke. — Konrad on foreign policy and war. — The line of political behavior of Conrad. — Establishing policy objectives and the basis for this. — The romanticism of the general staffs and the real views of diplomats on the politics of European states. — The role of the General Staff in setting political goals. — The nature of politics` and its influence on the war. — The nature of politics according to Conrad. — Imperialism and the nature of its policy. — National policy. - The General Staff and diplomats before. world war. — Defense policy. - Diplomatic success. — Imperialism as defined by Lenin; against the theory of "ultra-imperialism". - The essence of war as a socio-political phenomenon. — Military success and its significance. — The extent of the war. — Fear of war. - Responsibility for the war. — The justice of war. — Classification of wars (offensive and defensive. — Mering and Lenin on just, defensive war. — World war from the point of view of justice. — Revolutionary war. — Preventive war. — War and International Law — Disappearance: Wars.

In the preceding chapters, we have unfolded before the reader a historical

outline of events on the threshold of world war. We are aware that the canvas is not complete enough, there are still many documents that not only have not been used, but have not yet been published at all, but lie in the state archives of the warring parties or in the personal archives of individual participants in the events. Finally, not all the participants yet told us sincerely about their moods and thoughts, with which they were seized in the whirlpool of the impending military storm.

It would seem that it is still impossible to draw any conclusions about those historic days which we have tried to describe in more or less detail. However, we think that such a conclusion would be erroneous, because we consider the use of the experiment closest to us in time to be the most penetrating. nym for current life. We have never set ourselves any other goals in our literary activity.

Every military figure is well aware that the situation is never clear and one always has to reckon with the unknown. But this circumstance does not stop a single military man from making a decision. In the same way, on the literary field, darkness often surrounds the one who stepped on it, and the more this field is plowed, the closer it is. to the virgin lands, the more difficulties one has to face in its development. However, such work does not mean, ultimately, failure.

226

for a certain amount of experience and providence make it possible, even in the darkness of the night, to see the surrounding objects more or less clearly.

If we consider that at the present time it is still impossible to base our judgments on the experience of the imperialist war, then it becomes completely incomprehensible to us how, for example, Clausewitz could build his theory of the war on the experience of the Napoleonic era. Meanwhile, such a theory was created by this head, and is so exhaustive that it has not lost its value to this day. By no means do we want to compare ourselves with a PHILOSOPHER OF WAR, and if we gave this example, it was only as proof that the path to understanding war on the basis of the experience of not so long ago days is not reserved even for a modern researcher.

In fact, the historical material given in the previous chapters is so vivid that we could stop our pen, leaving the reader to make his own judgment about the war and foreign policy. Thus, we will advise the one who decides to do this, hoping that he will find one or another historical Fact to confirm all the questions that have arisen in him.

If we decide to continue our narrative, it is for the sole purpose of sharing our thoughts with the General Headquarters and diplomacy, without considering them binding on anyone. Those who are interested may read them, but for those for whom they are superfluous, we advise you to close the book and figure out for yourself the history of Europe on the threshold of a world war.

We would like to draw attention to the use of theoretical propositions in the critical analysis of historical examples. We have heard opinions that our first book is overloaded with statutes, and a wish has been expressed that we ourselves should abandon the theory of this or that question, without reference or reference to this or that classic of military or political thought in general.

However, "without a reasonable theory, criticism cannot in any way be completely satisfactory and instructive," Clausewitz rightly says and points out, "that criticism sees in the conclusions of theory not norms and principles, & to support its judgments; they have exactly the same meaning for the practical worker.

The theoretical propositions of these or other classics are by no means rules and laws for us, and we do not intend to blindly bow before them, but use them only as a basis for our thoughts, being ready to criticize them too, if historical objectivity so requires.

Thus, we consider it necessary in this book to introduce the reader to the theory of one or another issue that we touch upon,

Here again we will turn to the theory of Clausewitz and, lest it seem strange, we consider it necessary to warn in advance about our path. We are prompted to this end by the method of presenting the theory by this mighty "Philosopher" of war, which is close to a monistic understanding of war. We can be accused of "childish" attachment to Clausewitz, of abusing his thoughts, which for our time are considered by some to be far from conclusive. In our military literature we had to meet. judgments about Clausewitz, as © "special" - with all

227

OO, AS POS

days for the first denomination of conclusions. We by no means want to ascribe to the PHILOSOPHER of WAR contemporary concepts of military phenomena and the method of developing them, but we must, in all fairness, note that his ideas have not lost their freshness for us either. The immortal work of Clausewitz was read with great interest by the founders of Marxism, Marx and Engels, and the latter considered Clausewitz a "star of the first magnitude." Speaking about politics and war, Lenin at the same time gave an attestation to this Philosopher of military affairs. "As applied to wars," wrote Lenin, "the main proposition of Clausewitz is: 'War is simply the continuation of politics by other (precisely violent) means.'" Such is the formulation of Clausewitz, one of the great writers on questions of military history, whose ideas were fertilized by Hegel. And that was always the point of view of Marx and Engels.

From those theoretical propositions of Clausewitz, which we will now remind the reader of our work, it will be clear without proof how close the Hegelian was to the monistic understanding of war as a social and social phenomenon.

Finally, we will have to stop at Clausewitz because his name was widely used by both the chiefs of general staffs and diplomats to prove the correctness of their views. The theoretical propositions of Clausewitz, if not completely, then in excerpts, sometimes in a false interpretation, but invariably found a place in the heads of bourgeois strategists and diplomats on the threshold of a world war.

In the first book of our work, we talked in part about the external force and its influence on military affairs. In the same place, Pami noted that the guiding line for its external relations with other states follow from the internal relations in the state. Finally, in the same place we pointed out that in the basis of all relations, both internal and external

are economic relations.

In this book, we have developed with sufficient completeness the foreign policy of Europe and, mainly, of Austria-Hungary on the threshold of a world war. At the same time, we studied in detail on this issue the documents of the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff Konrad, and along the way, other Chiefs of Staff of the armies of Europe.

Konrad's reports passed before us, in which, in addition to specific conclusions from the international situation, he also outlined purely theoretical propositions about the connection between politics and strategy, about one or another direction of the monarchy's policy. For the time being, we will not touch on the correctness or error of this kind of reporting, for we will do it in its place, having clarified the reasons that prompted Konrad to do this. For us, however, his theoretical arguments are not valuable at the present time, since we can use them for conclusions.

Our intention was to unfold before the reader the pictures of that life, those relations that developed between the General Staff and diplomacy not only on the banks of the Danube, but also in other capitals of Europe. Therefore, at times we have laid out in detail even petty, but characteristic, in our understanding, facts. The reader has passed a number of not only military details, but also representatives of foreign policy. We entered it

228

W p

into petty disputes, into clashes between sword and diplomatic pen. Now, without repeating ourselves, let's try to understand the accumulated material. .

As we pointed out above, Clausewitz's theory of foreign policy and war was well known not only to the chiefs of the general staff, but also to diplomacy. In fact, from one meaning to a true understanding of the theory, there is still "a huge distance."

"War is the continuation of politics, but only by other means" - the proposition of Clausewitz, borrowed from Bulow - can be likened to a piece of music that has fallen into a hurdy-gurdy. Depending on how perfect the instrument is, who and how the swivel and continues to twirl the handle of this instrument even today, we have heard one or another theory built on the thoughts of the PHILOSOPHER of war, with a corresponding, frankly, individual coloring. How successful our comparison will be seen from the following.

"Politics pervades the whole matter of war; its influence is constant, of course, to the extent that it is allowed by the very nature of war and the explosions that are characteristic of it ... War is not only a political action, but it is simply a real tool of politics.

So taught Clausewitz. Hardly any sane military leader of our day would have rebelled against this. Indeed, he is one of the chiefs of general staffs and did not try to object to such regulations, but, however, we saw their quarrels with the ministers of foreign affairs, reaching a hidden displeasure with each other, mutual complaints, mistrust, and even leaving their posts.

True, even today we often observe that the cause of disagreement is personal, sometimes quite small differences, but sometimes disagreement also rests on principles. This was also the case in Austria-Hungary, where

Not only did Erenthal's personal enmity towards Conrad contribute to the enmity between the two statesmen, but there were disagreements in their personal views on politics and war.

We have heard how with regret Conrad, Moltke (the younger) and some other contemporary military leaders recognized the dependence of the war on politics and tried, as much as possible, to emancipate the war from it. Such a course is not characteristic only of the days preceding the World War; its beginning must be attributed to the era of Moltke the Elder.

In the first book of our work, we talked a lot about the tensions that Moltke the Elder had with Bismarck, and about the struggle that the latter had to wage with the "demigods" from the banks of the Spree. We will not repeat here again the mouth, but we will only note that on the basis of these unhealthy relations, Moltke is a senior to the distortion of the theory of Vausewitz.

"War, according to Clausewitz," writes Moltke, "is the continuation of politics by other means... Politics, unfortunately, is inseparable from strategy, politics uses war to achieve its goals and has a decisive influence on its beginning and end, moreover it reserves the right during the whole war to raise its demands or to be content with a lesser success."

Here is the basis for those regrets which were expressed in abundance by the chiefs of the general staffs of the various countries of Europe in relation to politics.

229

PO OIK LLC In Germanip, the nephew copied his uncle, taking from him personally and through his mouth regret. Konrad and other chiefs of staff leaned more towards the theory of the German field marshal than the German Philosopher of War.

It should be noted that in the head of the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff there was the same dualism in the mouth question, which was a distinctive feature of the monarchy on the banks of the Danube. In his theoretical prerequisites for the reports, Konrad, analyzing the influence of politics on military affairs, in essence reached the positions of Yolauevits. Pointing out more than once that politics is reflected not only in concrete preparations for war on a certain front, but in general in all preparations for any war, the chief of the Austrian staff spoke the truth that war is politics itself. This served as an excuse for Conrad to plunge deeply into the bowels of politics, while, allegedly, his complete apoliticality, as he stated.

Thus, on the merits of the matter, there should be no disagreements or disagreements in the work of the military and diplomatic colleagues of the state machinery of Austria-Hungary, and indeed of other countries. However, those were evident and passed in a rather bright form before the reader of our work.

If Moltke the elder saw the "decisive influence" of politics on the war at the beginning and at the end of it, then this was only a kind of concession to politics.

War is such a phenomenon of social life, which, although it serves to achieve political goals, nevertheless, like violence, has its own laws, its own "spirit", its own nature. Therefore, on the political side, nothing should be done that would be contrary to the nature of the war.

Recognizing the influence of politics on the war as "indeterminate", the old German

The Mann Field Marshal taught his minions: "A strategy can only strive for the highest goal, which can be achieved by the means provided. Thus, the strategy will contribute to the success of the policy, keeping in mind its purpose, but remaining, as far as possible, independent, in respect of the military, in its actions. Politics should not interfere with operations."

"In this sense," continues Moltke, "General Von Clauseville expresses himself in his tactical letters to Müffling. "The tasks and right of the art of war in relation to politics consist mainly in eliminating demands that are contrary to the spirit of war, and errors in the use of mechanical means, which are the result of inexperienced handling of them." For the course of a war is primarily guided by military considerations, and political considerations only insofar as they do not require anything from a military point of view that is unacceptable. The commander, on the other hand, should never be guided by political motives alone, he should put success in war first. How politics will take advantage of victories or defeats, this does not concern the commander, it is exclusively her business.

Referring to the authority of Clausewitz, Moltke brought to the fore the "spirit of war", its nature, and on this he built his theory of the "independence" of war and politics. The situation is very tempting for the general staff, which, as we have seen above, in all countries and was widely

230

ii in ani inina

used. From this came the beginning and the struggle for the power of the General Staff in the field of politics and those severe requirements of strategy, which it presented to diplomacy. We think that it is not necessary to repeat all the arguments of Conrad, and indeed of other chiefs of staff, in order to prove how carefully they guarded war, its "nature" from the intrusion of politics. We will see below that the demands of the general staffs went so far that the basis of policy was the military relations of states.

To understand this issue, we must return to the original source - the theory of Clausewitz.

Recognizing that war is "a political action," Clausewitz concludes: "War in all cases cannot be understood in the sense of something independent; it is nothing more than an instrument of politics. Only with such understanding of the matter will we not find ourselves in contradiction with history.

Pointing out that the statesman and commander "must understand the EU (war — B. Sh.) properly and has no right to make something else out of war, contrary to the conditions that cause it," the old Philosopher again recalls that war is a continuation of political relations pursuing all the same political aspirations, although with special means.

"Behind the war," he continues, "remain only those features that are inherent in its nature. The theory of art in general, and the general in any given case, has the right to demand that the direction and intentions of politics do not run counter to the properties and characteristics of war; requirement This is far from unimportant. However, no matter how significant the effect of war on the goal of politics, it, in any case, can only modify the direction and intentions of the latter, for the political goal is still

retains its preeminence. Politics sets a goal; war is a means, a tool to achieve it; acting as a tool, one must not forget the purpose of the work.

Clausewitz analyzes what would happen to the war if, "abandoning politics and completely freeing itself from it, the war would rush along its own independent path." In such a case, war, "a blown-up mine, would spread destruction according to its initial structure, not subject to any other subsequent influences." "War was imagined in such a form in those cases when the theory had to analyze such wars, the course of the war went at odds with politics. However, this understanding is completely false."

"It is impossible," he says elsewhere, "to separate war from political relations. If you miss this in your reasoning, then all the threads of relationships will be interrupted and something meaningless and aimless will appear.

"The political point of view would be abolished with the outbreak of war only if wars were waged solely out of enmity for life and death; but in fact they are nothing more than a special expression of precisely politics... The subordination of a political outlook to a military one would be incongruous, because the war was caused by politics."

"In a word," concludes Clausewitz, "let us say that the art of war at its highest point becomes politics, but a politics that replaces diplomatic correspondence with bloody battles."

231

A

The theory of Clausewitz that we have briefly cited from his work "On War" says with sufficient clarity that war is not something self-sufficient, that no matter how special its nature, the spirit of war, it is impossible to subordinate politics to this nature, because then "something meaningless and aimless" will appear.

We considered it necessary to give textually the opinions of both authorities of military affairs, so as not to distort them with our own interpretation and turn out to be unsubstantiated.

Militarizing, if I may say so, politics, Moltke the elder handed over to his followers the struggle for the chastity of the "spirit of war", distorting Clausewitz himself. If the latter believed that the art of war at its highest point becomes politics, then the German Field Marshal, on the contrary, put forward the position that "for the course of the war, military considerations are mainly guiding, while political considerations are poured in so far as they do not require nothing from a military point of view is unacceptable."

The right to control politics was well understood by the chiefs of the general staffs, which we deduced in the previous chapters, and therefore, while declaring that they did not interfere in the affairs of politics at all, each of them actually tried to develop and carry out his own policy. Moltke the younger, it is true, apologized to Konrad for his boldness to throw political lies and believed that only a "friend" could he reveal his thoughts. With the death of Moltke Jr., his "friend" "justified" Moltke's trust by publishing the innermost thoughts of the former German chief of staff.

We noted above that Conrad, in his theoretical propositions, recognized the dominance of politics over strategy and believed that political principles penetrate deeply into the cause of war. Some chiefs of staff tried not to speak frankly about this, and only on the sly and sometimes complained about politics, recognizing that, unfortunately, it was impossible to emancipate war from politics.

In his own actions, the chief of the Austro-Hungarian general staff, on the other hand, was an apostle of the elder Moltke and not only with a confident hand: he sketched out political lines for the Veps lipomatists, but also gave them a justification based on the nature of the war. True, he exhibited something, in the form of a screen, even from the economic sphere, but it was only a light flair, and in reality the spirit of war hovered over everything.

In a word, Conrad did not disassociate himself from politics, but plunged headlong into it. As a matter of fact, we should not reproach him for this, if only the prerequisites for this were correct on his part. The Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff could not imagine the possibility of being on the right track in his work without maintaining close contact with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. His reports eloquently show how apolitical was alien to the representative of the General Staff.

Considering politics to be the basis of military affairs, Conrad, not without reason, considered it necessary to think about the details and the political lines of Austria-Hungary's foreign relations.

"Any war must be considered, first of all, according to the probability of its character and its general outlines, based on political magnitudes and relations."

232

SPI UKS -

This is what Clausewitz taught, and this is what Conrad correctly follows when he analyzes in detail the foreign policy of Austria-Hungary, which, in his quite fair judgment, arose from the internal relations that existed on the banks of the Danube.

The military hand more than once sketched and divided this policy and generally had its own definite line of political behavior. We consider it superfluous to go into a private analysis of these spells here, since they have been set out in sufficient detail above.

Let us dwell on the factors on which the General Staff determined these political songs.

Fairly noting that the state should have a fairly constant line of political behavior calculated over the years. Koprad defined it as the vital interests of the state, arising from its geographical, ethnographic and cultural features. To this, he then added economic competition with other states, stipulating that he was not strong in this area and that the opinion of special experts was necessary.

If we take into account the peculiarities of the structure of Austria-Hungary as a state formation, and take into account all the pento-fuge forces of its peoples, then, no words, the struggle of these nationalities within the state

and their attraction to the borders of the monarchy most of all stopped the attention of the chief of staff. The root cause of this - economic relations, the growth of productive forces both among individual nationalities within the monarchy, and among their fellow tribes abroad - was overlooked by Koprak. We have heard that he considered the Germans to be the bearers of "high culture" who were called upon to inculcate it among the Slavs. His friend Moltke in Berlin spoke of the coming struggle between the Slavs and Germanism as a clash of two cultures. In a word, the consequences in the brains of the General Staff covered up the root cause of the struggle, and from here a not always correct idea of the true political spheres of the states was revealed. If anywhere else you can find a more or less correct approach to determining the political goals of the state, then this is in the report of the Russian Naval General Staff, which openly declared that Russia's desire to seize the straits is caused by nothing more than economic competition.

If romanticism was characteristic of the representatives of the General Staff, then some bourgeois diplomats, on the contrary, had a more correct idea of the economic struggle of European states for markets, which they were engulfed in at the beginning of the 20th century. It is impossible to refuse this at least to the same Erental, who held back the romance in the vospny "mupdir", which was Conrad. And some diplomats were more sensitive to the definition of the political goals of states than representatives of their general staffs.

The economic struggle waged both within states and outside them has been and is the basis of all social relations. Various groupings—class, national, etc.—are taking shape on its foundation, and it was these economic superstructures that were taken by the chiefs of general staffs for those most important goals that required armed struggle for their solution.

233

ION UDS - ANI

True, we must rightly note that sometimes Koprak tended to settle external relations with Serbia and Montenegro through economic rapprochement with them. It was not his idea, but he sometimes agreed with it. However, as soon as the situation in the Balkans worsened, the chief of the general staff again returned to the path of war.

But one way or another, both Konrad and his colleagues in other states were clearly aware that war is a serious matter, that it is being waged for the achievement of important political goals, that war is a dubious matter, and therefore, for its preparation, it requires and the enormous tension of these states.

If Moltke Jr. and other chiefs of staff tried not to interfere, apparently, in the establishment of political goals, considering it "the prerogative of the supreme power and diplomacy," Conrad went further in this and not only entered into a discussion of the direction of foreign policy, but bold hand and sketch her way. If we recall his reports with a broad analysis of foreign policy, if we turn to his letters to Moltke, to his conversations with military agents of foreign powers, to his instructions to his military agents on the political line, then we can assert that the beginning of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff had his own line of political behavior and, not as a reproach to the diplomats, persistently pursued the EU.

It was pointed out above that the "nature of war" pushed the chief of staff from the banks of the Danube to this path.

"As long as war is subject to politics, it will take on the character of the latter. If politics strives for the great and powerful, then so will war.

These profound thoughts of Clausewitz were formally adopted by Conrad. However, the chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff understood Clausewitz in his own way. If the philosopher of war demanded that war take the character of politics, then Conrad, on the contrary, considered it the norm for politics to take on one character or another, depending on the nature of the war.

Politics, in his opinion, should be consistent with the laws of war, not demand from the latter anything contrary to its spirit. On the contrary, politics should make it easier for strategies to wage war. Political songs are finally remembered only when they are agreed with the strategy. Professional strategists even today come to such conclusions, not to mention the fact that they were considered immutable at the beginning of the 20th century.

Above, we cited other judgments of Clausewitz on this score, who tried to establish how much strategy can modify political goals, but in no way dictate them. The philosopher from here did not intend to turn war in social relations into an end in itself, as Moltke the elder and his followers did later.

In the first book of our work, we came to the conclusion that the nature of foreign policy is determined by domestic policy, that the external relations of the state also follow from it. Politics is a reflection of the growth of the productive capacities of the state itself.

Konrad seems to be right when he says that the policy of the state should be based on geographical, ethnographic and cultural

234

SAVIN SH AS II,

four features of this state formation. However, this is not the basis of their positivity. "The ratio of military forces is the basis of every real policy," the chief of the general staff tells us, repeating this many times and in different ways.

In our place, we will dwell in more detail on the military foundation of foreign policy, and now we will pay attention to the fact that the strength of the state is not determined only by its military forces. True, the latter constitute an important factor in war, but inasmuch as the latter is a political act, it is based on political values, and not on military ones alone.

War determines the nature of politics, and the most skillful politics will be defeated if military success is not achieved, if the army is not ready for war. Major political goals are achieved only by war. Such is the melody which the ear of our patient reader has listened to in the preceding chapters.

Considering themselves obligated by duty to guard the military readiness of the state, almost all the chiefs of general staffs, and Kon-

FAD in particular made their demands on politics. They did not arrogate to themselves the right to interfere in the conduct of diplomatic negotiations, but to modify and even to sing foreign policy, to determine its character, which they considered not only possible, but also due.

That is why we have gone through Conrad's attempts to prove that only an aggressive, offensive policy is the only healthy one, his proposals for a preventive war, his indignation at the restraint and "defensiveness" of the Foreign Ministers. The same "policy without war" was indignant at the military leaders - Bethmann's contemporaries - in Germany, who have not yet subsided in their anger and are wasting ink on proofs of all the stupidity of the Berlin diplomats before the world war.

We will not follow them, but we will adhere to the Yolausevitz Formulation that "as soon as the war is subject to politics, it will take on the character of the latter", and, recognizing the dependence of war on politics, we will define war as a historical phenomenon.

Conrad also determined the nature of the foreign policy of Austria-Hungary, and, in his opinion, only an offensive, aggressive policy was the only correct one. Other chiefs of general staffs were careful in their conclusions, and only the Russian naval general aptab frankly showed his face, and in the Moltke-Ludendorff report of 1912 we find an indication that offensive policy should also correspond to a strong form of warfare - offensive .

In opposition to such a policy, it was mainly the diplomats who put forward a defensive, restrained policy, a policy of "gathering forces" and, finally, a "policy without war."

"We must evaluate each epoch concretely," Denin taught us, and indeed, in order to judge whether the chiefs of general staffs or diplomats correctly determined the nature of the policy of the capitalist states; it is necessary to look back at the past times not so long ago.

Since 1898 the great states of Europe, and even America and Japan, have already stood in the way of imperialism.

235

ol TTT [

We will not go into proving the correctness of such a conclusion here, for this is now well known even without us. We are not talking about England, Germany, France, but even such countries as Austria-Wepgria. Russia, Italy, and those found themselves engulfed by imperialism. Clutch- . The suppression of the economic interests of these states, the struggle for markets, the oppression of colonial and semi-colonial peoples—all this was characteristic of the policy of the large states of Europe: on the threshold of a world war.

It is clear that their policy was to be aggressive, to "strive for the powerful," as Clausewitz said. Imperialism does not recognize any other policy. In other words, each of the major states. should have pursued an offensive policy, encountering in its course the same line of political behavior of another or other states.

Therefore, we, in fairness, must note the frank statements

Conrad about the aggressive policy pursued by the Danube Empire. Another question is whether such a policy was within her power. We know that Konrad directed the main lines of foreign policy to the Balkans and the Apennine Peninsula. If at the last the policy of Vienna met with strong resistance from the imperialism of Italy, which was not inferior in its power to the same on the banks of the Danube, then in the Balkans Austria-Hungary was economically stronger than the small Slavic states, and they were markets for her capital. Thus, we cannot at all agree with some of our strategists that at the beginning of the 20th century Austria-Hungary in the Balkans was in a state of "historical defense", from which she did not come out in 1918. On the contrary, we claim that here the "historical offensive" of the former Habsburg Empire, the "offensive" of its economics, which had the goal of seizing Serbia and Montenegro, developed. On other fronts, the aggressive policy of Austria-Hungary ran up against the more powerful imperialism of the big European states and had to not only give up its positions, but also seek financial support from them. In recent years, the economic penetration of Austria-Hungary into Serbia and Montenegro became more and more difficult, because the capital of larger European countries was already interested in them. Therefore, every year the policy of Austria-Hungary lost its positions, and its semi-colonies threatened to fall into more powerful hands. The Balkan question was becoming "European", which the chief of the general staff on the banks of the Danube, who was striving not to lose the Slavic lands from his hands, did not want to admit. True, it was not mainly economic reasons that led him to his mouth, but arguments about German cultural treason, one way or another - an "imperialist" in military uniform, who more than once thought about the "peaceful" economic conquest of Serbia and Montenegro, which sometimes dreamed of the "great" Balkan union—quickly cast all this aside when he saw how every year the Slavic states develop their productive forces.

In 1908-1909, Konrad sided with Erenthal, who took the path of an aggressive policy. The annexation brought these two hidden enemies closer together, and only because it was an indicator of the imperialism of Austria-Hungary.

236

and I

In the future, as we know, Erenthal slowed down the pace of his behavior, while Konrad pastured on quick and decisive steps.

If aggressiveness is characteristic of imperialism, then, on the other hand, it must be admitted that the path of a rogue offensive or, as some people now say, a "policy of crushing" can be followed by that imperialism which is strong inside. Other imperialism has to choose roundabout ways to achieve its predatory goals, to maneuver politically or, to put it in fashion, to adhere to the "policy of starvation".

If we admit that defense is a stopped offensive, then in that case the imperialist state's temporary renunciation of open pursuit of its goals can be recognized as a defensive policy. The concept of passive defense is by no means characteristic of imperialism.

Only in this sense can we interpret the "defensive policy" which, according to diplomats, was pursued by almost all the states of Europe before the World War, and against which the general staffs of most of them opposed. In fact, each of the major European

states aspired to capture colonies, to the economic enslavement of other small states, to the redistribution of already seized booty.

Finally, in each of the states of Europe, in America and in Japan, imperialism, represented by the bourgeoisie, crushed the individual opalities that make up these states and cruelly exploited the working masses (workers and peasants).

Thus, in assessing the nature of the policy of the European states on the threshold of a world war, there should not have been disagreements between diplomats and representatives of the general staffs, because, in essence, this policy was actively aggressive. The divergence was planned only during this offensive. While the general staffs were burning with the lust for war, the diplomats were more cautious about the war and, as Mehring says, "treated the god of war as an unreliable Kaptonist, who should not be trusted too much and with whom one can contact - to take place only if the vital interests of the state are in danger.

"The imperialist epoch," says Lenin, "destroys neither the aspirations for the political independence of nations, nor the "feasibility" of these "aspirations" within the limits of global imperialist relations."

Indeed, along with the imperialism of the major states of the world at the beginning of the 20th century, we can observe a purely national policy aimed at the struggle for the self-determination of nations, for their liberation from the oppression of imperialist states. With the war of 1870-1871, big national politics were being smoked in Europe, and by the time of the World War only the small Balkan states were still standing in this way. Such a policy was pursued by Serbia, which worried the hero of our story Konrad so much. However, here we must note that the imperialism of the majority of large European states was often covered up by the slogan of national policy, the struggle for national unification. The reader, frankly, remembers well that Russia, France, and Germany played on quiet strings. In our place, we will talk about why imperialism needed to hide behind national goals, and now we must

257

Il Ch y, yyz

establish that such a national policy was far from a truly just policy. Refuting Kautsky's arguments in defense of the national policy of the big states, Lenin cited them as "an example of the prostitution of Marxism."

In the struggle against imperialism, the just political policy of some small European states was on the defensive, withstanding the attack of capitalism, fighting against economic enslavement. Before us was such a defense of Serbia, which the diplomats, Konrad and other representatives of the General Staff paint rather as a pure offensive. We are not talking about military actions, but exclusively about the political field of action. If we look closely at the politics of Serbia at the beginning of the 20th century, we will notice the moments of its political offensive. We consider as such the formation of the Balkan federation and the preparation of the Serbip for a world war—the development of that broad propaganda which was conducted by the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, even in Montenegro. Not to mention the fact that the hand of the Serbian General Staff directed Prpacip's revolver at the heirloom of the House of Habsburg, thereby challenging Austria-Hungary to a bloody struggle.

On the top of the imperialist era, the national policy of the Serbs was only a small dot, and it was not, of course, that it marked our times. They took place under the sign of competition between the imperialist states, exacerbating more and more external relations between them.

Such, in our view, are the foundations of European politics on the verge of a world war. |

If in the documents of the general staffs we find various references to the struggle of the Slavs against Germanism, to the struggle of different cultures, to "historical tasks", to the unification of nationalities and similar problems, then we can see in this: 1) the remnants of the former ideology, the worship of various old philosophical doctrines; 2) the lack of a clear idea of the imperialist character of the era, and 3) the deliberate deception of the working classes of the population. In a word, we see in the thinking of the general staffs the usual bourgeois ideology, and if, for example, Conrad or Nemepeš pointed out the real ones: the engines of the policy of Austria-Hungary and Russia, then they would rather come to this, as they say, inwardly, rather than quite consciously.

We have come across the opinion that on the verge of a world war, representatives of the general staffs were stronger in politics than diplomats. We wouldn't say that. If the reader remembers the memorable Erenthal's note, then by it alone he can make a reverse judgment. Erenthal clearly described the events taking place in Europe as a struggle between Germany and England for hegemony in world trade and pointed out that a common struggle flared up around this struggle. In Europe, which founded the struggle not for self-determination of nations, but for the seizure of colonies, the robbery of small states, the redistribution of an already captured Fri. Diplomats, like the general staffs, were, of course, characterized by "prostitution of Marxism" in determining the nature of the days they were going through, but, in any case, internally they came closer to the truth than politicians in military uniform.

238

a {SchB

Of course, we have the right to ask what practical conclusion we draw from what has been said. It is clear and simple. Both a diplomat and a representative of the General Staff need a correct and clear idea of the epoch that is being lived through, of the relations between various states that are taking shape in it, of the driving forces of politics, of the goals they are pursuing. If "politics permeates the whole matter of war," as Clausewitz says, then a correct orientation in politics is necessary for the correct organization of military affairs. We agree with the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, who considered it unthinkable for himself to be outside of politics and by his actions and doom proved this with obviousness.

So, if Conrad unconsciously guessed the imperialist character of the policy of Austria-Hungary and frankly noted for it only the paths of conquest, at the same time he, as a "real military man", almost rejected any kind of political manipulation. His line of political behavior always turned out to be straightforward, leading closest to singing. Impatience seized Conrad. An opponent of the strategy of exhaustion and an ardent representative of the strategy of crushing, the chief of the general staff of the Danube Empire transferred this to the plane of his political muscle.

leniya. No wonder even his colleague - Moltke Jr. - was creeping in. sympathy for the calm and restrained policy of Austria-Hungary, for he was well aware of the hot head of Konrad and the weakness of the diplomats of Vienna.

If "war is a continuation of politics, but only by other means," then "peace is a continuation of struggle, but only by other means." This is how bourgeois diplomats today define the state of states which is called peace. The political struggle is going on all the time and will be going on as long as class society exists, even if there are no direct military operations. We will not here go into an analysis of those "other means" by which this struggle is carried out in the days of peace, but we must only note that our time brings to the forefront mainly economic competition.

That intermingling of interests of various states, which had to be observed before the world war, of course, could have led to it long ago. if it had not been chopped off by military and diplomatic preparations. Before. In the previous chapters, we have gone through all that diplomatic capital that enveloped Europe at the beginning of the 20th century. We have observed the shepherding, waiting and retreat of various states in the political. a field that diplomats tried not to stain with blood. Of course, it was not philanthropy that spoke in them, but only the desire to gain time in order to better prepare for war.

If we delve into the reasons for such a "defensive" policy of other states, a policy of "accumulation of forces", such as, for example, after annexations. Ehrenthal adhered to Bosnia and Herzegovina, then one should take into account that orientation in the internal position of the monarchy, which the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary did not. We heard how [Russia on the same. to her inner state she had to capitulate to Berlin in 1909.

233:

Us

In short, by means of certain combinations on the external front, by coordinating its goals with the policies of other states, by isolating potential adversaries, diplomacy bloodlessly achieved its goals. There was a diplomatic success. We heard with what distrust Konrad, and other chiefs of the general staffs, reacted to this success. The diplomatic victory was not indicative for them, and in any case not lasting. Only one sword could forge a good world. We have heard Conrad's dreams that it is not by diplomatic defeat of Russia that peace can be bought for a hundred years, but only by its military destruction. Let us say without exaggeration that not a single representative of the General Staff believed in diplomatic success, and above all in Austria-Hungary, which in remote times expanded its borders precisely through diplomatic and marriage bonds (the same well-known bed diplomacy).

We have passed before us the views on such a bloodless policy of many military men, who called it exclusively false, "houses of cards", in other words, they did not even have the least confidence in it.

Conrad did not believe in the decisive importance of diplomatic conferences and pointed out that the fate of states is decided not at the green table, but on the battlefields.

The view is not new, and history knows many statesmen who spoke about the same. Napoleon connected the fate of empires with battles, and Bismarck decided the issue of uniting Germany with blood and iron.

A tragic personality - one of Bismarck's successors in the chancellor's post - Bethmann-Hollweg thought to achieve his goals exclusively by peaceful means, pursuing a "policy without war." Bethmann proceeded from the proposition that the rapid development of Germany's productive forces would so far outstrip the rest of the states that their competition would be excluded. By diplomatic agreements the German Chancellor hoped to open the way for German imperialism.

As we will see below, Bethmann's ideas were in conflict with the views not only of Conrad, but also of military circles in Berlin. We therefore allow ourselves to dwell a little on the hopes of the German Chancellor.

The reader of our second book could already see how contradictions between European states accumulated since 1906, and how diplomats tried to smooth these contradictions. But the more the imperialism of the European states grew, the more difficult the work of diplomats became. Even Moltke the Younger, and not only him, but many other figures in military uniform felt inwardly, without realizing the economic situation clearly, how the collapse of all peace agreements and conferences between European states was approaching.

"Imperialism," writes Lenin, "is economic monopoly capitalism. In order for the monopoly to be complete, it would be necessary to eliminate competitors not only from the internal market (from the market of a given state), but also from the external, from all over the world. Is there an economic opportunity "in the era of Financial Capital" to eliminate competition even in a foreign country? Of course, there is: this means is financial dependence and the buying up of raw materials, and then all the enterprises of a competitor ... "

'24.0

m nai

"Big financial capital of one strapon can always buy up the competitors of a foreign, politically independent country and always does it. Economically, this is quite feasible. Economic "annexation" is quite feasible without political "annexation" and is constantly encountered.

Refuting Kautsky's theory of "ultra-imperialism" under which all imperialist powers would form an alliance for the "peaceful" division of colonies or semi-independent states, Lenin writes: suggests Kautsky) that such alliances should not be of short duration? So that they exclude frictions, coppice conflicts and struggle in every and every possible form?

"It is enough to put the question clearly," continues Lenin, "so that no other answer can be given to it than in the negative. For under capitalism, no other basis for the division of spheres of influence, interests, colonies, etc., is inconceivable, except for taking into account the cast of participants in the division, strength: general economic, Hypanese, military, etc. And the strength varies unequally among these participants in the division, for there can be no uniform development of individual enterprises, trusts, branches of industry, countries under capitalism ...

"Therefore, 'inter-imperialist' or 'ultra-imperialist' alliances... - in whatever Form these alliances may be concluded, whether in the Form of one imperialist coalition against another imperialist coalition, or in the Form of a general alliance of all the imperialist powers, — are inescapably mere "frontiers between wars. Peaceful alliances prepare wars and, in their turn, grow out of wars, conditioning each other, giving rise to alternating choruses of peaceful and non-peaceful struggle from the same soil of imperialist ties and relationships of world economy and world politics.

The foregoing shows better than we do that to hope for success, based only on the development of the productive forces of Germany, in competition with such states as England, France and even Russia in the east, not to mention America, the German chancellor under the capitalist chesky structure of the state could not. We cannot dwell on this question here, with tsikhers in our hands. Anyone familiar with the course of German economic development knows that it proceeded at a rapid pace, overtaking England and other European states. However, relations between Germany, as a capitalist state, and those like her could lead only to one thing—to armed struggle. There could, of course, be no agreement between "all the imperialist powers". From this point of view, we must recognize Bethmann's dreams, indeed, as a "house of cards".

We think that the politicians of the powers took a more correct line of thinking, seeing the inevitability of the impending struggle. We are not talking here about Gray's strokes characteristic of hypocrites in depicting the nature of a future world war. He was well aware of its scope and only frightened the German ambassador with it, desiring to prolong the "respite" in the camp of the capitalist states of Europe.

Thus, if the representatives of the general staffs, in accordance with their duty, were intensively preparing for a world war, not believing in the possibility

16 The brain of the army. In and. 3.24.1

[1

settlement of friction in Europe on the diplomatic field, then in the mouth, of course, they were right. However, this "depth of judgment" was not based on a true understanding of the era they were living through, but rather on a belief in: one thing - in military success in international relations.

As long as capitalist society exists, the dream of eliminating armed struggle from international relations and regulating them at the dinner table, as Lenin vividly demonstrated, is inconceivable. Only with the death of capital, and, consequently, with the withering away of the state, only in a socialist society is it possible to regulate controversial issues by other methods, but then there will be no disputes: on our planet.

Thus, we seem to introduce war as a necessary element into social relations. "In any dispassionate study of wars and their causes," writes Merpung rightly, "on the one hand, there is a danger of appearing as an adherent of militarism, and on the other hand, showing too much respect for militarism."

Indeed, not only in "investigating wars", but also in understanding their inevitability, we must: would Koprad and his colleagues in office

attach the label of "militarists" to the general staffs, because they all considered the war, in the final analysis, not only not exceptional, but even: necessary for the development of the statehood that they served.

We are not pacifists and "Tolstoyans" on the verge of war and believe that in a class society it exists and will live until the death of this society.

In the first book of our work, we cited Lenin's opinion on this subject, and we will repeat it here:

"Voypa is not an accident, not a "sin," as Christian priests think (who preach patriotism, humanity, and peace are no worse than opportunist), Lenin wrote on November 1, 1914, "but an inevitable stage of capitalism, as much a form of capitalist life as the world ... Imperialism has put the fate of European culture at stake: this war, unless there are a series of modern revolutions, will soon be followed by other wars - the tale of the "last war" is an empty, harmful tale, a petty-bourgeois "mythology".

Lenin saw the end of this "mythology" in one thing - in the civil war, in the revolution. "Down with the priestly sentimental and stupid sighs about "peace at all costs"! Raise the banner of civil war!...

Only "happy successful revolutions" will put an end to such a socio-historical phenomenon as war.

"In a class society," Mehring says, "voipa regulates in the last instance the conflicts of interests of different groups or states; in the last resort - that means when they have become aggravated to such an extent that no peace agreement is already possible.

By 1914, the atmosphere in Europe was already so thickened that war seemed inevitable. There are no words to say that it was still possible to extend the "respite", but only to prolong it, and for a short time, and not to eliminate the war.

Thus, war is one of the types of societal responses, a more concrete and vivid manifestation of violence in order to achieve a certain

242

ii v i p

higher political goals than diplomatic moves, than verbal battles for
green table.

We will not develop the theory of the definition of war here, because in our times it is clear to everyone and everyone that war does not constitute something isolated from politics, that it is a means of the latter, that the political ties of warring states do not stop with war.

Such was the point of view of Clausewitz, whose thoughts we textually cited above and we will not repeat here.

Lenin also took the same position, writing in his pamphlet Socialism and War: "War is the continuation of politics by other (namely, violent) means." This saying belongs to one of the most profound writers on military questions, Clausewitz. marxist

rightly considered this proposition to be the theoretical basis of views on the meaning of the present war. Marx and Engels have always looked at various wars precisely from this point of view.

Elsewhere, Lenin, citing the Clausewitz Formula, again points out that "this was always the point of view of Marx and Engels, to consider each war as a continuation of the policy of the powers, interested powers - and various classes within them - at a given time."

We recall the words of Clausewitz, who considered the war as a continuation of political struggles "with the intervention of other means", "At the same time, we affirm," wrote Clausewitz, "that the replies do not stop, they do not turn into something completely different, but they essentially continue, whatever the means used, however.

"Thus," says the Philosopher of War, "the main guidelines by which military actions follow and by which they are connected are the same guidelines which, through war, lead to peace. Is something else conceivable? Is it possible that with the termination of diplomatic correspondence, all political relations of the government of the indigenous peoples also cease?

Of course not! So will answer magnificently, after the world war, everyone. Well, on its threshold, the chiefs of the general staffs of the European armies, who followed the theory of Moltke the elder, according to which politics had an influence only at the beginning and at the end of the war, fully allowed this. Once the guns started talking, the diplomats had nothing to do. The decision of the war must have depended on "military success," according to Moltke Sr.

If the reader remembers, then Kropotkin spoke quite transparently about this, blaming diplomacy in the fact that he looks at the army like. on an umbrella, which can be used as a cover in case of war and then retreat in a hurry, placing the entire burden of responsibility on the "soldiers", i.e. on the armed forces.

Belief in one "military success" led the hero of our story to the proposition that every policy should be based only on the attitude of military forces. To a certain extent, this is true, but only to a certain extent. We now know perfectly well from the history of the World War that the Germans, "invincible" in all three dimensions, lost the war. The elder Moltke's theory of the saving power of "war success" turned out to be untenable.

The foregoing leads us to the conclusion that since war is a continuation of politics, then in its course it is guided not only by purely military

243

or etc

foundations, but mainly political ones. Rather, one is inextricably linked with the other, one follows from the other. Only with such a yardstick do we consider it possible to approach such a complex phenomenon as war.

We have already cited Mehring's words that in a class society, war in the last resort decides disputes between the state and peoples. The development of the armed forces by the European states, which began with the epoch of imperialism, spoke with complete certainty of the tremendous dimensions of the upheavals to which the foreseen war would lead.

If the scope of the war was not fully foreseen by the political and military figures of Europe at the beginning of the 20th century, then its horrors still frightened them with their scope. Is it worth repeating as evidence Gray's fears, the conversations of Moltke the younger with Conrad about the struggle not to the stomach, but to death, etc.? All this has been said above.

It should be noted that politicians went to war with more caution than the chiefs of the general staffs, in particular Koperad. Yes, this is quite understandable, for a person who considered warfare his trade more openly embarked on risky work than politicians, less experienced in the secrets of military art, but more aware of those upheavals of the state that should be the result of war.

Looking ahead a little, we must note the firm statement of Ehrenthal, who spoke with great clarity the same Clausewitz Formula about war and politics as Conrad, that it is the prerogative of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to apply war or to refuse it. and not the chief of the general staff.

Experienced in these matters, German Chancellor Bismarck said: "Politics is not a battlefield: it requires special knowledge to resolve the question of whether and when war is necessary and how to avoid it with honor."

A sound understanding of the war and the incessant influence of politics in it could only lead to such an interpretation of any more or less prominent political agent, even of a bourgeois state.

Thus, the war aroused a certain apprehension on the heels of politicians, even of such a cast as Poincaré.

If war in a class society decides controversial issues in the last resort, then such a fear of war, which we noticed among politicians, is quite understandable. If in the time of Napoleon war was a "serious matter", then all the more it becomes a grand event in the life of the state in our time.

In states with a capitalist structure, the fear of war was evoked: 1) by the internal and economic upheaval that the war brought with it, and 2) by the fear that the slogans of war in the interests of the bourgeois classes would not be able to impress the working masses of the population of the states.

We believe that it is not particularly necessary to provide evidence for what has been said, since it is clear from the historical part of our work how doubts have overwhelmed the diplomatic and diplomatic lines in this respect in almost every state. Even in the German General Staff, at least in the Army Chief Moltke, there were hesitation in this.

HALL

And [][[

The fear of war is connected with the responsibility for war, which, after the World War, was codified by international law. Now we know very well how the creators of the Treaty of Versailles play on this and how far Hermavia still tries to absolve itself of responsibility for the war. The term "responsibility for war" is essentially not new in our

time is only exacerbated.

The manifestation of violence, which is the war, has long been condemned, finding its extreme in pacifism. War began to be seen as a crime against humanity. Every war must be severely condemned. But since class society cannot exist without war, it has been interpreted in the sense of justice.

On this basis, wars received their classification and it was recognized that a defensive war, protection in a war, should be considered a just war and, conversely, an offensive war is a crime for which the one who started it must bear responsibility.

Let us leave the latter in a hurry for the time being, and turn to the classification of wars that was adopted in the bourgeois states on the threshold of a world war.

From the mouths of various diplomats and even representatives of the general staff, we heard de lapele warp pas: 1) offensive and 2) defensive, and this division, based, in terms of dryness, on the external form of warfare, was transferred to the realm of politics. War, in its political significance, in pursuit of positive (aggressive) goals or the goals of solely protecting one's interests, was classified as offensive or defensive.

We stuck together such a division from `Ehrenthal, who stood only for a defensive war, and even in Ludendorff's report we find a misapprehension of the policy of tripartite consent as aggressive, i.e. war on his part: it was necessary to consider offensive, while tripartite the alliance, which was defensive in nature, had to conduct a defensive war as well, which the chief of the operational bureau considered far unprofitable.

If since the time of Clausewitz there has been no pure offensive and pure defense in military affairs, then even more so in politics such a division cannot be made.

"From a political point of view, attack and defense," Mehring says, "are completely vague concepts."

"From this point of view," he continues, "the futility of all attempts to distinguish between offensive and defensive warfare is immediately apparent. At the same time, one should always separate the military point of view from the political one. From a military point of view, attack and defense are clear, precise and integral concepts of military judgment, although they are. and do not completely separate from each other, but constantly pass one into the other - in the famous expression of Hegel, embrace each other. In this case, defense is either the strongest or the weakest tactic of war. The weakest, when it is limited only to itself and in this case always leads to defeat; the strongest, if it can go on the offensive at an opportune moment. dialectic

245

A

Clausewitz devotes a significant part of his work on the war to the absorption of attack and defense.

Mehring is cardinal in his conclusions and states: "It is complete nonsense and absurdity to divide the wars that have taken place so far according to a completely external sign and random scale into just defensive wars: and unjust offensive ones. If this view cannot be eradicated even from the socialist milieu, then the only explanation for this can be found in the fact that we have not yet been able to completely free ourselves in questions of the war from cobwebs: bourgeois enlightenment.

"Socialists have always condemned wars between peoples as barbaric and atrocious," we read in Lenin and Zinoviev's pamphlet *Socialism and War*. "But our attitude to the war," the authors continue, "is fundamentally different from that of the bourgeois pacifists (supporters and preachers of the MPR) and the anarchists. We differ from the former in that we understand the inevitable connection between war and the struggle of classes within the country, we understand the impossibility of abolishing wars without destroying classes and creating socialism, and also in that we fully recognize the legitimacy, progressivity and necessity of civil wars, those wars of the oppressed class against the oppressor... And we Marxists differ from pacifists and anarchists in that we recognize the necessity of a historical (from the point of view of Marx's dialectical materialism) study of each war separately. There have been several wars in history which, in spite of all the horrors, atrocities, calamities and torments inevitably associated with every war, were progressive, i.e., benefited mankind by helping to destroy especially harmful and reactionary institutions (for example, autocracy serfdom), the most barbaric despotisms in Europe (Turkish and Russian).

"The era of 1789-1871," we read further, "left deep traces and revolutionary memories. Before the overthrow of feudalism, absolutism and foreign national oppression, there could be no question of the development of the proletarian struggle for socialism. Speaking about the legitimacy of a "defensive" war in relation to the wars of this era, the socialists always had in mind precisely these goals, which boil down to revolution against the Middle Ages and serfdom. Socialists have always understood a "defensive" war as a "just" war in this sense.

"It is only in this sense that the socialists recognized and now recognize the legitimacy, progressiveness, and justice of "defence of the fatherland" or "redeem- ing" war... oppressive, slaveholding, predatory "great" powers."

In the article "On the Caricature of Marxism" and on "Imperialist Economism", Lenin again clarifies the slogan "defence of the fatherland" and says: "This is simply the most common national, and has become just a philistine expression meaning the justification of war. Nothing more, exactly, just a little bit. What is "treacherous" here can only be that the townsfolk are capable of justifying any war by saying: "We are defending the fatherland," while Marxism, which does not degrade itself to the level of the townsfolk, demands

2465

in einnani

historical analysis of each individual war in order to make out whether this war can be considered progressive, serving the interests of democracy or the proletarian, in this sense, legal, just, etc."

"Voypa is the continuation of politics. It is necessary to study the politics before the war, the politics that led and led to the war. If the policy was imperialist, i.e., protecting the interests of the Thevansian kappl, plundering and oppressing colonies and foreign countries, then the war resulting from this policy is an imperialist war. If the policy is more national-liberation, i.e., expressing a mass movement against national oppression, then the war resulting from such a policy is national-liberation."

"The layman does not understand that war is a "continuation of politics," and therefore he confines himself to the fact that "the enemy is advancing," "the enemy has invaded my country," without understanding why the war is being waged, by what classes, for what political goal. ..."

"For the layman, it is important where the troops are, who is winning now. For a Marxist, it is important why a danpa war is being waged, during which first one or the other troops can be victorious.

In a word, according to Lenip, "to be a Marxist, one must swear at every single epoch of kokkretpo," and along with it, the war.

"If a war is a clash of various interests that can no longer be eliminated by peaceful means," says Meriig, "then their historical assessment is based on how much the victory of those million and other interests favors historical progress."

Mehring believes that "there are no firm signs to distinguish an offensive war from a defensive war", comes to the following conclusion: be from now on once and for all finished. It does not exactly explain anything and not only does not throw true light, but, on the contrary, only misleads.

Some of the readers of our first book reproach us for our abuse of ritats. In this case, we erred again, but "knowingly," because in such an important question as the "justice" of war, it is necessary to give the correct guidelines for our further reasoning.

We have already pointed out that the major powers of Europe at the beginning of the 20th century embarked on the path of imperialism, and therefore the war that broke out in 1914 should be considered an imperialist war. Such a war, of course, can by no means be called just, defensive, for it led to the division of colonies, to the oppression of nations and working classes in the belligerent states themselves. There cannot be two opinions per mouth. The only just, defensive war could be considered a war within these large states of Europe, and then America.

Such is the meaning of world war from the Marxist point of view. But we have heard in previous chapters that most of the diplomats of Europe, and even some of the representatives of the general staffs, spoke of a just defensive war, which they prepared for and then entered into. Needless to say, the debate is still ongoing.

247

aaa rr bb

who waged a just war, and they are judged on the basis of which

Lenin warned with a torus: who attacked first. Before us, the words "defence of the fatherland" bowed in different ways. In a word, each of the belligerent states, from his point of view, waged a just, defensive war, protecting their existence, and not vital interests.

In characterizing imperialism above, we pointed out that defense is not characteristic of it and that the policy of one or another of the imperialist states or their alliance had an aggressive character. Therefore, on the threshold of the world war, the large states of Europe: politically, everyone was advancing, if the development of their economy is considered an offensive. Indeed, Germany economically overtook England and advanced in the east, France advanced in Africa and then in the Balkans, Austria in the Balkans, etc. Everywhere the economic offensive, and, consequently, the policy of various states met in mutual shock. and inevitably should lead to a bloody clash. If a military measure is transferred to politics, as is done when wars are classified into offensive and defensive ones, then we, without pretending to wit and originality, will propose the following term. The Nemi from the banks of the Spree have the honor of establishing the term for meeting engagements. So, in accordance with its nature, we would classify the world war under the heading of a counter war. Perhaps bourgeois diplomats, politicians and historians will now come to terms with this in determining the nature of the war, and by the way, they will share the responsibility for the war in half, recognizing that it was fair for both sides - for the bourgeoisie, of course.

The responsibility for the war, as we have heard, has long troubled the German Chief of the General Staff, who wanted to shine in the halo of the commander of a mischievous war. In this, he was far from sympathetic to Conrad, who had a different opinion on the classification of wars, which we will discuss a little later.

To finish with the "justice" of the war, we must dwell a little on the assessment of the war from the Serbian side. In the war of this state against Austria there was a national element, and Serbia's war can be called a national war, that is, a just, defensive war, because Serbia strove for national unification. "Such a war with its "justice" frightened not only Austria, but also Moltke the Younger himself. We have heard his radical decision to surround the Balkans with a fence so that "justice" not only does not spread to the "cultural states" of Europe, but perishes by itself. In 1918-192, the Soviet Union experienced something like this "reshotka" and even now the representatives of capitalist culture dream of repeating this.

We will not argue that prison tendencies have always been characteristic of the politicians of Western Europe, but they must now admit that the honor of such an invention belongs to Moltke the Younger.

We will allow ourselves here to dwell a little on the possibility of national wars in the imperialist epoch.

Lenin wrote in 1916 that the imperialist epoch does not exemplify either the aspirations for the political independence of nations, or the "feasibility" of these aspirations within the limits of world imperialist relations.

248

from

Based on this, he believed that "not only probable, but inevitable in

era of imperialism, national wars on the part of the colonies and semi-colonies.... Every war is a continuation of politics by other means. The continuation of the paciopal-liberation policy of the colonies is inevitable. national wars will be waged on their part against imperialism. Such wars may lead the current "great" imperialist powers to an imperialist war, or they may not, it depends on many circumstances.

"Even in Europe, national wars cannot be considered impossible in the age of imperialism. The "epoch of imperialism" has made the present war (the past - B.Sh.) imperialist, it inevitably gives rise (until sodpalism sets in) new imperialist wars, it has made the policy of the present great powers completely imperialist, but this "epoch" does not in the least exclude national wars, for example, on the part of small (for example, annexed or nationally oppressed) states against imperialist powers, just as it does not exclude national movements on a large scale in the east of Europe.

Thus, even today a national war can be justified if it is a revolutionary war.

Only a revolutionary war, whether it be a civil war in the big capitalist countries or a really national war of the colonies and semi-colonies against the imperialist yoke, can be recognized as a progressive war promoting the development of productive forces.

Since such a war is opposed to a war of conquest by the bourgeois classes, in this sense it can be considered a "defensive" war, but not by the principle of who attacked first.

The purely outward appearance of a war (offensive or defensive) cannot be transferred to its historical significance. |

A revolutionary war can also be offensive, i.e., provoked by a war, such as, for example, the war of 1866 and 1870-1871.

The play on the justice of a "defensive" war, on the "defence of the fatherland", which was used on the threshold of the world war, and is still widely used by bourgeois diplomats, is designed, as Lepin pointed out, for the layman.

"Citizens are able," wrote the op, "to justify any war, saying: "we are defending the fatherland ... "The philistine does not understand that war" is a continuation of politics ", and therefore is limited to the fact that "the enemy is attacking ", "the enemy has invaded to my country", without understanding why the war is being waged, by what classes, for what political sang... For the layman, it is important where the troops are stationed, who is winning now.

In reality, however, war can be expedient, progressive, and, from this point of view, just, or, conversely, from the same point of view, reactionary. The point, of course, is not in the defense and the offensive, but in the historical sense of the war, i.e., in its revolutionary expediency. War on the heels of Austria-Hungary was inexpedient, unrevolutionary, counter-revolutionary. Started as an imperialist war, however, it ended for this state in a revolutionary-nationalist war, i.e., it made the very transition that Lenin foresaw and feared.

ZANOS PI

Both Conrad himself and his friend in Burlip, who were greatly disturbed by the motley national composition of the Habsburg army, were on the lookout.

We would digress aside if we began to analyze whether a world war was expedient for the other capitalist states participating in it. The time I'm going through now clearly shows how erroneous it would be to prove the progressivity of war even from the bourgeois point of view. The world war was counter-revolutionary, and only where it turned into a revolutionary war do we note its ultimately progressive features.

It goes without saying that not only one chief of the general staff of the 20th century, but even the most liberal minister, would not go to such a progressive war. The reader will remember with what fear, "crossing himself with the banner of the cross," the Russian Minister of the Interior signed the decree on mobilization, feeling in his gut that the war in Russia would turn into a revolution.

If in other large-scale capitalist states the bourgeoisie still held on to power, the war has shaken it so much that it is now rushing from conference to conference, trying by years of "respite" to heal its wounds.

On the threshold of 1914, the idea of a preventive war, that is, a preventive war, is connected with the personality of the Chief of the Austrian General Staff. Such a war is started by a state that does not want to miss the benefits of its combat readiness against another state and, taking into account the possibility of a war with it in the future, artificially causes it at this moment. "Preventive war is thus characterized by the position of political defense and strategic offensive," says A. Svechin in his "Strategy".

In previous chapters we have heard all the attacks on Conrad for his preaching of preventive war, which was condemned in the diplomatic arena in the time of Bismarck and has since been firmly supported by all bourgeois diplomats.

We have already said that Konrad thought only of defense, and therefore, not wanting to lose time, he proposed to advance strategically everywhere day and night. In other words, all the signs of a preventive war were present in his interpretation of the latter, and he himself made no secret of it. The name of the apostle of the "preventive" war was established for Konrad not only in his country, but also abroad, creating such glory for him, for example, in Serbia - a glory that he, in the depths of his soul, was not even proud of.

That from the point of view of military pre-emptive warfare has the unconditional advantages of surprise and calculation of forces, this is beyond doubt, and such a war can be recognized as desirable.

If, however, a preventive war is considered from the point of view of the "justice" of war, then all bourgeois politicians considered, and still consider, such a war to be offensive, that is, a war directed against humanity, and therefore without rights, worthy of all condemnation.

Conrad, of course, could not be intimidated by such tales, and, proceeding from the expediency of war and relying on the authority of Frederick the Great, he proved not only the necessity, but also the benefit of such a trick. Let him go

was not afraid of the responsibility for a preventive war. However, he did not understand

250

ii ii

It is small that it is far more difficult to move the masses to such a war today than it was in the time of Frederick the Great, by the mere fact that in the time of the Prussian king the question was about the war of armies, and not states as a whole.

We are interested in the question of whether a preventive war can be justified in general from the point of view of historical progress. Here we must give a definite answer, that if such a war is progressive, revolutionary, then it will also be just, "defensive", in spite of the fact that the instigator of it will be the side that caused the war.

We have no doubt that in this question we can encounter an objection in the form of an indication of our desire to carry the "revolution on the bayonet". We are far from this, because the revolution is made first of all by the masses themselves, but it is completed with everything as a weapon. Therefore, a moment will always come when the revolutionary masses or the backward and oppressed states will have to take up arms in the struggle against capitalism. That in such a struggle it may be necessary to enter into a preventive war, there is no need to explain this. The "defensive" nature of war is not determined by establishing who first caused the war. The reader of our work remembers that in 1914 all states entered into a defensive war and, while preparing for it, long ago had in their plans those conquests, increases in territory and population that were to come as a result of the war. Some diplomats spoke openly about this, others concealed it by playing diplomatic tricks, but steadily followed the marked path. The hero of our story, Konrad, rather frankly sketched out a plan for annexations and, when it was impossible to talk about them diplomatically, advised Berchtold to answer evasively that after the war, they say, it would be seen. We do not seem to need to repeat all the examples of annexation projects, the division of future spoils, which we have given in the previous chapters.

For us, it is interesting to establish that a global war, in the understanding of political and military leaders, was bound to be smoky with conquests, to be aggressive.

"According to its tendency," Mehring writes, "every war is conquest, since every belligerent seeks to expand its possession at the expense of the opposite peak, that is, it tries to conquer what it has not yet possessed; this may not always manifest itself in the Form of annexing lands and subjects of the enemy, but it usually manifests itself in this Form.

According to Mehring, "in reality, a war does not lead to any conquests only if both sides exhaust each other to such an extent that one of them cannot completely subordinate its opponent to its will, as was the case in the seven-year war on European mainland". "If one of the parties wins so much that it can dictate terms to its opponent, then it will always be able to insert the gains it needs into the peaceful conditions. The widespread idea that a state that has undergone a dishonorable fall should, having repulsed the enemy victoriously, calmly sheath its sword, with the joyful consciousness that it has successfully fulfilled its duty, also belongs to the realm of fairy tales. Such a war has never been fought and never

251

E dddd_ddddkd.—a

will be carried on, at least as long as a class society exists.

"Now in all the military manifestos of the belligerent powers one can find, along with assurances that they are waging only a defensive war, in most cases, a reflection of any conquest plans. However, this is pouring {asop 4e paer "...

"A victorious army," Mehring concludes, "never gives up conquest. This may be an unpleasant circumstance, but for all its horrors, war always thinks radically, and if not a hand is extended to it, but only a little finger, it will always try to make a clean experiment.

Mehring's arguments about the aggressive nature of the war fully explain to us the falsity of the assurances of the diplomats of various countries about the territorial disinterest of any states in the results of the war and the just distrust that, for example, the Russian minister had in this. Foreign Affairs Sazonov. From this point of view, one cannot particularly condemn the petty annexations that Wilhelm planned for the Austro-Hungarian army in the event of a war between Austria and Serbia. You don't have to deceive yourself on this score.

If we turn to the results of the Second World War, then it is now known what the "defensive" wars of Francis, England and Italy were smoked into. America received the least in territorial terms, because the conquest, according to Mehring, "cannot always manifest itself in the Form of accession

lands."

Everyone knows the positions that America's capital has now won in the world economy. They are more expensive than territorial seizures. If we specifically take into account the imperialist character of the current period of development, then we can say with certainty that modern warfare will necessarily be accompanied by conquests in the field of territorial, or economic, or political, because "a victorious army never renounces conquests." This lies in the essence of war and will disappear only with it.

This concludes our interpretation of the question of the classics of wars and the justice of such a socio-political phenomenon as war has been and will be. We think that the reader of our work has formed a definite idea of what kind of war can be considered "just" or "defensive".

If we talk about this again, it will be in connection with those slogans of war, which are important in the modern conditions of warfare, when in

masses of the population are drawn into it.

If in the days of armchair wars, and even earlier, the governments of the states entering the war considered it necessary in their manifestos to throw out well-known slogans for war, to explain to the population why this war was undertaken, then now this is especially important.

We heard how Berlin diplomacy, and Wilhelm himself, pointed out that there would be no active action for Austria in the Balkans.

appropriate slogans in order to move the masses of the German people into battle.

Finally, Moltke (the younger), and indeed all diplomats in general, tried to portray the war as "defensive", to reduce the matter to "defence of the fatherland" from

253

a shi

the fall of the opposite side, from parism, etc., would only arouse the working masses of the population to fight for the interests of capital. Not a single government could have loudly announced an "offensive" war because it would not have found support among its own population.

My: Lepin's thoughts on this matter have already been cited. The bourgeois classes could not proclaim the true meaning of the war to the working masses, and it was necessary to throw out slogans for the "philistine".

"Each of the belligerents," writes Mering, "claims in its military mapifesto that it defends its sacred rights and declares the claims to these rights of another belligerent to be a criminal attack; each does it with full confidence in their rights. This firm confidence can be built on false premises, and therefore the task of war is to eliminate false premises and establish the true state of affairs.

In our work we deliberately did not cite a single military manifesto, because we considered it an idle occupation to bore the reader with reading false documents.

The more counter-revolutionary a war is, the more it has an aggressive character. the harder it is to find slogans for it. On the contrary, the more revolutionary the war, the more "just" it is, the more it is understandable and close to the working masses of the population, the easier it is to find slogans for it.

"Marxism demands," Lenin teaches, "to justify any slogan, an exact analysis of both economic reality and the political situation, and the political significance of this slogan."

Such are the requirements for war slogans. Of course, the slogans thrown out by the bourgeois governments before the world war far from met these requirements, but amounted to "philistine defense."

"Defence", as a method of struggle, in the eyes of the layman created a more underground form of war, and therefore it was widely used for slogans.

But, as Mehring said, the war itself seeks to eliminate "false assumptions", and now we can appreciate all those "defensive" slogans that were read in the manifestos of the belligerents in 1914.

Despite the fact that Germany, in the eyes of her population, was waging a "defensive" war, the war in its very course exposed the "offensive" tendencies of German imperialism.

War is a political action, and therefore the development of war slogans, their corresponding rooting among the population of the state, is a matter of politics. On this basis, such chiefs of the general staffs as Konrad, Yanushkevich and the Minister of War Sukhomlinov excluded this from their thinking, and only Moltke (the younger) took care of the "defense-

telpa" war against the Slavs. Nevertheless, it seems to us that the position of the Chief of the German General Staff was more correct, and if the development of a slogan is not the direct responsibility of the Chief of the General Staff, then it is still so interesting for him that he does not have to isolate himself from this.

Let us allow ourselves here to draw the reader's attention to yet another characteristic feature of modern warfare—the

E 2

the looming possibility in our times of local (isolated) wars and, conversely, on the broad development of coalition wars.

We will talk about this in detail in its place, although one of the reviewers of our first book reproached us for hushing up this issue. Everyone, however, has his own time.

This increased number of coalitions can be explained by nothing else than the imperialist character of the modern era.

Together with the trusting of the capital of various countries, there is also the unification of their military forces in defense of common economic interests. True, in powerful economic states this is difficult, because, quite often, the interests of the financial capital of these countries collide, and much effort must be made to regulate these relations in the interests of military policy. An example of this is the tripartite alliance, in which political ties were so shaky that the states that were part of this alliance had to repeatedly ask their allies at serious moments whether they would provide support in a possible armed conflict. The same can be observed in the Anglo-Khrapduz negotiations. It was different in the Franco-Russian Union, where the Franzia, strong with Fipasov's capital, could impose its will, however, with a certain caution, on the monarchist Rosspi.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, two were available on the European mainland. strong coalitions of large states, to which small European states gradually became economically attached.

The question of their military alliance with this or that group of states was still open for most of them, and some of them then turned out to be neutral, maintaining this position throughout the war or later appearing actively in the arena of world struggle.

In any case, the coalition character of the war, with a touch of imperialism, was already so firmly established that one could count. for a local war between major European states, such as the war between France and Germany in 1870-1871, and even for such a war as between Austria-Hungary and Serbia or Russia and Turkey, it was necessary. In this, the diplomats of the European states were more than welcome. the right path, stopping the ardent dreams of the chiefs of the general staff about the possibility of waging an isolated war. There is nothing to hush up, of course, that Koprad was a great optimist in this, developing the plans of various political groups for the isolation of Serbia and a possible attack on it. The Russian chief of the general staff, Palntsyn, was wrong in this, counting on fighting Turkey alone on the Caucasian border.

European states cannot draw a sword without causing a European war.

However, oddly enough, with the desire of Berlin to localize the war between Austria and Serbia, a world war broke out. Berlin, having made a false: the premise of the possibility of such a war, losses then the ground under but; ami and quickly descended into a European armed clash. The reader has gone through all the efforts of German diplomacy to localize the war. and the disappointment that resulted from them.

254

ON IOOOIYA—_24— OIIIOYen

Above, we quoted Lepin's words about war and alliances in capitalist society, which predetermined coalition war both at the beginning of the 20th century and in our time.

My: It has already been pointed out that warfare has been and is now in a class society the last resort to which states turn in resolving their disputes. More or less peacefully settled clashes are either resolved by diplomatic negotiations between the states concerned, or are considered at a conference of ambassadors, if . they affect the interests of other powers. In a word, states try their best to avoid war.

We heard how Conrad unhooked such confessions, and other politicians, not with great confidence, went along with them. Each such kopfferenipya, in essence, had a right only when its decisions were voluntarily subscribed to. An attempt to force Montenegro by military threat to comply with the decisions of the London Conference of Ambassadors in 1913, due to the lack of a sincere desire of the big states to intervene in this, ended in failure. To grant the right of execution to one of the major states, the London Conference, because of its lack of confidence in the honesty of this state, did not dare.

Such is the significance of the diplomatic conferences, to which the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff was so skeptical.

However, the idea of fighting for peace and the abolition of war, which was first discussed specifically at the Hague Copherevsia, found many supporters, mainly in the ranks of either weak states or political dreamers. More real politicians looked sensibly at the approaching world battle and considered it necessary to prepare for it.

As you know, the war with its horrors was subjected to a special regulation on an international scale and was reflected in well-known international legal norms.

Not a few "wise" minds sat behind the drawing up of these norms ... and precisely so that with the start of the world war they would become invalid. True, the indignation, the noble indignation, against the violators of these norms was great, they threatened with a court ... and even tried minor characters. The persons more responsible for Vedennian warfare looked at this somewhat differently. We heard the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov say even before the war that "any legal form is valid only in peacetime." The former Minister of War of Germany, and later the chief of staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Falkepgain, in his book "Supreme Commander", published after the war, writes that "above

of all forms of international law is the duty of self-preservation. Ludendorff notes that "new foundations for the conduct of war also create new international principles."

In a word, the international norms on war, which tried to bring it into the framework of a slander, turned out to be dead, and the works of many jurists were in vain. One of these champions of peace, the well-known pacifist Nitti, is forced, after the war, to admit that "war in general shatters all the foundations of tradition and morality." "The most important thing for war is victory - Respect for some traditional rules of international conduct

255

but is rather a mutual insurance of the warring parties than a remnant of knighthood ... The need for war takes the form of legality.

Nitti refuses to normalize war, but demands that norms be observed in peacetime: "when peace has been declared and the danger has passed, every violation of international law, every insult to the vanquished, every violation of given obligations, every denial of law, is an insult similar to civilization and culture."

Professors of international law must recognize its force only in peacetime, because the war turned out to be stronger than them.

With the end of the World War, the idea of the struggle for peace revived again and is being successfully cultivated by the major European states in the form of the well-known League of Nations. It must be said that the League of Nations has taken several steps forward against The Hague, being in fact the representative of the dictatorship of England and France on the continent of Europe. We will not go into detail here about the true physiognomy of this capitalist institution, over the entrance of which "peace" is inscribed, and in its very essence lies the guarantee of "war" and "violence" of capitalist-strong states. The role of the League of Nations in the mental development of Europe and the attempts to disarm it is well known to all. It can be said with certainty that, first of all, the creators themselves do not believe in the neediness of this existence, continuing to insist not on voluntary, but on compulsory disarmament of the defeated countries.

On this, strictly speaking, it would be possible to put an end to the war as a historical phenomenon in the life of class society.

It only remains to say a few words about the disappearance of war. We have pointed out more than once that war will die out only with the death of the capitalist world, and if "eternal peace is possible only in a cemetery", then, precisely, in the cemetery of a capitalist society.

In the meantime ... "the tale of the last war," as Lenin said, "is an empty, harmful tale, a mixed mythology"...

CHAPTER 10 WAR PLAN AND FOREIGN POLICY

"Diplomatic war plan" and its existence in reality. — The political aim of the war and its modification by strategy. — Military goal and its place in considerations of general staffs. - The war plan before the World War and in our time. — Clausewitz on the main lines in terms of war. — Clausewitz on the amount of funds for the war. - Political and military values that are taken into account when drawing up a war plan. - The ratio of military forces and its significance. — Political creativity

Konrad and other chiefs of the general staff. - The basis of politics, according to Conrad, is military force. - Alliances with other states. — Neutral states. — Priority in achieving political goals. — Choosing the time to start the war. - Suddenness according to Clausewitz and in our days. - Accounting by the General Staff in terms of war of the revolutionary movement. — Lenin on the influence of revolutionary movements on the war. — The modern nature of the war and the need to take it into account in politics. - Technique of work according to the war plan and its influence on politics. — A special line of conduct for the General Staff. - Distrust of strategy to foreign policy. - The flexibility of the war plan and the need for it. - Approval of the war plan. — Orientation in terms of war by representatives of departments. — The Council of Ministers and its role in the war plan. — Knowledge of war by politicians. — Bülow and Jo-Clausewitz on the need [for politicians to study war. — The Triumvirate and its role in this matter. — Knowledge of the war by diplomats at the beginning of the 20th century and mentoring of the General Staff. — Modern formulation of the question. — Marxists in the knowledge of war. — Border incidents and their significance in the work of the General Staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In the previous chapter, we tried to substantiate the general conditions for the connection between war and foreign policy, as well as to reveal in general terms the face of war itself. Now we set ourselves the task of delving a little deeper into the joint work of diplomats and strategists in the preparation of a war plan.

We have heard that war is not particularly related to politics, in particular foreign politics, but is permeated through and through with politics, that war is a real tool of politics, that it is waged to achieve important political goals. Oldpacko, in the previous chapter we noted that war has its own laws, which must be taken into account by politics.

On these "laws of war" some chiefs of the general staffs played a game, presenting their demands to representatives of foreign policy. The basis for this was the premise that in war one must first of all strive to achieve military success.

On the other hand, the diplomats in the war saw only one of the means to achieve the goals to which all their work was directed, and we heard how, for example, Ehrenthal spoke about this with sufficient clarity to the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff. Even such a conservative "husband" as Sukhomlinov, and he in his memoirs, however,

17 The brain of the army. Ning. 3.257

ai

his number, indicates that the solution of the question of war or peace was beyond the scope of his competence.

We also noted that warfare is an extreme means of politics, and therefore politics cannot build its work solely on war, but must always keep in mind the possibility of entering into armed clashes with other states.

However, if we open some treatises on strategy, even those of our time, we will find chapters that are devoted to a special "diplomatic plan" for war, i.e., in other words, diplomacy must constantly work for war. What is required of foreign policy is the appropriate preparation for war, the achievement of political surprise in its announcement, and the choice of the time most favorable for the state entering the war.

donations.

We know that international relations are not built on the military balance of forces of states; that economic power lies at the foundation of foreign relations; that in the competition in this area there are conflicts, a political struggle is being waged. War is only the extreme form of this struggle.

Therefore, it seems to us that it is possible to speak of a definite diplomatic war plan only when the state is striving for a preventive war. However, by this we absolutely do not want to say that any war, even a purely defensive one, should not be prepared by diplomacy.

War is an instrument of politics and is waged to achieve certain political goals.

"No one starts a war (or, at least, acting reasonably, should not start), writes Clausewitz, without telling himself what he wants to achieve by war and what in war itself? The former is the purpose of the war, and the latter is the purpose of the war. This basic idea gives direction to everything, indicates the size of the means and the measure of energy; its influence descends even to the last divisions of actions.

Thus, two songs are revealed: political and military.

The political goals that the state sets for itself are usually achieved through peaceful agreements and only as a last resort are resolved on the military field. But even in the latter case, the political goal should always be in front of the eyes of a modern strategist.

We in the previous chapter cited Clausewitz's judgments about the modification of the political goal. The philosophy of war says with complete certainty: "No matter how significant the impact of war on the goal of politics, it, in any case, can only modify the direction and intentions of the latter, because the political goal still retains paramount importance. Politics sets a goal; war is a means, a tool to achieve it; acting as an instrument, we must not forget about the singing of the workers.

Meanwhile, in all the reports of the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, we met something completely different. Correctly theoretically christening war as an instrument of politics, Conrad, however, giving "primary importance" to the military goal, and with a bold hand not only modified, but also outlined independently the political goals of the foreign policy of the Danubian Empire.

258

And -

The chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff demanded a completely definite, years-long diplomatic war plan. His future comrade-in-arms in Berlin, Moltke, also found it necessary by the beginning of the war for a complete clarification on the part of diplomacy of "enemies and friends."

The reader could see for himself that the closer Europe came to the war, the more insistent were the demands of the general staffs for foreign policy, and its work was called into question not only in Vienna, but also in Berlin. Conrad frankly told us that the approach of war should signify the subordination of diplomatic work to the conditions

war, and Moltke, according to Ludendorff, fully admired the abilities of the Berlin diplomats.

It cannot be said that such an attack of the sword against the diplomatic pen had no basis. In order to outline the political goals of the foreign policy of the former Habsburg Empire, Conrad had to proceed from quite definite provisions, which would serve as strong evidence of the correctness of his actions and actions.

So it was in reality.

If we recall, then each of the chiefs of the general headquarters considered himself responsible for preparing for war from the military side and, above all, for the correct and accurate development of a war plan, or, as Konrad classified this activity, for general and, especially, specific military training. to war. |

It was this responsibility for the plan of war and exclusive duties that gave the right to the chiefs of the general headquarters to come up with certain, sometimes harsh, demands on diplomacy in its preparation for war. That is why we find in treatises on strategy, though more modern to us, proofs of the need for a special diplomatic war plan.

As you can see, the requirements are by no means unimportant, and we consider them necessary to understand in more detail.

"The plan of war," says Clausewitz, "brings together the whole of the military. activity, klopyschuyusya to the goal of the last and final, in which. all private goals have merged.

We meet with such a concept of the plan of war on the threshold of a world war. It is known from the preceding chapters and the first book of our work that the chief of the Austro-Hungarian staff considered "all, in the aggregate, the peaceful work of all the armed forces" as "preparatory work" for the war, which constituted the war plan. However, Conrad further clarified this, dividing the war plan into general military training in general for any war and specific military training for a specific war, in other words, a definite variant of strategic deployment. In the usual sense for that time, this strategic deployment or specific military preparation was called the plan of war on such and such a front. |

In modern conditions, when the war is waged by the entire state as a whole, it is already necessary to invest in the concept of a war plan not only one strategic deployment, but even the entire preparation for war of armed forces.

259

forces, because, as you know, war must also be prepared on the economic and political fronts.

In what follows, speaking of the war plan as understood by the general staff at the beginning of the 20th century, we will, in essence, be talking about the strategic deployment of armed forces for war on a specific front. With such a restriction, we will leave not far from Vlauzevid, and all his thoughts on this issue will be vital even at the present time.

"War is not an independent matter, but a continuation of the kidnapping

by other means, - says Yolauevits, - in view of this, the main lines of all major strategic plans are predominantly political in nature, which is the stronger, the more they cover the war and the state as a whole. The whole plan of war follows directly from the political existence of both belligerent states and from their relations with other powers.

Elsewhere Philosoch of War explicitly states that "when it comes to the plan of war or campaigns, the recourse to politics is absolutely inevitable", and in general "no one of the military plans can be sketched out without consideration of political relations." ° - Thoughts are quite clear and distinct. It must be said, in all fairness, that they were well assimilated in the various general staffs of Europe at the beginning of the 20th century, especially in Vienna. Here we will not repeat all the thoughts and documents on Konrad's mouth, because we have given them in sufficient detail above, and we will only note that in his mouth the butcher of the Austro-Hungarian general headquarters was a strict follower of Clausewitz. Konrad testified quite often that a particularly specific military training required clear and constant main lines of foreign policy. He immediately pointed out that the concrete preparation for war is also influenced by domestic policy, for it is one thing to throw all forces on the external Front when there is peace in the state, and another when part of them has to be left inside the state to protect the existing state order. Demands from diplomacy for the same main directing lines of foreign policy came from other chiefs of general staffs.

Indeed, "the theory requires," says Kzausewitz, "that before any war, first of all, on the basis of probability, recognize its character and the general in large outlines, taking political magnitudes and the situation as the basis."

"Our violence against the enemy is measured by his and our political aspirations. As far as they are mutually known, they represent the measure of the required efforts.

We have already said that in order to achieve a political goal in a war, a military goal is determined, which requires appropriate means for the implementation. Speaking about their size, Clausewitz comes to the conclusion that "it is necessary to determine its political (war: - B. Sh.) goal, both one's own and the enemy's; equally and reciprocal forces of states and their internal relations; further, the nature of governments, peoples and the ability of both, finally, political ties with other states and the impact on them of the upcoming war.

280

o ———_shshsh | [][[

"It is not difficult to understand," says Clausewitz, "that it is absolutely impossible to weigh and overcome all these various and variously intertwined subjects by mere school-correct discussion."

"To quickly solve such a large task requires a real bright eye of a genius. And Bonaparte quite rightly said that these are mathematical problems that even Newton would be afraid of.

"So," concludes Clausewitz, "we must first of all recognize that the determination of the possible goal of the upcoming war, as well as the means,

necessary to achieve it, can be derived by a general look at all the relationships, including all the most particular features at a given time.

We have not heard here about the economic relations between peoples, the kop should also be taken into account in determining the political and military goals of the war. But we have pointed out more than once that in Khausewitz's time they did not come out as sharply as they do in our time. The concept of "politics" of war also embraced the economic relations of states. Today it is well known that politics is a superstructure of the economy, and therefore, in order to correctly understand the political goals of states that may find themselves in a state of war, we consider it necessary first of all to consider their economic ties.

In this regard, we will remind the reader of the reports by Nemits and the Russian Naval General Staff, which began precisely with the definition of Russia's economic spheres in the Black Sea.

Before us passed many documents of the general staffs, which had the task of determining political and military goals, the amount of necessary funds for a possible war, in other words, documents that tried to determine the basis with the "bright look of a genius"! war plan.

The bold hand of Conrad sketched them in abundance, for the chief of staff considered himself responsible for the work on the war plan, did not think to wait for instructions from representatives of foreign policy, but tried to figure out for himself the nature of the future war for the monarchy.

Conrad, remembering well the precepts of Clausevid about the close connection between politics and strategy, did not think of fencing off with a reshotka from Vienna diplomacy, knowing in advance that in the face of some of its representatives he sees not friends, but enemies.

Above, we cited Clausewitz's theoretical propositions about those Factors that should be taken into account when determining the "possible sang" of war. From the enumeration of the most important of them by the Philosopher of War, it is already clear that they are numerous, and we consider it possible to divide them into two groups: the political foundations and the foundations of war as such. It is clear that the first group must be based on economic relief.

Clausevid attributed to the political foundations: political goals, the nature of governments, peoples and the abilities of both, internal relations in the state, political ties with other states. As we can see, in order to correctly take into account these factors, the main guiding lines of foreign policy, it is necessary to understand the daily work in the field, not purely

military.

Finally, the nature of war, the situation of modern war, must also leave their mark on the definition of the military goal, the amount of funds and the way they are used in the event of war.

261

r a aanannia

We have pointed out more than once that there can be no question of any opposition between the demands of the military and the political, and we have referred to Clausewitz, who considered this absurd. No matter how important the "spirit of war" is, its nature, but it cannot exclude political magnitudes, but is only able to modify the goals of foreign policy.

In other words, when drawing up a plan for war, we must give priority to political foundations and proceed from them in determining the military song, but by no means build the foreign policy of the state according to the laws of war.

Meanwhile, in the reports of the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, and others, we find a different architectonics.

We have noted more than once that Conrad's state policy was based on the correlation of his military forces with other states. Only on this basis did the Viennese Chief of Staff find it possible to justify political states. More than once he told us that a policy not based on the army is a building built on sand. Recognizing the need for Austria-Hungary to pursue a policy of alliances with other states, Conrad did not particularly rely on them and said that relying on the allies, without a strong army of its own, was a dangerous business. Each step of diplomacy is armin, according to the chief. headquarters, must be backed up and even based on military strength.

In this, of course, our hero is not original, for even Frederick the Great believed that diplomatic notes not based on armed forces are like notes without instruments.

From the enumeration of certain nolithic Factors, which we have taken from Clausewibe, it is clear that the war is not decided by a single correlation of military forces, and in the previous chapter we quoted Lenin's condemnations on this score. Finally, the same Clausewitz, examining the question of the type of war, offensive or defensive, says: "The mutual balance of forces, it would seem, should be the most important and decisive reason. However, we believe that, based on this, we would have just gone astray."

We must note such wandering both in Conrad and in other chiefs of staff who wanted to base the foreign relations of states on a military basis and determine their political goals.

It is impossible to disregard the just demands of Conrad from the foreign policy of determining the main directing lines for drawing up a war plan, because only on the basis of them it was possible to build a correct military plan. Not receiving these instructions, or disagreeing with those given, the chief of the Austro-Hungarian headquarters himself outlined the political goals of the foreign policy of the monarchy, proceeding from military conditions, from the nature of war for the Danubian Empire.

We do not intend to condemn Konrad for his political creativity, because, of course, one cannot unconditionally take as the basis for drawing up a war plan these political goals, which must be taken into account with military capabilities. We have pointed out above that strategy can modify these goals, but only not subordinate them to itself. Conrad had a voice in this respect, but the basis of his condemnations led him "astray."

262

EO AS OOV

If we take a closer look at the political part of the reports of the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, and even at the Moltke report of 1912 and Konrad's letters to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, we will find confirmation

said.

In the person of the chief of the general staff, the strategy made certain demands on foreign policy in preparing for a future war; moreover, these demands rested: 1) on the fundamental military foundations and 2) on the technical work on the war plan.

Documents and thoughts of the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff indicate that he considered the path of war to be the main way to achieve important political goals for the state. Occasionally and for a very short time, Konrad left him, leaning towards the economic conquest of the neighboring Balkan states. Basically, he believed that the fate of states, their vital aspirations, are decided on the military field, and not at the diplomatic table.

Naturally, the basis of each real policy was the corresponding
carrying military forces.

The Chief of Staff began his reports with the establishment of those political goals which, depending on geographic, cultural and ethnographic conditions, should be pursued by Austria-Hungary. Needless to say, it all boiled down to imperialist conquests, because, as we indicated earlier, Austria-Hungary at the beginning of the 20th century was firmly on the path of imperialism.

From the consideration of political goals, Konrad identified the main ones, and depending on this, the main enemies were determined in the person of the states that were on the way to achieving these goals.

At the same time, the chief of the general staff turned to a real force to carry out the planned line of conduct - the armed force of Austria-Hungary - and proceeded from it in determining the goals that diplomacy should set itself. Op has pointed out to us more than once that the latter has the right to set itself goals that cannot be backed up by military force.

Its dimensions in Austria-Hungary did not correspond to the possibility of pursuing several political goals, and those had to be limited. Konrad noted with complete certainty and justice that a state threatened from all sides, such as the Danube Empire, could not fight 360, and therefore it was necessary to prepare only for a certain, pre-planned war. In confirmation of his words, Conrad cited other states, such as Italy, Germany, which have limited threatened units, on which they can concentrate their preparations for war.

For the same state as Austria-Hungary was on the map of Europe, diplomacy should create favorable conditions for waging war, if nature offended in this.

To achieve this, according to Conrad, it was possible: 1) alliances with other states; 2) neutralization of some of them; 3) the order in which political goals are achieved through war; 4) an appropriate timing for the outbreak of war.

If we look again at Conrad's documents, we will find in them how gradually, starting © to recognize the need for a local war, he acquired the concept of a future war, as a trusted war, in alliance with other states.

In the previous chapter, we already noted that a coalition war was bound to emerge as a consequence of the epoch we are experiencing, and therefore any assumptions of the chiefs of the general staffs (Konrad, Moltke, Palidyn) about the possibility of waging an isolated war must be considered, at least, unfounded. . This was also pointed out by some of their contemporary diplomats.

counting unions. with other states necessary. for a future war, the chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, however, looked at them as a harsh reality, and in any case did not want to base his assumptions on them. We have already heard his opinion on this matter and will not repeat it.

Alliances with other states gave an increase in military forces, which was what Ekonrad needed, but the chief of the Austro-Hungarian headquarters did not want to unconditionally subjugate not only the military, but also coordinate political singing with the allied states.

Below we will dwell on this issue in detail, and for the time being we will only note that state egoism was characteristic of Konrad more than any other of the chiefs of staff.

Recognizing the necessity of alliances, especially the alliance with Germany, Conrad presented his demands for this to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, sketching out drafts of new alliances for purely military reasons, with little regard to the extent to which economic ties contributed to their conclusion. True, in fairness, we must note that in 1912 Conrad's desire to have Rumania on his side was so great that, on his return from Bucharest, the chief of staff even raised the question of concluding a purely commercial agreement with this state.

Reluctantly, Conrad endured allied relations with Italy, foreseeing her perfidiousness, and not only thought about joint actions with Italy, but, on the contrary, developed defenses against this state, entering into a heated argument with the Minister of Foreign Affairs because of this.

We have come across in our literature the opinion that before the World War the General Staff: narrowly regarded foreign relations with other states, concentrating them only on the nearest states. We consider this opinion superficial, because the documents of the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff say otherwise. His political outlook was broad, not limited to Europe, but spread to Asia and America. We heard that China, in particular, attracted Conrad's attention. Whether this is right or not is another question, but in any case, almost all states, more or less significant, were taken into account by the chief of the general staff.

If, as indicated above, some of the states were counted by Conrad as direct or indirect enemies, some were considered allies, then the other part, in his opinion, should remain neutral, like Switzerland, or create a threatening position for

<

[1

direct enemies. Among such states, Konrad especially assigned Albania, which, with its armed gangs, and in the project with a special national army, was supposed to divert part of the military forces of Serbia from the main theater of military operations. We have heard more than once Konrad's proposals to buy the neutrality of Montenegro with monetary compensation.

In a word, political relations with other states were subjected to extensive analysis by the Chief of the General Staff in Vienna from the point of view of strengthening the military power of Austria-Hungary. True, sometimes his proposals for diplomacy seemed groundless and sharply at odds with the line of conduct of foreign policy, but this happened because Conrad did not take into account the economic basis of these relations deeply enough. To his credit, it must be said that he himself admitted that he was not particularly strong in this.

Speaking of neutral states, whose influence, in one way or another, was to be reflected in the plan of war, we cannot ignore the notorious Belgian neutrality. As you know, there is now a large literature around this question: was it beneficial for Germany to violate Belgian neutrality, or should its inviolability be recognized?

Economic conditions did not at all speak for the need to occupy Belgium, and an invasion of Belgium could only be justified by Schlieffen's "brilliant" plan. Meanwhile, the consequence was the participation in the war not only of the Belgian army, but also of England. It can, of course, be assumed that even if Belgian neutrality were observed, England would have come out against Germany. Could the plan of the invasion of the German armies into Francia, bypassing Belgium, be carried out, and what would be the results of it? It seems to us that success would have accompanied German arms without violating Belgian neutrality. Wilhelm's doubts that, on purely military grounds, Germany's general staff had hung the war with England on Germany's neck, to some extent, are not unfounded.

We pass over the assertion that allegedly German diplomacy was unexpectedly confronted by the General Staff with the act of violating Belgpi's neutrality. Ludendorff's testimony, and Jagow's behavior itself, say otherwise, namely, that the Canpler and his closest assistants knew the war plan long beforehand, at least in its political part. Another question is why this was not protested in advance by German diplomacy and not approved by Wilhelm himself. The responsibility for violating Belgian neutrality, in any case, cannot be shifted onto the shoulders of the German General Staff alone.

As regards the achievement of political goals by war in the order of priority, we have spoken about this above. It would seem that it was impossible to object to such a line of conduct. It led, of course, to preventive wars, of which Conrad was a supporter, relying on the authority and example of Bismarck in his policy of creating a German empire. However, it must be said that the intensity of the coming war for the European states should have been such that it was difficult to count after the European war again to raise the state to the next armed

O [

fight. True, the example of the Balkan states in this suggests otherwise. On the part of Serbia, we saw precisely such a gradual achievement of the goals set by the war, but it must also be taken into account that the first and second Balkan wars were not as destructive as the coming European war. On the part of today's Yugoslavia, the former Serbia, in its kidnapping complications with Italy, we see a completely different approach: caution in referring to war as a special type of international relations.

The timing of the start of the war must be coordinated by diplomacy with the war plan. Timing depends 1) on political reasons and 2) purely on the nature of the war.

We pointed out above that some contemporary strategists demand from diplomacy such a preparation for war as to "give us the advantages of political surprise in the offensive and eliminate their disadvantages in defense."

"We affirm," Clausewitz wrote, "that inadvertence lies at the basis of all enterprises without exception, but only to varying degrees, according to the nature of the enterprise and other circumstances."

"It should be noted, however, that although the striving for the unexpected is universal, that it is really necessary and will never remain without a certain influence, nevertheless, by the very nature of things, it succeeds in full measure only in very rare cases."

"It would therefore be erroneous to assume that by this predominant means it is possible to achieve much in war." —

"Unexpectedness is more real in tactics, for the natural reason that time and space are more limited in it. In strategy, spontaneity is more real in those actions that are closer to tactical, and the less, the higher they rise into the realm of politics.

"Preparations for war usually last for months," continues Clausewitz, "and it happens very rarely that one state warns another by an accidental war or by the general direction of its forces."

Thus, the Philosophy of War, even given its time, reduced almost to nothing "political extraneousness." Indeed, it can hardly be asserted that the world war came upon any of the states politically suddenly. Everything we have said above about the policy of Europe on the eve of 1914 says the opposite. Of course, we are not going to believe the tales of Poincaré, according to whose testimony Germany suddenly attacked France, and Austria-Hungary attacked Serbia.

With modern means of reconnaissance by one state of the military training of another, one cannot speak of any political surprise. In this we fully agree with the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, who pointed out to the Minister of Foreign Affairs that it is impossible to hide preparations for war, and because of suddenness or fear of drawing the attention of another state, there are no grounds not to conduct preparations for war.

Thus, we reject political suddenness and do not want to challenge diplomacy to enable us to use the benefits of this means.

Another thing can be said about strategic visibility these days. As you know, the Schallifen plan was partly built on such surprise

266

What

in fact, Joffre's mixed cards in the border battle. We would not object to this if it were not for the mirage, not for the prejudice, which was embedded in the brains of the French General Staff. History clearly shows that the plan of the German offensive through Belgium was known for a long time and was even taken into account in Michel's plan. If the "French general staff of the time of 1914 was pleased to pollute its brains in advance with the doctrine of the offensive and false ideas about the plan for the deployment of German armies, then we see the least advantage of surprise in this.

The inquisitive mind of Clausewitz foresaw such an "accident". Clausewitz said: "Whoever surprises the enemy with an unsuccessful accident, instead of success, risks getting a well-deserved surrender." Thinking in the offensive to prepare "sorrowfulness" for the Germans, the French General Staff received a "well-deserved lunch".

True, in our times the speed of concentration of military forces has changed towards an increase, and it seems that the advantages of surprise in the "direction of forces" have increased, but on the other hand, the means of reconnaissance of the enemy's intentions have improved long before the war.

The only requirement that the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff made of the diplomat in regard to timing was to prevent the enemy from giving warning in deployment, so as not to create moral success and not start a war in the winter, for which the Vienna army was not ready.

These demands of Conrad cannot be summed up under the concept of "political surprise". As for his fear of winter for the campaign of the Austro-Hungarian army, we find this quite natural.

In order to put an end to the "political" side of the war, we must turn our attention to one more demand that strategy has made and will make to politics.

The reader has more than once heard the Viennese talk about the revolution in Rosspi, dressed up by the Austrian General Staff for the war plan. Then the Chief of the German General Staff presented, it is true, on the threshold of the war, a whole report on the "revolutionary lowering of the world." In his book "How the World War Started," Kautsky sharply attacked the German General Staff and Wilhelm for this document, who, as a matter of fact, either initiated this or repeated the ideas of the General Staff, but before they were published by the latter.

We are no longer inclined to follow in the footsteps of the apostle of Menshevism, for his preaching is a preaching that is contrary not only to war, but also to politics.

In the first book of our work, we came to the conclusion that the nature of war is determined by internal politics and that the fluctuations of the mouth policy, whether caused independently by classes of the population in the state or accelerated

wounded by the hand of the enemy, they will give the war this or that impression.

When quoting Clausewitz's thoughts on the quantities that influence the definition of a military goal, we have just indicated that Clausewitz advised to consider the internal relations in the state, attaching importance to them.

Thus, at the rate of the general staffs on the revolution in the enemy

267

o

In wealthy states, we not only do not see anything unnatural, but, on the contrary, we see completely legitimate demands for war.

In the article "Results of the Discussion on Self-Determination," Lenin says: "The general staffs in the present war (world war — B.Sh.) are carefully trying to use any national and revolutionary movement in the camp of their opponents, the Nemdy—the Irish uprising, the guards - the Czech movement, etc. And from their point of view, they are doing quite right. One cannot take a serious war seriously without taking advantage of the slightest weakness of the enemy, without seizing every chance, especially since it is impossible to know in advance at what exact moment and with what exact force this or that store of gunpowder will "blow up" here or there. . We would be very bad revolutionaries if, in the great liberation war of the proletariat for socialism, we failed to use every popular movement against the individual calamities of imperialism in the interests of sharpening and widening the crisis. If we began, on the one hand, to declare and repeat in a thousand ways that we are "against" all national oppression, and on the other hand, to call a "putsch" a heroic uprising of the most mobile and intelligent part of certain classes of an oppressed nation against oppressors, would reduce themselves to the level of being as stupid as the Kautskyites.

On this we consider it necessary to finish with the question raised, all the more so since the shaking of the internal foundations of a hostile state in the interests of an external war is now everywhere recognized, and all charges of this should be removed from the General Staff. One thing can be said that in peacetime, as we sometimes see today, without government sanctions, the general staff has no right to act independently in this area, because such a struggle is part of the political struggle, led by the government of the state, and not its military body - the general headquarters. In this regard, we recognize as quite correct Berchtold's displeasure at the General Staff, which independently sent weapons to Albania for the Formation of the BAP, for the actions of which it was necessary, if not to answer, then to unsubscribe to the Serbian diplomacy not to the General Staff, but to the Minister of Foreign Affairs grandfather.

"The end that the one who undertakes the war sets for himself, and the means that he sets out to achieve it, will essentially correspond to precisely all the given conditions of his position. But at the same time they will bear the imprint of the nature of their time and general relations, and finally, they will also obey the general conclusions drawn from the nature of war. |

So teaches old Clausevia.

In the preceding chapter, we showed that Field Marshal Moltke built his theory of the emancipation of war from politics on the "nature of the war".

268

the chief of the general staff to ensure this numerical superiority, if not by developing their own armed forces, then at least by concluding appropriate alliances and isolating the enemy.

However, as we pointed out above, the ratio of military forces can be recognized as only a relative value, but in any case not decisive in a war. Yes, and the example of the struggle of the middle states of Europe themselves, which were inferior in the number of military forces to the Entente, shows that it is not necessary to modify the political goals of the war only because a simple arithmetic calculation of the number of divisions is not in our favor. .

Neither Clausewipes, nor Lenin - no one came to the conclusion that a small state in the struggle against a large state or an alliance of such is doomed to destruction in advance. On the contrary, such a small state will sometimes be forced to resort to the offensive, that is, the most active form of warfare.

The next thing that Konrad, and other chiefs of staff of foreign policy put forward as requirements that must be taken into account when determining this or that line of conduct, was the modern nature of the slaughter and preparation of her. We will not repeat here those teachings that, for example, in this respect, the affairs of Conrad, enumerating the modern elements of the war, which complicated it. They are certainly fair and must necessarily be taken into account by both the politician and the strategist when drawing up a war plan.

It is well known that “each epoch,” as Yoklausewip says, “should have its own theory of war,” and this “theory” must be taken into account by the politician. Below we will repeat how broad his knowledge of military affairs should be, but here we note that the teachings of the chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff were appropriate, since the diplomats of Vienna had a rather vague idea of the “nature of wars”. In our time, the study and knowledge of the general principles of war is especially necessary for every statesman.

Conrad, in his teachings, also talked about the technical conditions for developing a war plan, giving diplomats an idea of how difficult and lengthy such work is. He clearly pointed out that a war plan was developed over years, that specific preparations should be carried out for at least a year, and only under special conditions would it require at least 4-6 weeks to change. In our proper place, we shall discuss this question in detail, and now we will point out that knowledge of the painstaking and difficult work that is being done by the General Staff in concrete preparation for war on this or that Front is not only not useless for a politician, but is even necessary.

Finally, we must also note the difficulties in the ways of the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian Staff, which he had to meet in conversations with diplomats when discussing their, sometimes fantastic, projects of various military demonstrations, small incursions and similar military threats, which did not at all correspond to modern conditions. waging war. Instructive, and still controversial, is the issue of Russia's Bosphorus expedition. As you know, the Russian land general staff believed that the key to the Bosphorus lay in Berlin, and therefore concentrated all

269

ii nBNmnl oh,

their attention and strength on the western frontier. At the same time, the Naval General Staff believed that the operation against the straits should have been carried out simultaneously with the offensive on the Western Front. Due to the size and objectives of our work, we are not able to elucidate this issue in detail, but we believe that the point of view of the representatives of the land in 1914 was more correct, which was confirmed in 1915 by the unsuccessful Dardanelles operation. Despite the importance of the political song, one cannot ignore the "nature of war", which advises not to scatter one's forces, but to strike at the main enemy.

From all that has been said about the specific preparation for war, the reader of our work can already get an idea of how closely politics and strategy are intertwined in this. This was clearly understood by the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, who plunged deep into the depths of politics in his documents, conversations and thoughts. There is, of course, nothing unnatural in this, and one can only recommend a similar way of thinking to all those who are called to such responsible positions.

But Conrad sinned in one thing and sinned so much that he reduced his activity to shabby conclusions not only in the face of history, but also in the eyes of his contemporaries. The path of thinking of the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff was directed along the channel followed by Moltke Senior.

As has been pointed out more than once, Conrad in his political discourse proceeded mainly from the "nature of the war." The "spirit of war" dictated to him the demands that should be made on politics.

From this came his demands for the establishment of a favorable ratio of armed forces, for a permanent, firmly established line of conduct for foreign policy, for the independence of politics from the influence of individual personalities, parties, his entreaties and demands for a preventive war, his drafts of alliances, and finally, his bold sketches not only political purposes, but even appropriate notes of a purely diplomatic nature.

In short, the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff came in with proposals not only to modify the political goals of foreign policy, proceeding from military considerations, but also sought to create them independently and even carry them out, which we noted in its place. That is why we took the liberty of subdividing the line of conduct in foreign policy, singling out from it a special line of the General Staff. Whether we are right in this or not, we leave it to the readers of our second book to judge.

Of course, there cannot be two opinions that such a phenomenon should be recognized as abnormal, that it is not necessary to subordinate politics entirely to the "spirit of war" when drawing up a war plan, and anyone who embarks on this path will take the wrong path.

It was pointed out above that the reason for this was the mistrust of strategy towards diplomacy. Conrad declared emphatically that he did not intend to subordinate his military preparations to an erroneous policy. Even the cautious German chief of the general staff did not trust Germany's diplomatic helmsman. Of course, such arguments are rather unconvincing, and Clausewitz is right when he wrote: "If, as is often the case, people complain

270

UI - AS PILI

on the harmful influence of politics on the conduct of the war, they say not what they should say. The philosopher of war notes with certainty that "only the subordination of the military view to the political one remains possible."

If we observed the opposite when drawing up the war plan, then this must be explained by the lack of flexibility in it, purely military flexibility, and not political. Most of the chiefs of the general staff were pretty straightforward about the use of the armed forces in the event of wars! and, conversely, they demanded maneuvering from the latest policy, i.e., flexibility from the diplomatic plan of war, if one admits the existence of such in nature.

The complicated mechanism of modern mass armies, with their focus on the frontiers, required advance preparation, in accordance with the given political grouping of potential opponents. At the same time, the simpler this grouping was and was foreseen in advance, the easier it was to concentrate troops on the well-known "Front". The ideal for every general staff was to prepare the concentration of the army so that, like mobilization, it would go like clockwork. Every chief of the general staff strove for this, demanding from diplomacy an exact and early clarification of who should be considered an enemy and who a friend, and Konrad himself, from a military point of view, was engaged in a similar classification of the states of Europe.

The same chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff more than once

led us to all the benefits in the development of specific military preparations by a state that, like Spain, has, in essence, one Front, i.e. a predetermined political goal, according to which a strategic deployment could be well prepared. According to Konrad, Austria-Hungary was in a difficult situation, when she had to prepare for war on several "Fronts" that were diametrically opposed. The general headquarters in Vienna had some ideas on this score, dividing the concentration of forces into "ledges" A and B, the second of which, depending on the situation that became clear, should be directed to one or another Front in the next few days of the war.

Without going into details of all the measures leading to the maneuver of the seals during concentration, which we will do when considering the work of the general staff on specific military training, we have to note, as common to all general staffs, the lack of flexibility in it, the pursuit of straightforwardness, caused by technical considerations,

and by no means the political situation at the time of the declaration of war.

True, in the documents of the Austrian General Staff we find various options for a war with neighboring states or their alliance, in French - the appearance of a special variant to the KhUP plan, in Russian - two options A and D, and in German - in fact one "brilliant" Schlieffen's plan in the study of Moltke, on which all the hopes of a demigod from the banks of the Spree were placed.

Even if we forget what we know from the past events of the World War, we must say that German diplomacy and German

2771

And

The Russian General Staff could be in a more difficult position than it actually happened. Whether the deployment of the Austrian, Russian and French armies should have been good or bad under the general conditions of the situation is another question, but that it sought to meet the possible political goals of the war is beyond doubt. On the contrary, the chief of the German General Staff came to tears when he was asked to start a war only against Russia, because the plans for this event, which were available under his predecessors, were not updated and developed, a chaotic principle had to be introduced into the existing list of concentration, and Moltke continued to insist on his demand for politics to start dancing from the stove. Today, in German military literature, this issue has already been raised and discussed, however, rather timidly and with reservations, so as not to particularly disturb the memory of the noble deceased.

We are also not particularly going to dig up the graves of the chiefs of general staffs and limit ourselves only to establishing the fact that before the world war in the general staffs there was a tendency to develop a war plan for a certain political grouping of states, which should be in sight even by the beginning of wars. Diplomacy had to try to withstand this grouping and in its actions was bound by the well-known development of the General Staff. Flexibility in specific military preparations was almost non-existent, and where it turned out to be, it was poorly thought out from a purely military, technical side. The reasons for such straightforward war plans are: a) bias in understanding the relationship between politics and war; 6) the dominance of the principle of throwing all those mobilized to this or that Front in the absence of strategic reserves, and c) the desire to have as few variants of the strategic deployment plan as possible.

We consider it interesting to recall Moltke's telegram to Konrad - not to be the first to declare war on the Russians - and Berlin's fear that Vienna would abandon her forces, mainly against Serbia. Even such a narrow-minded person as Berchtold was, even then a doubt arose: who rules in Berlin - the chancellor or Moltke? We are not talking about the complaints on the banks of the Spree by the military about the policy of the chancellor and Wilhelm's indignation at the same "civilian" chancellor, who did not understand anything in military affairs.

In short, Clausewitz's teaching that "war is an instrument of politics" was forgotten, and almost all general staffs strove, on the contrary, to make politics an instrument for war. |

We have heard sharp condemnations of the Austro-Hungarian general

the central headquarters, which laid out its versions of the war plan among the various regiments. We do not subscribe to such conclusions and believe that the war plan must be flexible and correspond to various political combinations. Some of them can be foreseen in advance, and therefore you can have several options for a strategic deployment plan. In addition, each option must provide for the possibility of applying to the political situation that is developing on the external side at the time of the declaration of war.

272-

[A

In any case, foreign policy cannot be bound by technical military considerations, for if war recognizes a maneuver, then the same maneuver lies in the nature of the political struggle itself.

“War is an instrument of politics,” said Kalauzewip, “acting as an instrument, we must not forget about the singing of work.”

We repeat again that we do not find it necessary to deepen this question here from a purely technical, military side (in relation to the development of a war plan), which we will do in our place.

Let us turn our attention to another issue—the approval of the Zoina plan.

In the modern understanding of the plan of war, the prerogative of approval, of course, can only belong to one government. We agreed that by a war plan we mean concrete military preparation, or, in other words, strategic deployment.

As you know, the annual "memoirs" of the chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, which also touched upon specific military training, are divided into 3 parts: 1) political, 2) general training and 3) specific military training. If the first two parts were reported to the ministers of foreign affairs and the military, then the last part was reported only to the supreme authority - Franz Josich and Franz Ferdinand, and the attention of these persons was drawn to the special secrecy of this part of the considerations of the general staff.

Similarly, the approval of plans for strategic deployment took place in other countries, even with a republican system, where the plan was approved by the president.

The Council of Ministers, which preliminarily decided on the question of war or peace, in the same way, only in excerpts, was devoted to the operational part of the war plan, without, of course, entering into the minutes the reports of the General Staff that took place on this issue.

In the majority of European states before the World War, the highest leadership in politics and war was concentrated in the hands of persons representing the supreme power, and thus, in essence, the adopted procedure for approving the plan of war should be considered normal, if we do not take into account the fact that in fact the supreme power of the byma is rather limited both by law and by its individual

qualities.

As we know, the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs about the main lines of foreign policy.

tiki and on their part was already the military part of the plan. If the minister of foreign affairs was informed of the variants of the war plan being taken for development, then the latter was not informed of the means and methods of carrying out these variants in the usual manner. There was even a legend that the German Chancellor did not know the plan for the invasion of the German armies into Belgium. Now this legend has been destroyed.

This order of participation of foreign policy in the approval of the war plan by the same general staff was to be gradually violated, as we will say a little below.

The war plan submitted for approval was to contain an indication of the main opponents, the main theater of war, the military goal,

18 The brain of the army. VNN. 3.273

DD...

suggestions of ways to achieve the set political and military goals, i.e. application of a strategy of exhaustion or crushing, offensive or defense, distribution of forces and means, setting a time limit for their readiness for the start of operations, and a plan for the first operations.

There is no need to say much about the fact that in all these issues the representatives of not only foreign but also domestic policy are strongly interested. If we recall the meetings of the Austro-Hungarian Council of Ministers, then Tisza's speeches at them must be recognized as quite correct and normal.

Therefore, we believe that options for strategic deployment should be discussed and approved not by individual representatives of the government, but by its responsible members in full force. The evasion of this by the chiefs of general staffs is explained by: 1) the recognition of their personal responsibility, according to the behest of Moltke the elder, only before the king, i.e., the highest representative of power; 2) the changing frequent composition of the cabinets and the unwillingness, as a result, to inform a wide circle of limes about the plans for the war. As you know, Conrad was dissatisfied with the naval representative, who at the council of ministers let slip about the existence of a naval convention with Italy and reprimanded Berchtold when he talked about the questions of the war plan in the presence of the chamberlain of the court - a person who was completely not responsible.

If the first argument, as an attribute of the power of the "demigods", we must reject, then the question of keeping specific military preparations secret is, of course, of great importance. The fewer people involved in them, the better. But, on the other hand, it is impossible to deprive not only the orientation, but also the discussion of the war plan of representatives of foreign policy, and other members of the government responsible for preparing the war in one direction or another. We are not going to list here the persons who should be involved in the approval of specific military considerations, but we must note that their number cannot be reduced to one, and on the other hand, not expanded to infinity.

If the question is posed differently, as it was on the threshold of world wars, it becomes necessary to orient the strategic deployment of various members of the government, and primarily diplomats, in the same questions.

Such an orientation on the part of the chief of the general staff of the minister

foreign affairs began to take place, as a consequence of the very nature of war, which lies, at its core, in politics. As much as any chief of the general staff wanted to emancipate himself from politics, in the end he turned to politics. "Spirit of War" handed over.

In each orientation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Council of Ministers by the Chief of the General Staff, we find, first of all, indications of the strength and timing of the readiness of the armies for the opening of hostilities. The same applies to potential adversaries.

Then, from here one or another conclusion was already drawn about the desirability of either hastening the outbreak of war, even deliberately causing it, or, conversely, prolonging it. We do not give examples of what was said here, since the reader of our work remembers them very well from Conrad's conversations with the foreign ministers.

274

As for Zi cases, and the future marshal of France, Joffre, tried to introduce even the arithmetic beginning into this area. True, he used such a method with the aim of frightening the government and pushing it to war, for, having concentrated simultaneously with the German armies, the commander-in-chief of the French armies did not think of going over to an energetic offensive, and those kilometers with which he intimidated the council of ministers were given up with a vengeance and with rapid deployment. |

The military objective was also communicated to the general staffs, to the representatives of diplomacy and to the councils of ministers, albeit on a reduced scale. Partially, even the very plan of operations was touched upon, but in a strictly confidential manner.

The details of the strategic deployment plan were kept in the тайпа by the chiefs of the general staff, and we know how sharply Konrad reacted to any attempts by the Foreign Office to look into this area of the work of the general staff. The incident on the Italian border with the capture of observation posts and the inquiry on this occasion by the Minister of Foreign Affairs whether this was being done according to the war plan met with a sharp rebuke from the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff. And meanwhile, in essence, the question was quite appropriate, because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs still had to settle border incidents. Finally, already on his way to the Front, Conrad saw Berchtold intruding on the rights of the commander-in-chief in conducting operations and again protested.

In a word, the military part of the war plan was considered an integral part of the General Staff and the circle of its direct jurisdiction. If he made revelations in this area, it was out of necessity in order to get help from politics, but not in any way in order to harmonize military requirements or even subordinate them to political ones.

It must be said that no matter how scrupulous Konrad was in these matters, he nevertheless devoted the Viennese diplomats to his specific military considerations more than other chiefs of the general staffs did. Representatives of the politics of Germany, Russia and France were less aware of the war plans of their general staffs, therefore, naturally, the result was that tangle of contradictions and misunderstandings that occurred between them and created unnecessary friction, making some nervous about false steps. politicians, while others consider the military to be overly militant. More or less frank conversations between these governing bodies were already taking place in the whirlpool of growing events.

ty, i.e., in other words, going hunting, they fed the dogs. Naturally, under such conditions, "civil chancellors" appeared and a complete discord between politics and strategy, which did not signify a good end or even a beginning.

To this day, some are still convinced that German policy proved untenable on the threshold of a world war and placed the strategy in difficult conditions. One has to recall Clausewitz, who in this case pointed out that what is said is not what should have been said. The lack of flexibility in terms of war, the violation of the neutrality of Belgium, which the strategy required, not only did not correspond to the plans of German policy, but turned out to be harmful to German strategy. One thing to blame

275

"civilian chancellor" in Berlin and his assistants - this is that they did not promptly demand from the general staff a more detailed orientation in its plans and did not discuss them from the political side.

In any case, we believe that diplomacy should not only participate in determining the main directing lines of foreign policy for the war plan, but for its more correct work, it should be introduced into the "holy of holies" of the General Staff. Of course, this once again emphasizes the need for firm stability of the diplomatic language in the preservation of military secrecy. If representatives of foreign policy are entrusted with keeping diplomatic secrets, then there is no reason to deprive them of the right to keep military secrets. True, the ministerial leapfrog, which is characteristic of capitalist states, expands the circle of leaders who would be privy to the foundations of the war plan, but this must be overcome in a different way, and not by building a Chinese wall around the general headquarters.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary, Ehrenthal, more than once pointed out to Konrad, Chief of the General Staff, that all questions of politics and war are decided in such a highly competent body as the Council of Ministers. We observed and even attended with the reader at the meetings of this governing body in various countries, and the chief of the general staff himself was either invited to them as a military expert or did not receive an invitation at all. Of course, there is no need to say much about the fact that the Council of Ministers should be more fully privy to the plan of war in order to take a decision that is fully appropriate to the situation. It is only natural that even purely operational questions be discussed at it, for we must not forget that the war is waged not by the general staffs with their armies, but by the entire state as a whole, whose supreme governing body in the capitalist countries is the Council of Ministers.

The modern era of military art has already with sufficient clarity transferred the preparation and conduct of the war into the hands of the government, and therefore it has the right to demand from the general staff and an account of its military plans, not limited to just reading letters like those sent by Geoffre, or semi-mysterious allusions Conrad and other chiefs of the general staffs about the plans for strategic deployment -

wapia.

Here we come close to the question of whether the knowledge of war is necessary for politicians who make up the government and, in particular, for representatives of the foreign policy of the state - diplomats.

We have pointed out more than once that war, as a socio-historical phenomenon, is more a political act than a military action. We may

perhaps even abused references to various authoritative persons in the mouth to reinforce their judgments. This is now firmly established.

Since war is an instrument of politics, it is clear that the leaders of the latter must! know the basics of using this tool, its nature.

The question is, in fact, not entirely new. On the threshold of the 20th century, the classic strategist Bülow sharpened it in his writings and came to quite cardinal conclusions.

Based on the axiom that war must contain politics, Bülow wrote: "How can there be a good diplomat who

276

ANI AS PONY

would not be at the same time a good warrior? After all, he needs military knowledge for the performance of his most important Functions; from this it follows that only good soldiers should have been appointed as thugs, since what is cunning without strength good for?

"How can a diplomat," he continues, "estimate the forces of opposing states if he does not know the very science of forces? If, therefore, he does not know the natural boundaries of the state, that is, the boundaries that ensure security? How does the moment when it is necessary to attack slip away from his short-sighted eyes, and he does not see the time when it is no longer possible to defend? In a word, the knowledge of a cryptographer cannot be sufficient where the necessary basis is a military spider.

In informing the world of the "principles of a political strategy" that "is not diplomatic," Bülow concluded that "diplomats are seldom politicians."

Bülow's contemporary, Napoleon, turned out to be both a good soldier and a good diplomat, proving the correctness of the theoretic strategist's judgments. Delbrück testifies that "in the innermost depths of his being, Napoleon was much more of a statesman than a warrior." But it should be noted that the same Napoleon had with him such prominent diplomats as Talleyrand, who were not "good soldiers".

Clausewitz refused to follow Bülow's theory in this and admitted that "politics is able to influence war harmfully by its decisions, but only when it promises itself success from known military means and measures, evaluating them falsely and contrary to their nature." "Just as a person who has little knowledge of a foreign language is capable of expressing a fundamental thought incorrectly, in the same way a politician can demand something that does not at all correspond to her intentions. This happened very often, so that there is a need for those who govern political relations to a certain extent to understand military affairs.

"However," continues Clausewitz, "let us make a reservation in order to avoid a false interpretation of what we have said. We are far from believing that the best minister of state will be a military or scientific engineer buried in papers, or even a military man who is efficient in the field (50] 4a0), namely, in cases where the monarch himself is not, at the same time, his minister of state. In the same way, we do not believe that the main

knowledge of military affairs was the monarch's goal.

"The main thing here," advises Yolauevits, "is a strong, bright head and a strong character; as for the understanding of military affairs, it can be done in one way or another. France has never been so badly directed politically and in terms of war as under the brothers Belle-Ile and Herme Choazel, although they were all three good military men.

Conclusions contrary to the theory of Bülow and Clausewitz were led by the study of the wars of the Napoleonic era and the French Revolution, when the complicated situation of the war and the dependence of the latter on politics already outlined a departure from the principles of unity of command in the management of the war and its transfer into the hands of the collective.

271

About UNO UKS IIA

A prominent theoretician of military thought demanded that "those who govern political relations should also understand military affairs to a certain extent."

As you know, the next era is marked by the appearance of the triumvirate, as the body that controls the war.

With the advent of the triumvirate, history marks the friction between politics and strategy, of which we spoke more than once in the first book of our work. If the representatives of strategy, trying to ensure the purity of the nature of war, expressed regret that they could not separate themselves from politics, then one of the reasons for this was presented by them as a misunderstanding by politics of the laws of war.

On the other hand, we heard Bismarck testify about the complete illiteracy in the politics of the representatives of the General Staff of his time, and the German Chancellor came to the conclusion that "politics is not a battlefield", because in all the political arguments of the General Staff he saw the desire for methods of military struggle transfer to the political arena.

We will not go into a detailed analysis of the knowledge of war by politicians and strategists of the era of Moltke the Elder, because the reader had the opportunity to present the same accusation of illiteracy in military affairs, which was presented to diplomats, to many persons whose words we have quoted in this book. our labour.

Indeed, if we recall Conrad's conversations with Berchtold or other diplomats of Vienna about the course of mobilization, concentration and other military operations, we must note a rather weak understanding, if not complete ignorance, of the situation of modern war by representatives of foreign policy. People of the "diplomatic pen" had a rather superficial understanding of how the "sword" is used in modern conditions, that is, the instrument with which they must act in the last instance in international relations.

In Germany we heard Wilhelm accuse the chancellor of having a "civilian" understanding of war.

In Russia, Sazonov was subjected to intensive indoctrination by the land and naval general staffs with the looming specter of war, and the German ambassador Pourtales notes in his memoirs that Sazonov, as a civilian, did not understand the war at all, following the lead of

general staff.

In Paris, Joffre, with phrases in his hands, demonstrated clearly to the Cabinet of Ministers all the harm of postponing mobilization.

In a word, it can be established with certainty that the mechanism of modern warfare was vague for diplomats, which was their weakness.

place.

The reason for this must be considered the same false interpretation of Clausewitz that, supposedly, with the outbreak of war, diplomatic work ceases and all control passes into military hands.

It was the ignorance of foreign policy representatives and the fear, no matter how much it damaged the military situation in the event of an armed conflict, that forced Conrad not only to patiently explain the essence of the conditions of modern warfare in personal conversations, but also to fill out his reports

278

purely theoretical reasoning on this topic. Such teachings of the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff were listened to not only by diplomats, but also by representatives of the supreme power. The same explanations were given by Danilov to Sazonov and his closest assistant Basili.

The lack of understanding of war as an armed struggle often forced diplomats to follow the lead of the general staffs, which explains all the talk about the greater preparedness in the policy of the general staffs than politicians in military affairs about unsuccessful policies, etc. In a word, the lieutenant of the Prussian reserve, what was the German ambassador Puryales, throwing himself on Sazonov's chest, strenuously begged him, in the interests of maintaining peace, not to let the general staffs speak, not suspecting that he himself was an echo of the chief of the Austro-Hungarian general staff. What we have said and the facts cited above clearly show that knowledge of modern warfare, the conditions for its conduct, preparation, and a certain time scale for various military operations should constitute the necessary school for a political figure, in particular, for a diplomat of our day.

We absolutely do not want to say that the best politician or diplomat will be a "soldier", but that every statesman operating in the political field should have a certain circle of military knowledge - this is irrefutable. We do not want to immerse him headlong into the secrets of strategy, especially tactics, but we believe that understanding the nature of war should not be alien to politics, because one cannot work well with a weapon without knowing the conditions for its use. Clausewitz found that in this case it is enough to have a "strong, bright head and a strong character", and the understanding of military affairs "can be replenished one way or another". Now, with the complicated nature of modern warfare, one cannot count on "one way or another," just as one should not rely on one fortress and the enlightenment of one's head. Nowadays, even a politician has to replenish his mental baggage in advance with a cycle of purely theoretical knowledge of the mechanism of modern war in general, large outlines. If Bismarck said that "politics is not a battlefield", then today we can say that war is not a diplomatic table, and since politics takes the first part in managing a war, then, consequently, purely military start

armed struggle.

Without knowledge of the essence of modern struggle, politics can take the wrong path and flatter itself with the achievement of those political goals by war, which are completely beyond their strength. "Just as a person," says Clausewitz, "poorly knowing a foreign language, is capable of expressing the right thought incorrectly, in the same way, politics can demand something that does not at all correspond to its intentions."

A "strong, clear head" of the politics of our day, in particular, of a diplomat, must also contain within itself knowledge of the fundamentals of military affairs.

Indeed, if we look back at history, we will find a number of prominent political figures who studied the fundamentals of war and strove to understand its nature.

Of course, the knowledge of the lieutenant of the Prussian reserve, which Pourtales was proud of, is not yet a guarantee of the unerring steps of a diplomat, which is proved

279

but they are in fact. Bismarck, too, was an expert in second-line troops, but his knowledge of the nature of troops was deep and thorough.

Finally, if we take the Marxists, then their striving to study war as a form of social relations, to learn its foundations, can be recognized as a general one. Beginning with Marx, a number of the founders of Marxism—Engels, Mehring, Lenin—all of them carefully studied Clausewitz's Philosophy of War. We have already given proof of this, and therefore we will not repeat ourselves. The war, at its core, was well known to Lenin, and therefore we see on his part the correct orientation in it, as in the "action of the kidnappers", and an understanding of its purely military phenomena.

If war must be understood by politics, then, on the other hand, the latter must not be alien to the strategist, the chief of the general staff. In the first book of our work, we dwelled on this in detail and we do not intend to return to this issue. Without a correct understanding of the economic and political relations both within the state and on its external paths, it is impossible to draw up true military plans. which should be well learned by the generals of our day.

We consider it necessary to draw the attention of the reader of our work to one more thing—that is, to those misunderstandings that arose between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Chief of the General Staff because of the border incidents that took place.

It is known from the preceding chapters that such clashes took place during the establishment of borders or the violation of already existing borders by the border guards. |

There are no words that drawing a new frontier requires discussing it from various points of view: political, economic and purely military. Representatives of the General Staff are also involved in the task of establishing and designating the frontier. Conrad complained that in this matter the Minister of Foreign Affairs ignored the wishes of the military department. The complaint is unquestionably well-grounded, but only in the mouth question one should not waste money on trifles. Depending on the nature of the terrain, the frontier line itself has one or another military significance. If the terrain is mountainous, then tactical conditions on the ground itself

become more important than in open and level terrain. It is necessary to divide the border area primarily from the operational point of view, and, depending on this, make military demands. It happens otherwise, when the enthusiasm for the purely tactical advantages of a narrow border strip, shown by the General Staff, creates difficulties for diplomacy in the conduct of negotiations. There is no need to be petty in these matters, it is necessary to have a broad military outlook.

As for the violation of the already existing border, the claims in this regard of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the military department, the General Staff in particular, must be recognized as fair, because it is up to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to clear up the created political misunderstanding. Conrad's grievances in these cases, no matter how his arguments may be justified by military necessity, cannot be recognized as worthy of attention. We can only talk about the joint work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the General Staff

80

| shcha

bomb on settling the conflict, but not about the grievances of the General Staff at the requests of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to violate the border. If there are similar cases on the part of the state complaining about the violation of the border, then which conflict can be settled sooner, but such cases cannot serve as a basis for waiving the inviolability of the border. The inviolability of the border, at least as a decorum, must exist if neighboring states maintain diplomatic relations with each other.

With this, we consider it possible to end our discussion on the joint work of foreign policy and strategy to float the war. We have not touched on the technical part of the work on the war plan, because we will make the mouth in its place. There are no words that with such an architectonics of all our work, we will have to return to the political motivation of this or that decision, but in any case we take responsibility for this. The repetition method is not a bad method.

"When it comes to the plan of war and campaign," Clausewitz taught, "it is absolutely inevitable to turn to politics."

These wise counsels should never be forgotten by anyone who, even today, undertakes to draw up a plan for a war or a campaign.

CHAPTER USHP MOBILIZATION IS THE OPIUM OF WAR

The Role of Mobilization in the Origin of the World War — Mobilization as a military phenomenon. — Mobilization of the era of Moltke the Elder and mobilization before the World War. The nature of the war also determines the nature of mobilization. — War plan and mobilization plan. — Independence of mobilization from operational deployment. — Types of mobilization. — Duration of stay at rest on the borders of the mobilized army. — Pre-mobilization period. — The first day of mobilization and its announcement. — Mobilization as a political act. — The increased political significance of mobilization. — Economic mobilization. — Mobilization and internal relations of the population in the state. — General and private mobilization as understood by various European states in July 1914. - Mobilization is the threshold of war. — Official declaration of war. How is mobilization announced? — Deadline for the announcement of mobilization and

choice of such type. - The modern meaning of mobilization.

<

Our generation still remembers all the noise that the Russian mobilization made in 1914. In the heat of the moment, this mobilization was called the Torch that ignited not only the European, but also the world military fire. This conviction held until the end of the war and even later; in many serious works we find interpretations of Russian mobilization as the root causes of the imperialist war. Some accused Russia of this, some of the former Russian, mainly military figures, justified themselves in complicity in such a crime before "humanity", "civilization", etc. There was even a whole theory about the automaticity of mobilization in Europe during the July and August DPs of 1914. In a word, mobilization has acquired such significance in international relations that one whose pen describes the events of the world war cannot pass by this phenomenon.

It is quite understandable, therefore, that in the chapters of this book devoted to the exposition of historical events on the eve of the World War, we dwelled on this in detail and tried to give the reader more or less exhaustive material on the question of mobilization in the summer of 1914 for the reader's judgment.

Mobilization is not excluded from military use even today, and therefore its topicality in 1914 has not diminished in our day either. What has been said compels us, in more or less detail, to deal with this question. Of course, given the scope of our work and the goals pursued in this book, we cannot delve into the interpretation of the purely technical conditions for the production of mobilization, but we will confine ourselves to general conclusions.

Without drawing the reader into the depths of the centuries of military art, we consider it necessary to point out that mobilization, as a military phenomenon, has received the most

282

and oh ya

clearer expression in the era of the elder Moltke. The concept of a cadre army, of an "armed people" is also connected with the idea of mobilizing this people for war. The Prussian Minister of War, Roon, made a name for himself on excellent mobilizations in 1866 and 1870, by the way, by keeping the matter of mobilization in the bowels of the military minister.

The mobilization of those times marked the transition from peacetime cadres to an army necessary for war, by deploying cadres and replenishing them with people, horses, supplying weapons and all other types of allowances for war. At the same time, the mobilization of railway transport was carried out, the duty of which was to quickly deliver the mobilized army to the theater of operations. -

Mobilization required speed and regularity in work, so that the combat forces would be prepared for war as soon as possible. Mobilization called tens, hundreds of thousands of people under the banner, and therefore, naturally, required a good preliminary development of the so-called mobilization plan.

The experience of the Prussian mobilizations mentioned above was taken into account in all the states of Europe and taken as a model.

With such a concept of mobilization, the states of Europe found themselves on the threshold of a world war. In the first book of our work, we focused on the economic mobilization of the country and pointed out how much opia was available in 1914, so we will not repeat ourselves here.

It is impossible, of course, to consider mobilization as a military phenomenon, apart from the epoch of military art in which it originated and developed, from those principles of strategy which were guiding at that time.

We have noted more than once that the dominant tendencies of the strategic line on the threshold of a world war were thoughts and intentions to wage war on the principles of a strategy of destruction. Therefore, mobilization had to correspond to this type of war.

The strategy of crushing required the rapid production of the largest possible number of fighting forces, their rapid concentration, and their almost simultaneous introduction into action in order to achieve equally rapid decisive success. In other words, the strategy of lightning-fast action also required extreme effort in the deployment of armed forces for war. These requirements served as starting points for mobilization and formed the basis of all work in this area. The more armies grew in size, the more complicated mobilization became and the more its importance grew as an act requiring greater exertion of forces and calm, uninterrupted work.

It seems to us that we will not be far from the truth if we say that the character of the next war determines the nature of the modulation itself.

The very course of the imperialist war, which revived the second type of war, the strategy of attrition, brought to life a gradual mobilization, bringing to combat readiness forces and means that had not been used at the beginning of the war. |

Now, on the basis of the experience of the world war, the theory establishes the duration and echelon of the mobilization of the state for war. Such a concept

283

ana fo fo noinentia

The idea of mobilization is quite natural in connection with the scope that the war must assume in the times we are living through. We will not go into the details of the interpretation of the present-day conditions of mobilization, which now involves all the forces and means of the state as a whole, and not only its armed forces. Let us only note that the mobilization of our day is an even more intense and prolonged phenomenon for the entire state than it was before. th

But no matter how slow and prolonged the mobilization may be, however, even today its first echelon must still be of sufficient strength and power so as not to immediately suffer a decisive setback. Porto, even under modern conditions, the question of the early combat readiness of the first echelon remains as acute as it was in 1914. The exhaustion strategy also requires the rapid readiness of a certain amount of forces and means in order to make it possible to continue the struggle, accumulating strength, and not to start it with such a military failure that would not make it possible in the future not only to restore strength, but also to get a known, necessary victory. numerical superiority over the enemy.

It is difficult, of course, to foresee in advance all the force, all the means that the enemy will use in the war, and in accordance with this determine the measure of our efforts for the struggle. However, preliminary calculations in this respect not only can, but must be made.

The philosopher of war, Clausewitz, on the other hand says: "In the very preparation for war, the world will really supplant abstract conclusions: the real measure will take the place of extreme assumptions. In the same way, in carrying out the war itself, the opponents will not reach the limits of extreme tension, and therefore will not put forward all their forces and means at once. Military forces and means, by the very nature of things, cannot be brought into action, side by side. . . .

"By the very nature of war, it is impossible to reach the path of complete simultaneous readiness of all forces for their immediate, simultaneous input into action. Nevertheless, all the same, one should strive to prepare the largest possible forces for the first clash, even if with extreme effort. The reason is that the first failure is undesirable in itself, and no one consciously wants to undergo it; moreover, it will always have a harmful effect on subsequent collisions; the disadvantageous influence is the greater, the greater the size of this failure.

A war is waged to achieve certain political goals, with a certain political grouping of states. In the previous chapter, we pointed out that the real expression of our intentions in achieving the political goals set for the war is the war plan, concrete military considerations for the war on a particular front.

Fulfillment of the war plan requires bringing to combat readiness the required number of combat forces and means, i.e., in other words, their mobilization.

Thus, it is possible to establish the relationship between the war plan and mobilization. In accordance with this or that plan of war, this or that mobilization is carried out. If the plan of war requires an extreme strain on the forces of the state, then it also requires a general mobilization of all forces and means, and, conversely, in a war on secondary fronts, it is possible, in

284

with iiiiati No. pi

connection with the plan, be limited to the private mobilization of armed forces and means. Finally, private mobilization with a change in the political situation can be translated into a general one. |

We could observe such a close connection between the strategic deployment plan and mobilization in all armies on the threshold of a world war. In France such a plan led to a general mobilization; in Germany it required a certain flexibility; - both private and general mobilization are considered - in case of war in the Balkans and in case of European complications. Mobilized units had their purpose in the phase of strategic deployment, not giving them the opportunity to maneuver. There was a particularly close connection between mobilization and strategic deployment in frontier units, because each mobilization requires a corresponding operational cover. So, for example, the episode with the 16th German division, which, upon mobilization, was supposed to occupy Luxembourg and

provide it as an area for the unloading of brought troops. The slightest attempt to change this brought the Chief of the German General Staff to tears, although, as is known, the Minister of War did not attach such serious importance to the delay in this small military operation.

In a word, a certain independence of mobilization from operational deployment could only be observed in the activities of the Khranpuz General Staff, which covered the border by individual conscription under the banner of reservists in the frontier corps by the authority of the Minister of War, without announcing either private or general mobilization.

As we shall see below, mobilization is such a serious step on the road to war that, of course, such independence of mobilization from operational deployment must in principle be recognized as desirable. The lack of flexibility on this issue hampers both military and political maneuvering. Indeed, the close connection of mobilization with specific considerations led, both in Germany and Austria-Hungary, as well as in Russia, to the insistent demand of the General Staff from the foreign policy of decisive steps in making a responsible decision about the war and deprived the diplomats of freedom of action.

We noted above that, depending on the general plan of the war, mobilization takes the form of private or general. One form or another of it is determined by the political grouping that is taking shape at the time of the declaration of mobilization and the war itself. Thus, the choice of the type of mobilization is dictated by political motives.

As for the military side of this question, here one must take into account the measure of tension that the state must display in a war on one or another Front. Depending on this, the existence in Austria-Hungary of a private mobilization for the Balkans and a common one in the event of Rosspi's intervention can be considered appropriate to the situation. Finally, as we heard from Davilov, the Russian General Staff provided for private mobilization for secondary, non-European fronts.

In Germany, only a general mobilization plan was available.

285

[And

France developed a gradual transition from private to general mobilization.

We have elucidated in detail the questions about the general and particular Russian mobilization, both from the political and military sides. We will not repeat it, but only summarize. Leaving aside the political side for now, it must be admitted that the mobilization of the four districts, which so unexpectedly emerged in the July days in the Russian General Staff, being an echo of the events of 1909, in reality did not provide the forces and means that would be needed for the war. with Austria-Hungary, not to mention the fact that the borders of the Warsaw district were not covered from the blows of the Austrians. Therefore, if one could speak of private mobilization, then in the sense of its expansion at the expense of the Warsaw and, most likely, St. Petersburg military districts. In other words, things tended towards a general mobilization in the case of the need to properly secure the frontiers with Germany.

The dubious neutrality of France, which Moltke dreamed of, forced him to go to the general mobilization of the entire German army,

to leaving a significant part of it on the French frontier and presenting tough demands on the French government as a guarantee of neutrality. „

If you delve into the essence of the private mobilizations of France and Avetro-Hungary, then they were actually the threshold to the general mobilization. War in modern conditions requires so much effort from the state that private mobilization in our day will indeed be a special case, rather a temporary course of politics than a military means. As such, it must be regarded as nothing more than a transitional step towards general mobilization. In this respect, the activities of the French General Staff should be recognized as instructive.

Here it is necessary to pay attention to the 060d0m type of modifications, which we observed both in Austria-Hungary and, partially, in Russia. In the Danube Monarchy, the low staffing of the army units, which we spoke about in the first book of our work, forced the general staff, with the aggravation of the political situation, to call up part of the reservists under the banners, thereby increasing the combat readiness of the army. Since 1909, such a call: spares has become almost chronic for the Austro-Hungarian army. In the days of sharpening of the political horizon in the Russian army, an annual contingent was kept under the banners, subject to dismissal, and, thus, the combat readiness increased to a large extent. Such an event should be partly explained by the underdeveloped and insufficiently transportable railway network of the former Russia.

However desirable such events, which in Austria-Hungary were called private mobilizations, their duration had a negative effect on the morale of the army itself. Representatives of all military authorities of the Habsburg army were aware of this, and even. their initiator, Konrad, uttered the truth that the organization of the army as an "armed people" cannot be combined with a long stay of the reserve under the banners in anticipation of war. We know, however, that on this basis Conrad had misunderstandings with the minister of war, and if the chief of the Austro-Hungarian general staff opposed the dissolution

286

SBI EE AS II

to the homes of called-up reservists, then only because of the tense political situation. Various measures had to be found to keep the morale of the army at the proper level, up to and including the establishment of a badge of honor for "peaceful" mobilizations. Conrad tried to use these appeals even as evidence of the necessity of waging war, which, of course, cannot be justified by either side.

We dwell on such events because they are recommended even today. It goes without saying that they achieve an increase in the combat readiness of the armed forces, but, on the other hand, one must also take into account the reverse side of such vile mobilizations. A long stay of recognized reservists under the banners, without the prospect of war, may affect their morale negatively, and instead of increasing their combat readiness, it will be lowered. We would rather lean towards actual rather than illusory mobilization, even making certain sacrifices in advance in the time of concentration, but with the certainty that combat-ready military organizations are at hand, than we would put into action units that have lost their moral resilience from long military stress.

Bringing an army into martial law creates a certain rise in its military prowess and raises the morale of the entire army. Therefore, it is interesting to dwell on the question that preoccupied both representatives of the general staffs and diplomats on the threshold of the world war: to what extent a mobilized army can calmly remain on the frontier. As you know, Sazonov, and representatives of the Russian General Staff, considered it possible for the Russian army to stand for a long time "with a gun at its feet" on the borders of Russia. Konrad, Moltke and ZoffFhr looked at it differently, and the chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff rather figuratively explained that, after mobilizing the army and concentrating it on the borders, it is very possible and quite acceptable that the mouth of the army at any moment will throw a gun "on its shoulder" and go over border by invading the territory of its neighbor.

When investigating this issue, one must proceed from 2 provisions: 1) the combat readiness of the army and 2) its increased militancy. |

Achieving the combat readiness of the army and warning the future of Prague in this was so desirable for each command that the seizure of the initiative in actions by the army that had anticipated readiness should be considered quite mortal. It must be admitted that the completed concentration of the army will be the last weapon in the hands of diplomats, but it must be pointed out that in such a state of the army, its command in reality will certainly put pressure on foreign policy, achieving. move quickly to action. We have already pointed out how highly military success was regarded by the General Staff, and therefore it is quite natural that since the chances make it possible to achieve it, we also meet with an ardent desire for this on the part of the command. Viche noted how much Joffre, and other chiefs of staff, feared the possible. delays with the end of readiness in comparison with the enemy; therefore, the desire of the command of the army, already prepared, to go over to active operations will be just as persistent. Pourtales was right in his mouth when he explained to Sazonov that with the mobilization of diplomacy, the solution of the question of war or peace is handed over to cannons.

287

ZOO II UKS PV

Mobilization raises the military spirit of the army so much that mutual border crossings, clashes between small detachments, and a certain nervousness on both sides become completely inevitable. If we look at the first days of mobilization from this point of view, then we can fixify many different parachutings of the border, various rumors about it, unnerving the border units, which are already upbeat in their mood. In a word, no matter how much the command, and even more so diplomacy, wants, with the announcement of mobilization, due to purely military reasons, the guns can start firing

themselves.

Thus, it is necessary to consider doubtful the assumption about the possibility, in modern conditions of war, of a long stay of mobilized armies in a state of military rest without going over to active operations. If today the state of the world does not secure the frontier against raids by armed gangs, then even more so, in mobilization, one cannot be sure that not a single shot will be fired at the frontier.

The importance of the systematic conduct of mobilization, on the one hand, its complexity, on the other, and, finally, the hardships caused by the rise of people and

cavalry, forced in all states on the threshold of a world war to establish a special preparatory to war or pre-mobilization period.

We will not dwell on its content in detail, but we will only note that by establishing it, all states sought to do everything from mobilization work that was possible to do without the call of men and horses. We even listed these events in their place.

Essentially, the pre-mobilization period was the eve of mobilization, and it was vigilantly watched from the opposite camp. Of course, it was not necessary to count on its long period without the enemy reacting with countermeasures. Therefore, such a period was in fact short, and only Russia sought to lengthen it, announcing it on July 26, with the beginning of the Austrian mobilization against Serbia. Equally well in advance, on July 24, the English Navy began its mobilization. In Berlin, at 1 o'clock on July 30, a situation threatening war was announced, and at 5 o'clock in the afternoon on August 1, a decree was signed on the general mobilization of the army and fleet. True, even before July 30, a number of measures were taken in the German army that contributed to increasing its combat readiness. In the same way, gradually and in advance, the actual mobilization of forces in France was carried out, and the government of the republic gave advice to Petersburg, however belated, on the secret mobilization of the armed forces of the ally. Mobilization, as a public act, had to appear at the last minute and, moreover, be irrevocable.

Under the present conditions of the war, of course, we will encounter the same situation, with the same pre-mobilization period that existed before the war of 1914. It can be expected that, in view of the more complicated mobilization of the forces and means of the entire state as a whole, in essence, such a preparatory period, especially in the field of economic mobilization, will begin much earlier than it was before the world war. But we think that to hide such events from the eyes of the opposite

288

rony. is unlikely to succeed, and therefore: 1) we will meet the same countermeasures, and 2) both sides will shorten this period and move on to the actual mobilization of forces and means. In any case, we will now observe a certain gradualness and advance in the preparation of mobilization in all areas of the life of the state on a much larger scale than in 1914.

In addition to the pre-mobilization period before the war of 1914, we saw the presence of a certain period between the announcement of mobilization and its first day. This term everywhere did not exceed a day, and only in Austria-Hungary was it set at two days. The postponement of the first day of mobilization against its announcement is explained by the desire to let the last preparatory work be smoked up in order to then move on to a calm and planned mobilization. In spite of the fact that Joffr for every missed day in the announcement of mobilization threatened to lose the well-known frontier territory to Fravia, he also did not agree to change the daily break and earlier appointment of the first day of mobilization. Any haste in this would only be detrimental to the success of the mobilization work.

So far we have considered mobilization mainly as a military phenomenon and sketched out its military nature in general terms.

But since "war is an instrument of politics", then such an act of it as mobilization has a greater political significance. We cited Clausewitz's thoughts that not every military action is the same in its specific political weight, which, in relation to mobilization, must be recognized as large.

Already on the threshold of the World War, mobilization turned out to be such a phenomenon that it deeply extended its influence on the life of the state, not being confined within one military framework. Today, with the increased complexity of technology, with the enormous tension that is manifested in the war by struggling streaks, the significance of mobilization, as a nationwide phenomenon, has increased even more. Today, mobilization captures all areas of the life of the state, is reflected in one way or another in the life of almost every citizen. In the first book of our work, we spoke not only about the mobilization of military resources, but mainly about the mobilization of the country's economy and the need for appropriate preparation for this.

Indeed, before the World War we already heard on July 5 the proposals of the Minister of War of Germany on the implementation of measures that would contribute to economic readiness for war. True, such measures were rejected by the Kaiser, but the very fact of the proposals speaks of the need for a corresponding economic mobilization. In our time, the question of it has been covered with sufficient completeness and we will not develop it. We consider it necessary only to note that mobilization deeply affects the country's economy, and therefore it seems to be an act, deciding on which, one must thoroughly weigh the pros and cons.

In the area of internal relations between the various strata of the population in the state, mobilization also marks a new orientation. If we recall, the bourgeois governments of almost all countries were worried about how the broad masses of the population would meet the mobilization. Appropriate slogans were necessary for successful mobilization. Even in such

19 The brain of the army. Nn. 3.289

Wee

In the stagnant government, as the former parish government of Russia, and in it, however, some of its members, there were doubts about the stability of the balance of internal relations, which existed in the days preceding the mobilization. Let us remind the reader of the former Minister of Internal Affairs Maklakov, who, with fear and predictions of an imminent revolution, signed a decree on mobilization. If mobilization almost always causes at the beginning an upsurge in the population, caused by one or another slogan, then at the same time it also soon gives rise to a critical evaluation of these slogans. In states with a capitalist structure, of course, there are much more reasons for a critical analysis of the causes of mobilization than in a state where the authorities reflect the interests of the working masses, where the slogans for mobilization are more understandable to the latter. We do not give examples from current life, but there are many of them in the life of capitalist states, when major diplomatic steps are shortened in the country itself by unstable internal relations. In such a state, when signing a decree on mobilization, one will have to follow the example of Maklakov, passing the consequences into the hands of the divine limes. The method is easy, though. far from trustworthy...

In this book, on a historical example, we considered. mobilization, mainly in the field of foreign policy. Before Pamy

there was a mobilization in the assessment of diplomats, general staffs and the supreme power of various states. We heard different views on this military phenomenon, which we will try to understand.

In essence, in all the Western states of Europe, general mobilization was understood as such an act when there could no longer be a return to a peaceful situation, and after bringing the army to martial law, war would inevitably follow.

This is how mobilization was understood in Germany and France, and even in Austria-Hungary, for although on July 25 private mobilization against Serbia was announced, it had the character of an act that inevitably led to war. Despite Russia's threats, Austria-Hungary still did not announce mobilization on the Russian border, waiting for events that would make the danger of war so real that it would be necessary to reckon with whom as with the inevitable *Fhakt*.

Various military precautions have been taken! by all states, but without the announcement of mobilization.

If we recall, then in Germany mobilization was announced then. when an ultimatum was sent to Petersburg, that is, the war was a foregone conclusion; in France, similarly, the mobilization decree was signed after the government's firm resolve to go to war. There is no need to speak of Austria-Hungary, because there mobilization, apart from private conscription under the command of reservists, has always been combined with war. In other words, in the understanding of both diplomats and the general staffs of the Western states, mobilization meant *soda war*. Pourtales Sazonov quite rightly explained this, pointing out to him that Russian mobilization would evoke persistent demands from the General Staff in Germany for the same retaliatory step, which would inevitably lead to war.

With a view of mobilization as a diplomatic means, pa.

290

o SHSH

such an act, which should reinforce the demands of diplomacy, but not ultimately lead to war, we meet only in English and Russian circles.

England mobilized its Fleet and recognized it as a diplomatic move. Rather, it should be considered that this fleet was taken in order to sew up its coasts from the attack of the German Navy. As for specific. weight in the policy of such an action, then it was not particularly great and did not frighten Berlin, which until the last moment considered it possible to agree on neutrality with the state, whose naval military force was in full combat readiness.

Petersburg, as you know; there were great fluctuations in the choice of the type of mobilization—general or private. First, private mobilization was chosen by the diplomatic and dipastic lines as a means of influencing Austria, and then the diplomatic line united with the general staff in demanding the announcement of a general mobilization.

We pointed out that until 1912 the Russian General Staff combined with the declaration of mobilization the declaration of war on Germanpi and Austria-Hungary, but then abandoned such a formulation, separating the mobilization

from the war. In other words, the Russian General Staff believed that mobilization could be declared regardless of the decision to enter the war, be taken either as a preventive measure against enemy attack, or as a means to support the demands of Russian diplomacy.

If we admit our assumption to be justified, then in this case Russian mobilization should have been flexible and not dependent either on the political situation that might develop or on operational considerations. In other words, in the Russian General Staff there should be several options for mobilization with the foreseen possibilities of transition from one to another.

With such a formulation of the matter, the announcement of a partial mobilization could be justified.

In fact, as is well known, private mobilization was not worked out in the Russian general staff, and such was prepared only as a general one—in case of war! with Germany and Austria-Hungary. Porto had no reason to announce private mobilization. It is rather strange how the chief of the general staff, Yanushkevich, could even come up with a proposal for private mobilization, and Sukhomlinov not strongly protest against its announcement. If Yanushkevich was not informed about mobilization matters, then Sukhomlinov, in his former position in the General Staff, was certainly aware of the matter. The adoption by the Council of Ministers on July 25 of a "principled decision" on the announcement of the mobilization of four military districts can be regarded only as a purely diplomatic move, completely unsuitable for military readiness, and therefore of relative value.

If Russia could not allow the defeat of Serbia by Austria, then, on the other hand, it could be said with certainty that only with a rich fantasy, devoid of any reality, it was possible to assume a local war between Russia and Austria-Hungary. We have already said that at the beginning of the 20th century the war took on a trusted character, and as such it

291

ZON SH UDS - OI DIILIA,

seemed to Sazonov when on June 24 the phrase escaped him: "This is a European war." If Sazonov's conclusion was profound and not superficial, then there were no grounds for announcing a partial mobilization with the intent to intimidate Austria.

We know that Vienna was not particularly frightened by the private mobilization of St. Petersburg and turned to its German ally for help. Under pressure from Vienna, German diplomacy, which at first did not attach any importance to Russian private mobilization on the Austrian border, then demanded that it be stopped. Out of the Russian private mobilization came a diplomatic stir, which was very soon understood by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which resolutely took the side of the military line in its demands for a general mobilization.

We know with what perseverance, with what distress and operetta threats to smash the telechon, the Russian Chief of the General Staff, who came to his senses, asked, persuaded and insisted on the announcement of a general mobilization. Sukhomlinov played a double game. On the other hand, "intimate" circles, minor characters of the General Staff, worked vigorously, proving

who did all the harm of announcing private mobilization to the same "small" diplomats.

In a word, to the extent that mobilization was declared in the Western states when the war had already been decided, to the extent that in St. - fear of a possible attack by Germany and Austria-Hungary, with the awareness of the fact of delay in their combat readiness. Neither the diplomats, nor the supreme authorities, nor the Russian general staff had a clear understanding of the contemporary political significance of mobilization. The latter looked at mobilization from the standpoint of combat readiness only, not entering into a discussion of the extent to which mobilization was a prelude to war.

We leave aside all the arguments of Sazonov to Pourtales, all the assurances of Sukhomlinov and Yapushkevich to the German military representatives that Russian mobilization does not pose a danger to European peace. It can be said with certainty that Germany would not have allowed the mobilizations of Russia or France to be completed in peace, although both of them dreamed of it.

Mobilization on the threshold of the world war was the threshold of the war, its feigned declaration, and only in this sense could it be understood.

The chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff did not separate mobilization from war, and Moltke Jr. believed that after the announcement of mobilization, the official declaration of war was an empty formality, completely unnecessary from a military point of view, known as a tribute to diplomatic courtesy and international law.

However, we know that the German diplomats hung on to a formal declaration of war, the Russian General Staff also took this into account on the part of future enemies, French diplomats sought to impose a formal declaration of war on the enemy.

In our place, we talked about the responsibility for the war. The desire to relieve oneself of this responsibility can be explained by: 1) the unrest of the German

292

E o Sh y

diplomats when they first had to make a formal declaration of war; 2) the efforts of the French diplomats to maintain the support of their neighbors and the establishment for this purpose of a ten-kilometer zone that was not occupied by troops; 3) Sazonov's evidence that Russian mobilization does not mean war; 4) Moltke's advice to Vienna not to be the first to start a war against Russia, etc.,

After the Russo-Japanese War, which was started by the Japanese without a formal announcement, no one really thought that the future European war would take place with all the formal changes, and would not start with a de facto attack by one of the parties. Therefore, all the importance of the events that had previously accompanied the declaration of war was transferred to the mobilization. The decree declaring the latter could be considered the beginning of the war. If we consider the responsibility for the war from this point of view, then those who lay the blame for the global fire on Russia are certainly right.

In the UG chapter, we dwelled in detail on the question of the perpetrators of the war, and, of course, it was not Russian mobilization that was the cause of the Euroneutral war. But in the philistine imagination, he was the first to begin to transfer his armed forces to martial law! considered to be the mastermind of war. Such was the political significance of mobilization at the beginning of the 20th century, and it was not for nothing that Konrad left the choice of the time for the formal declaration of war exclusively to diplomats, while Moltke considered it completely unnecessary. True, we must note here that the principle of responsibility for the war still plays a certain role in our times, and not a few efforts are being made by modern German diplomacy, if only to exonerate Germany of the blame for this. At the same time, the victors of the world battle are playing on this, using the responsibility for the war to present tough demands on Germany in relation to its armed forces.

However, since the Formal Declaration of War played a certain role in the international relations of European states, Conrad decided to use it in military songs as well. We are talking about his advice to Berchtold not only not to declare war on France and England for as long as possible, but also not to break diplomatic ties with them in order to enable the weak Austro-Hungarian Navy to complete its mobilization. True, the calculations of the Chief of the General Staff of Austria-Hungary were not fully realized, but nevertheless, several days were won for the calm mobilization of the Fleet.

Today, the political significance of mobilization has not only not decreased, but, on the contrary, has increased even more, since this military act captures all areas of the life of the state. Therefore, in modern conditions, the mobilizing state must make a firm decision in advance on waging wars. If in 1914 no one could be frightened by private mobilizations, then all the more so now such mobilizations constitute the least real threat.

We spoke above about the permanence of modern mobilization and pointed out that for the first echelon it would be close to the 1914 mobilization. Therefore, from a political point of view, the initial mobilization in our day will be considered as the same odium of war as it is

293

S

took off before the World War. It is not necessary to turn a blind eye to this, no matter what is said about the independence of mobilization from the political grouping of states and operational considerations. To this it must be added that in our days the violation of the border will begin not only with the declaration of war and not even from the moment of the announcement of mobilization, but much earlier than they will become a Fact - through the development of the activities of sabotage detachments. States may find themselves in actual war before its formal declaration and even mobilization of their armed forces. The latter will probably take place in the presence of hostilities on the border, when diplomats will no longer need to turn to the general staff for the selection of facts for a formal declaration of war.

Our interpretation of such a military phenomenon as mobilization leads to the rather definite conclusion that mobilization is not a purely natural action, but has tremendous political significance.

Therefore, on the threshold of world war in all states, the announcement of mobilization was carried out by government acts. This is all the more indispensable for our days, when the control of the war as a whole passes into the hands of the government. There cannot be two opinions on the mouth.

In the presentation of the historical part, we focused the reader's attention on the following questions: 1) the timing of the announcement of mobilization and 2) the choice of one or another of its types.

Both diplomatic and military lines were interested in both these issues, and, finally, their final decision came from the supreme power in the state.

Since mobilization was a political act, the determination of the date for its announcement had to come from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mobilization was the prelude to war, a new type of international relations, to which only diplomacy could determine the time of transition, which alone could tell when other types of relations would finally lose their force.

On the other hand, the time of the announcement of mobilization was connected with the conditions of combat readiness of the armed forces and the protection of the borders of the state, which most of all concerned the general headquarters. In those states where there was fear for the successful achievement of combat readiness in comparison with a probable enemy, as, for example, in Russia and France, there the general staff turned out to be persistent in determining the time for declaring mobilization. We will not give proofs of what has been said here, because they will sketch us above. Where the general staff was not afraid to be late with the concentration of armed forces for the Grand Prix, as in Germany, there we observed a more relaxed attitude towards the date of the announcement of mobilization, and even feelings of "humanity" and similar "high" manifestations of the soul spoke in it. On the evening of July 29, while discussing with Bethmann the question of responding to private Russian mobilization, the chief of the German General Staff spoke "very restrainedly" about the general mobilization, not finding sufficient grounds for this, and Falkenhayn, Minister of War responsible for the mobilization, did not object Chancellor to his statement about the desirability of not taking the lead in the war: "The leadership of politics," wrote Falkenhayn, "was not part of my

291

and I was unable to give advice unless military interests were materially affected. So far, there was no reason to talk about mobilization just because it was two or three days late against the Russian and Austrian ones, since it could be carried out faster than the latter.

Thus, when choosing the time for the announcement of mobilization, political values should be taken into account, but, on the other hand, military conditions should not be forgotten. Above, we cited Clausewitz's judgments that politics should not demand anything from war that is contrary to its nature and should not flatter itself with hopes for military successes that have no real basis. Therefore, we believe that the choice of the moment of declaring mobilization should belong to the diplomats, but taking into account the real reasons for the success of the mobilization, which lay in the hands of the general headquarters, and in modern conditions - and other bodies closely involved in the defense of the state. If mobilization warns the enemy in its duration, then all the more freedom of action remains for

diplomacy, and, conversely, the longer the mobilization is, the worse it is prepared from the technical and military side, the less free is foreign policy in choosing the moment of declaring mobilization, forced to align with the work of its general staff.

Almost the same conclusions can be reached when deciding on the choice of the type of mobilization—general or private. In Russia, in the July days of 1914, the question of this, at the suggestion of Sazonov, was decided in the Council of Ministers, although all the pressure exerted by the General Staff should be noted. In his memoirs, the former Russian Minister of War, Sukhomlinov, writes that he did not consider himself entitled to insist on this or that form of mobilization, because it was up to the "politician" - Sazonov, and not him, Sukhomlinov - the "soldier" to decide. Theoretically, this is true, but in reality we have shown with sufficient completeness how the "soldiers" in the uniform of the General Staff these days not only insisted, but even dictated the announcement of a general mobilization. Ultimately, it must be said that they were right, because private mobilization meant little politically. However, they did not put them in the basis of requirements, but purely technical conditions for work! — lack of a developed version of private mobilization. Crossing the threshold of a world war, Russian diplomacy found itself at the mercy of the General Staff, foreign policy fell under the influence of the crude technique of mobilization work. But there was no other way out. Still, justice must be done to Sazonov that, imbued with the arguments of Sukhomlinov and Yanushkevich, he resolutely took the path of general mobilization. If anyone was to blame for depriving Russian diplomacy of the opportunity to maneuver, it was exclusively the Russian General Staff, and not the establishment at the Pevchesky Bridge.

The reader of the last chapter of our work has probably judged that we are not supporters of private mobilization. We can only strengthen it in this conclusion. Since under present-day conditions mobilization is not only a specter of war, but war itself, we consider only the general form of mobilization to be expedient, as the exertion of all the forces and means necessary to achieve victory. We are not going to dispute the fact that in our days mobilization will be esche-

295

(OOV AS IIA

bottom nature, but we affirm that putting the first echelon on alert should be: 1) completely sufficient in terms of manpower and resources; 2) short-term, in order to be able to continue the mobilization of the next echelons in the future, and not to submit to the military success of the enemy.

The mobilization of our day is the odium of war, and the order of the government with the announcement of mobilization is the actual declaration of war. It is possible to try in every possible way to justify the war diplomatically, to issue any kind of white or other color books of documents, to draw up broadcast manifestos, notes and ultimatums, but reality will always remain a fact. .

Mobilization is war, and we cannot conceive of a foreign understanding of it.

\

ry aoe

CHAPTER 1X. | EYES AND EARS OF THE GENERAL STAFF

The need for intelligence. - The volume of exploration in modern conditions. - departments. intelligence leaders. "Interest in Foreign Office intelligence. - Methods of orientation. - Foreign trips of the chief of the general staff: the political and military side of trips. - Official trips and private tours. - Purpose of travel. - Control of diplomacy over the trips of the chief of the general staff and reports of the latter. — Contents of the reports of the Chief of Staff. - Sending special missions abroad, their role and purpose. — Military agents and their service: historical background. - Separation of military attaches by specialties. — Specially authorized military representatives. — Personnel of military agents and their training. - Conditions of appointment. - Testimony of Urbansky. - The main duty of military attaches. - Political activities of military agents. — Lines of command of military agents. — Konrad on the political activities of military agents. — The nature of the work of the military attache. — Relations of military agents with ambassadors of their state abroad. — Visits by military agents to the chiefs of general staffs of foreign states. - The purpose of these visits. - Conditions for inspection by military agents of units, institutions and presence at maneuvers. - A wide circle of acquaintances of military agents. - Sorority and military agents. - Commonwealth of military agents of various countries. — Participation of military agents in undercover intelligence. — Evidence from Nikolai and Urbansky. - The real appearance of military agents and wariness in relation to them. — Military agents of the allied states and their binding role. - Reports and personal reports of military agents. — The nature of the conversations of the chief of the general staff with foreign military agents. — The role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in these conversations and reports on them from the Chief of the General Staff. — Modern views on the service of military agents. — Business trips and private vacations of officers abroad: the purpose of such business trips. — They are of particular importance in the study of foreign states. — Collection of secret information by business travelers and vacation pay. - Prohibition of travel abroad to the commanding staff by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the reasons for this. — Nikozai about his foreign tours. — Collection of information by the general staff from other sources: correspondence of the chiefs of staff and its contents. — Exchange of information of allied general staffs. - Evidence of this Nicholas. - Orientation of the General Staff by other departments. - Undercover intelligence: Nikolai Ob undercover intelligence of Germany and other countries. — Dissatisfaction of diplomacy with undercover intelligence of the General Staff. — Konrad's rebuke. — The role of foreign policy in undercover intelligence. — Political leadership of military intelligence. - Centralization of intelligence. — Monetary appropriations for undercover intelligence. - Their sizes in Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia. - Active intelligence of the General Staff. — The Sarajevo murder and its true inspirers. — The role of diplomacy in active military intelligence. — Nicolai's reflections on the modern significance of undercover intelligence and its centralization.

It is hardly necessary to especially prove the need for all military actions to be oriented in the intentions, forces and means of possible or real opponents. At all times of military history, knowledge

297

Na Ah Myo Yoon!

his enemy, his reconnaissance always played a big role. Neglect or mistakes were always severely punished.

Porto, a long time ago, various methods of orienting in the intentions, forces and means of the opposing side were established. Such a reconnaissance was carried out from the moment the danger of war was ripening, or it was carried out continuously and in peacetime. The next centuries mark, as a rule, the need for continuous reconnaissance of neighboring countries, constant monitoring of the development of military affairs in them, moreover, the closer to our times we turn, the more we will notice not only continuity, but also the deepening of intelligence, deployment it in various areas of the life of the state.

Essentially speaking, any struggle requires prior knowledge of the opposing side, and therefore, no matter what type of struggle we turn to, we will everywhere find elements of reconnaissance from each of the sides of our opponent. Whether it be a diplomatic field, whether it be economic competition and, finally, the war itself - all this requires a preliminary orientation in the plans, forces and means of opponents.

Modern warfare, in the figurative expression of Clausewitz, "spreads out in all directions, not finding definite boundaries for itself." The war of our days seizes all spheres of the life of the state; therefore, the preliminary orientation about the state, which could be in the position of the enemy, is directed in exactly the same way to all spheres of his life. If in the era of Louis XIV, Frederick and Napoleon, intelligence had as its objects the political life of the state and, mainly, its military forces, then since the time of Moltke the Elder, it has also turned to other branches of the life of the state, primarily to the railways.

The imperialist war that has taken place in our memory has further expanded the scope of intelligence to include the entire economic life of the state and its cultural aspirations. Moreover, this same war raised the importance of orientation not only in the foreign policy of the state, but also in the class correlation of forces within the state. The latter, as we have seen, was taken into account even on the threshold of a world war, but in the course of it and after its end, the so-called policy of involvement in the war has grown so much in its influence on the war that in our times we determine the nature of the coming war by it.

At the beginning of the 19th century, the intelligence service was concentrated mainly in two departments: military and diplomatic. We also meet with such a scheme for organizing intelligence on the threshold of a world war.

In the military department, the orientation service was part of the work of the high command. If we recall, both Frederick the Great and Napoleon took a direct and lively part in organizing, directing and accounting for intelligence data of potential opponents. With the advent of the General Staff - an organ representing in peacetime the interests of the main command - the intelligence service was concentrated in the army. So it was under Moltke the elder, and so it was in the rest of the armies of Europe, not only before the World War, but even today. We slipped that Konrad, Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, considered it his duty to monitor the development of foreign and domestic weapons.

298

and [W

zhenspykh these and to make a general picture of their ratios. We will meet with the same idea of preliminary orientation in the booth.

there is no head of the general staff that we would venture to look into even in our day.

As we have noted above, under present-day conditions of preparation for war, reconnaissance of the military forces of a state alone cannot exhaust all the data necessary for drawing up even purely military considerations in case of war. Intelligence has expanded and covers a much larger number of objects than it was even on the threshold of the World War, and therefore it is quite natural that in our times we also meet with decentralized intelligence, the data of which, however, must be summed up in order to 'compose the real, and not a partial or superficial idea of the strength and power of a potential adversary.

We shall return to this question below, but here we must note that, on the threshold of a world war, the General Staff strove, on the contrary, to concentrate intelligence in its own hands and to receive directly from its organizations exhaustive information on the preparations for war of this or that state. True, the "brain of the army" nevertheless admitted that the diplomatic line could carry out reconnaissance completely independently and have its own special bodies for this, but, in any case, the general staff, especially the Vienna one, by no means wanted to limit itself to direct collecting information about the foreign policy of the intended object.

We pointed out that foreign policy, represented by its diplomatic bodies, conducted its own reconnaissance against the peak, sought to obtain a preliminary orientation on the steps that it would take in the arena of international relations. It would seem that diplomacy should not put obstacles in the same aspirations of the General Staff. However, the reader is well aware that it was in this area between Entente and Konrad that great disputes arose. We will discuss this in detail below, but now in general terms we will touch on the root cause of misunderstandings on this ground between diplomacy and the General Staff.

Under normal external relations, states declare their intention to live "in friendship" with each other. True, not one of the states refuses to take those or other measures of defense, which may be necessary when the lines of their foreign policy are so crossed that it will no longer be possible to direct them along the right channel without a war. Orientation about your neighbor consists in collecting information about its defense capability, that is, those data that are considered secret in each state. It is clear that not a single state will communicate them, except perhaps for such an "abnormal" and corrupt government as the government of the former Tsarist Russia, which itself drew up the corresponding memorandums and handed them over to foreign ambassadors, as we know from the historical part of this chapter. In most cases, detailed and documented data is obtained by the orienting state in secret ways. Since such paths go from secret to open, they undermine the "friendship" and trust of the states maintaining diplomatic relations.

Obstacles rise in the paths of diplomats and the usual

299

= :ÿ=——

political fluctuations and complications. The matter sometimes comes to special explanations and negotiations about this or that fact, which testifies to the active steps of one of the parties in collecting secret information.

This is the Formal side of the matter, but if you delve into the essence of the issue, look at its inside out, then, of course, going to establish "friendly" relations, not one of the states refuses in advance to collect by the other the information that it will need in one or another areas of life, in particular the military. What can be obtained openly will be used in orientation about your neighbor. What makes it up. secret, will be obtained by ways that are also secret. International "politeness" requires that a certain dexterity of hands and "cleanliness" in work be shown in this. If, on the contrary, there is no secrecy in this area, and the state conducting intelligence directs it in ways that quickly become known to the other side, then diplomatic friction will arise. As a matter of fact, they should not have taken a place, since even without that every diplomat knows that not a single state can do without a preliminary and advance orientation in the intentions, forces and means of its neighbor. Nevertheless, such tensions arise and grow especially where a tense situation is already created in the foreign relations of states for one reason or another. Cases of collecting secret information are used by the injured party as a pretext for exacerbating external relations, allowing in the eyes of the "philistine" to accuse the other side of violating "friendship" and international ethics, of deceit and similar unseemly acts that prove the hostility of this state. True, this path is not particularly indicative, but in any case it is used even today, especially by that government, whose skull is particularly hard.

But one way or another, we must: still note that the well-known decorum in the collection of secret information was observed always and at all times, a special kind of ethics was established, which required that this collection should not be public. Since this was not respected, diplomatic complications arose, because the "philistine" always demands "friendship", if a special agreement was made about it.

Turning to the consideration of methods of orientation about a possible enemy or opponents, and also, in general, about collecting information about one or another area of their life, we must make the reservation that here we will talk about military orientation, as the title of the chapter implies. We will not speak in detail about the other lines of orientation, in accordance with the tasks of our mission.

Orientation methods consist of: 1) open personal observation, 2) secret observation, and 3) obtaining information from authorities of other states and other departments in one's own state.

Open personal observation of the state and development of military affairs in another state is carried out by: 1) trips to reviews, maneuvers and similar solemn occasions, usually at the invitation, or the chief of the general staff himself or special missions from representatives of the high command; 2) appointments to states from which

300

ZOO ShAS - IONOV

rymi are in diplomatic relations, special military representatives at the supreme power and military agents at diplomatic missions; 3) sending officers abroad to study languages or allowing them private vacations.

Orientation through the bodies of other states and other departments in one's own state consists of: 1) personal correspondence of the chiefs of the general staffs of the allied states; 2) from the exchange of data obtained by the allied general staffs, and 3) from the communication by other departments of military information received by them or of their own data, having one or another relation to the defense of the state.

Finally, secret surveillance and the secret collection of information constitute the so-called undercover intelligence, the technique of which we will not go into, because we would go beyond the scope of our work.

In what follows, we turn to an examination of the general grounds and provisions that accompany the villas we have outlined: the orientation of the current headquarters, which, as we said above, is one of the main branches of its service.

In the historical part of our work we introduced the reader to the travels of the protagonist of our story Konrad abroad. We also pointed out the trips of other chiefs of the general headquarters, although not in such detail as the chief of the general staff from the banks of the Danube, but we did not strive for this, considering it more useful and sufficient to give one historical example in detail than to get carried away by the rest and risk being scattered in historical art.

As from the first book of our work, and especially from the present one, it clearly follows that in the person of the chief of the general staff there always appeared not only one military line of the state, which he "should represent", but also a diplomatic line. We do not say that the chief of the general staff was a special kind of military policy, because, in general, we do not imagine such a policy in nature. In his person, the military and ordinary political lines of behavior of the state whose army representative he was were always combined. As a matter of fact, this must be so, since war is an instrument of politics.

Thus, both on the threshold of a world war, and even today, in the person of the chief of the general staff, military and political lines are always connected. To Shorty, every journey of this control center of the brain of the army and even every word of his are regarded not only from a military point of view, but also from a political one. However, the military side still remains predominant, and the appearance here or there of the chief of the general staff is seen as the path of the Torch of War.

We must always keep these two sides in the trips of the chief of the general staff of any of the states of the earth when it comes to one or another of his tours abroad.

Such trips were undertaken, and are still being made, either to allied states or to neutral ones, especially to those whose involvement in the orbit of military influence is desirable. Rarely did the chief of the general staff go to countries with tense diplomatic relations, because, in essence, he, as an official

301

CONNECT OI

puter, there would hardly be any observation of those armed forces that, not today or tomorrow, may be in

standing in open struggle. True, there are no rules without exceptions, and we must be reminded of the trip of the former Russian Minister of War Sukhomlinov to Berlin and his breakfast at Wilhelm's, about which he, Sukhomlinov, enthusiastically recounts in his memoirs. But it is also known that he was urgently ordered to immediately go to Paris and visit the president of the republic in order to smooth out the admitted incorrectness against the background of French-Russian relations.

The military side of the trips of the chiefs of general staffs consisted of: 1) personal acquaintance with the army of the state where the trip was made, and open observation of it; 2) in getting to know new people; samples of weapons adopted in a foreign army; 3) in studying the system of organization and combat training of foreign armed forces. states, and 4) most importantly, either in the development of a new military alliance, or in coordinating the operational considerations of already allied general staffs.

There are no words that the tour of the chief of the general staff abroad was. an event of great importance and therefore it was undertaken: 1) with special invitation of the country where the chief of staff intended to go, and 2) with special permission for this from the supreme authorities of both states. If we remember how Konrad's trips to Germany, Schweiparia, Pollio to Germany, and, finally, mutual visits to the Russian and Khranduz, as well as the English and Khranpuz general staffs, were arranged, then we must testify that each trip of the chief of the general headquarters is a well-known facet in military affairs and the military training of his state. Therefore, such trips were always undertaken in combination with special important cases of the military life of the state, which include: 1) maneuvers, 2) military celebrations.

But there were cases when, for discussions on purely military issues, the chiefs of the general staff met in an intimate, friendly atmosphere. So, Conrad, before the impending world war, was in a hurry to see his friend and ally Moltke at the resort. He, under the pretense of a special one. diplomatic mission, traveled to Romania. as "private". The chiefs of the general staffs of the Balkan countries looked into Vepa. They did not miss the opportunity to see their colleague in the uniform of the general. headquarters on the banks of the Danube and talk with him on purely military issues.

When enumerating these issues, which we made above, it was noted that the most important were strategic issues, military issues. conveypies and war plans arising from them. In other aspects of the military life of the state, personally, the chief of the general staff, of course, could not orient himself in detail according to his high position, and indeed not: in every state such an orientation was given in an exhaustive form. If, nevertheless, the chief of the general staff was interested in these questions, as, for example, Konrad was during his trip to maneuvers in Switzerland, then. with this pill he was accompanied by special employees from the general staff and various branches of the military, who helped the chief of staff in replenishing his personal orientation in the details of the device, the state of the

302

PONY, UDS THEY ›

preparation of the studied army to the extent that this was allowed by the object of study itself.

Above, we pointed out that each trip of the chief of the general staff carried political principles. Sometimes even the political side prevailed over the military. Such is Konrad's trip to Rumania in 1912, the meeting of the three chiefs of the general staffs of the tripartite alliance on maneuvers in Germany in 1913, about which Moltke wrote to Konrad that the military meaning of this meeting lies only in Konrad's acquaintance with the chief of the Italian general staff, and from the point of view of monitoring the combat training of the German army, in terms of the size of the maneuvering formations, the trip does not represent an interest. This meeting was a confirmation of the military solidarity of the tripartite alliance, the sealing of a diplomatic act "at the fear of enemies" with a sword. We will also find a political connotation in the meetings of the chiefs of the Russian and Khraduzek general staffs.

Therefore, every conference, every trip of the Chiefs of General Staffs abroad was first of all weighed and dispelled by diplomacy. as a well-known course of foreign policy. We have heard of this more than once. We even cited Moltke, Chief of the German General Staff, complaining about diplomacy, which does nothing but "throw stones" at the military nut, intending not to let Konrad go on a date. Needless to say, every trip of the Chief of the General Staff to other countries was under the account and control of the foreign policy organs, and representatives of the General Staff even reported to them.

This state of affairs evoked a feeling of resentment, a hidden, and sometimes even an obvious protest of the chiefs of general staffs, but, in essence, it could not be otherwise. If we recall the topics of conversations and conversations, the circle of people with whom these conversations were conducted by the chiefs of general staffs, then we have to state that abroad the chiefs of general staffs by no means closed themselves in the framework of purely military issues, but "created" foreign policy. It is clear, without evidence, that in such actions they had to report to diplomacy. Yes, finally, inasmuch as "foreign policy is an instrument of politics", insofar as foreign policy turned out to be strongly interested even in purely military questions, which were considered by the chiefs of general staffs, because they did not at all concern the "trifles" of military affairs, but in the majority they put major strategic problems for the defense of states.

If we take a closer look at the trips of the chiefs of general staffs today, then we will find the same political beginning in them, and even to a much greater extent than it was at the beginning of the 20th century. Under modern conditions, it is enough for the chief of the general staff of a large state to put a foreign passport in his pocket or just take steps to obtain it, as this will be immediately taken into account by the foreign policy of the states concerned. The specter of war haunts Europe and its shadows are the chiefs of the general staff, who begin to lead the same "wandering" lifestyle, preparing or reinforcing already existing military alliances and conventions.

Foreign policy control over the freedom of movement of brain centers

305:

.....

armies are not stones scattered by diplomats on the military path, but a completely natural continuation of foreign policy, but only by other means.

So, every trip of the chief of the general staff abroad was and is accompanied today by a report submitted by him or a personal report, or a combination of both types of information from the supreme power and the minister of foreign affairs.

As for the content of the report, it was divided into two parts: 1) political and 2) military.

The political part of the report consisted in a report on the course of those negotiations that were conducted by the chiefs of general staffs with various officials of a foreign state on political topics - about military alliances and conventions, about the lines of foreign policy, which were outlined or carried out by one or another state, etc.

In the military part of the report, various meetings and conversations were set out: 1) on the war plan of one or another military alliance; 2) according to the assessment of the opposing side in military terms; 3) on the organization, arrangement and combat training of the state to which the chief of the general staff made a tour.

We here by no means want to give any summaries of the reports and reports of the chiefs of general staffs on their trips abroad, because it is impossible to cover and provide for all the questions that they can be touched upon and carried out, and on the other hand, for the control centers of the brain armies do not risk making trakharets at all. Big ship 'big and sailing, even in the inky sea.

In the historical part of this book, we gave an example when the chief of the general staff himself was only a member of a special commission commissary to another state and headed by a more responsible person, usually a representative of the supreme authority. Such was the trip of Franz Ferdinand with the highest military representatives of the Austro-Hungarian army to the Leipzig celebrations in 1913.

Usually the dispatch of such commissions is associated with special solemn days in one state or another, but it is the same commissions, during their stay, that decide questions of the foreign policy and defense of states. Questions of foreign policy, which back up their moves with the rattling of the sword, are connected with their arrival, but even the latter misses the opportunity to agree on one or another point.

If we recall, the Austrian agent in Rome, Sheptytsky, proposed to send a representative of the supreme authority or an outstanding general to Italy to improve Italian-Austrian relations. Koprak rejected his candidacy on purely political grounds, not feeling political authority behind him, and put forward the figure of Franz Ferdinand, who would be the supreme power and the military department. There were many obstacles to such a trip, but they were the pasty chief of the Austro-Hungarian general staff. could not stop. The Sarajevo shot ended not only this mission, but also brought to the grave its planned head.

In a purely military field, assignments of the chief of the general staff may be replaced by the dispatch of special commissions from the composition of the general town-centre.

Thus, we acquaint the reader with the trip of the commission of the Italian General Staff to Berlin, with the trip of the head of the German General Staff (without Moltke) to Vienna. The purpose of these trips was to resolve operational issues according to the war plan. There are no words that, on the one hand, they replaced the trips of the chiefs of general staffs, and, on the other hand, supplemented them. If we recall that each trip of the chief of the general staff left a special mark on foreign policy, then the sending of the said staff commissions achieved almost the same results, but with less noise. We say: almost the same, since such commissions were less responsible in their statements than the chief of the general staff, and therefore, in essence, were rather an addition to his work in this area.

We will not bother the reader here with an interpretation of the scope of work of full missions and commissions sent to other countries, because this scope is basically similar to that which we outlined for the trips of the Chief of the General Staff. The only difference was that the range of their work either expanded in its political significance, or closed in purely military matters.

In the same way, we consider it superfluous to prove that the sending of such missions was accompanied by preliminary diplomatic negotiations, the participation of diplomats in working out assignments for them, even the selection of their composition, and, finally, a report by the missus to the foreign policy organs on the results of the trips made. This is quite clear even without us.

However, trips of both the chiefs of general staffs and special missions to foreign states were a sporadic phenomenon, they were undertaken on 06060 important occasions, and, meanwhile, the need for constant monitoring of the development of military affairs in other states was dictated by life itself.

Tasks of this kind were entrusted to special bodies—military agents or military attachés seconded abroad and permanently attached to the state's diplomatic missions.

In our time, the role and significance of these military representatives of the state are well known to everyone, and if we allow ourselves to stop the reader's attention in their service, then for the sole purpose of sharing our conclusions from the historical picture of events unfolded before him.

Our work does not claim to be complete in elucidating this question, and we do not intend to write a catechism for military agents or draw up a "regulation" for their service. We consider the first, in general, harmful in military affairs, and the second is not included in the circle of our duties, as a servant of the military literary pen.

The emergence of the institute of military agents dates back to bygone times. True, it did not have that constant character that can be observed from the middle of the twentieth century, but was introduced when the war was ripening. In any case, already in the era of Napoleon, the service of military agents becomes necessary in peacetime for the state and its army.

With the epoch of Moltke, military agents take on more and more form and are accepted by all states as necessary state organs abroad. The complexity of the range of their activities, about which

a)>>), ETTP No.

we will discuss below, at first created friction not only in the very course of their work, but also among those highest bodies of the state who were called to lead the service of military agents. History has left us pages filled with those misunderstandings that took place between the old man Moltke and Bismarck in the leadership of the service of military agents. We will not interpret them to the reader, because we will encounter a similar situation in the Austro-Hungarian army and, using this example, as a more modern one, we will try to understand this issue.

Military agents were organs of the armed forces of the state and, in accordance with the division of the latter into land forces and the navy, in large states they were also represented along two lines - land and sea. In other words, on the threshold of a world war, large states sent two military agents to one country or another at the same time - land and sea. Where the Navy played a subordinate role in relation to the army, as, for example, in Austria-Hungary, there were no special naval military agents, and their duties were carried out by land military agents.

Today, the war has been transferred to the air. The air combat forces of a state are placed in line with the rest of its forces, and therefore the possibility of sending a special military agent, an air agent, to the state in which the development of this type of troops is underway is not ruled out.
b: fast pace forward.

Based on this, one could assume the emergence of something else. kind of military agents, in addition to those listed by us, for example - chemical, if only an unknown regime of economy, releasing enough. to be stingy with the deployment of a network of military agents abroad, which is very costly financially. Despite the well-known specialization of military affairs, any state still has to be economical in maintaining military agents and divide them into special representatives in strict accordance with the significance of the combat forces and means to which their activities are directed.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, in addition to military agents, we could observe. commissioning to neighboring states of specially authorized military leaders of the highest ranks, who were supposed to be under the supreme authority. Thus, under the former tsar, there were special representatives of Germany in Russia, and, conversely, in Berlin under Wilhelm there was a special representative. Nikolai Romanov in military uniform. Such people were an echo of antiquity, when it was they who were military agents, or rather, military ambassadors in a neighboring state. On the eve of the world war, these positions were associated more with the role of the representation of the army than the essence of the service of a military agent. However, these leaders sometimes served as a connecting link in military matters. If we skim through the correspondence between Vpily and Nicky, with which the reader is already somewhat familiar, we shall find several letters from Wilhelm recommending one or another of ours. a highly authorized military representative sent to Petersburg. True, the enumeration of the qualities of these candidates shows what was required of them. something other than from military agents. They had to be different

the position of the family, "chivalry", to be pleasant conversationalists, to be able to tell entertaining things from some African adventures, etc. In a word, these were persons who were by no means destined for the menial work that fell on the shoulders of military agents.

In view of the special special activity of those "affiliated with" the former "supreme" rulers, which has now receded into the realm of history along with those persons under whom they were accredited, and since their service had little in common with the service of the general staff, we will no longer continue to reap acquaintance with them. They are not the heroes of our story.

It cannot be denied, of course, that military agents were also required to have a certain polish that would allow them to enter the top of the dynastic and bourgeois lines of the state, but, at the same time, they had to have special knowledge for their work. .

The former head of the intelligence bureau of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff under Konrad Urbansky, in his article on military agents, published in the August 1927 issue of the magazine Miiyag-UosVepany, writes: for this position. Neither name, nor rank, nor secular gloss, nor wealth or knowledge of languages could be decisive in choosing a military agent, but this was influenced by

special education, a clear military outlook and a strong sense of responsibility for a correct judgment about this or that military phenomenon.

Theoretically, this is true, but in practice, in the same Austro-Wevger general staff, something else was noticed, and when appointing military agents, those data were often taken into account that, according to Urbansky, should not be decisive. However, still the presence of a military education. was considered especially necessary for candidates for the posts of military agents.

Therefore, in most cases, military agents were appointed from the depths of the general staffs - land and sea, where the latter was a special body, and in the absence of it - from officers of the fleet who had received a higher naval education.

As a rule, we repeat, it was recognized that the service of a military agent requires extensive military knowledge in order to quickly navigate the development of military affairs in the state where this military agent is seconded.

But there were also exceptions. In small states, ordinary ordinary officers were often sent to the post of military agents, but bearing the stamp of nobility, gloss and favor of the authorities.

The current situation of the war, which has become much more complicated since the beginning of the 20th century, all the more requires from the military agent broad knowledge in military affairs, broad political development and, thus, even more forces them to select these agents from among the leaders who received a higher military education in land, sea or air lines. Without such an education, a person appointed as a military agent will not cope with the tasks assigned to him, which, as we will see below, are not easy.

We will not go into a list of other qualities that should be characteristic of military agents, because from the following

307

rya blue

provisions, they will follow of themselves, and then some of them are so special for the bourgeois system that they cannot be recognized as any eternal norms.

In the first book of our work, we took the risk, apparently not entirely successful, of sketching the appearance of the representatives of the General Staff in our understanding, of course. We do not deviate from such an understanding even now, believing that many of the traits that we have singled out as being especially necessary for persons of the general staff will be inherent and necessary for military agents of our day.

The appointment of military agents was previously personally agreed with the state where the military agent was supposed to be sent. Such a situation must be recognized as quite normal, because only if this is observed can one expect that the official activity of the military attache will proceed in a normal way. Otherwise, many doors will be closed to the military agent, which he, as an official representative, will not be able to penetrate, and even if he is pro-pushed, he will find emptiness and "secular" courtesy, but not a business reception.

We noted above that the institution of military agents was appointed to monitor the organization and development of military affairs in the state to which the representatives were seconded.

Thus, the most evil duty of the military attachés lay in their military work, 6 familiarity with the armed forces of a foreign state, their organization, condition, combat training, and even preparation for the slaughter of the entire state of the state.

If military activity, in general, is thoroughly imbued with politics, then, of course, in their service military agents could not avoid not only making acquaintances, but also studying the politics - internal and external - of the state in which they were located. Without a clear understanding of the political life of the state, it was impossible to form an exhaustive idea of the structure of its defense.

Therefore, it is quite understandable that in all the arguments and reports of military agents, with which we have been acquainted above, there is an assessment of the political position of states and the line of their political behavior. True, it should be noted that the object of their study was mainly foreign policy, but it must be said that internal politics did not leave their field of vision either. We heard the reports of the Austrian agent from Psterburg about the revolutionary movement in Russia and his assessment of this movement from a military point of view.

However, the chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff believed that military agents, in addition to having a good orientation in the political life of the state, could lead a certain line of politics, like private people.

Such a view of military agents expanded and complicated the range of their duties, placing them in a false position before the official representatives of foreign policy.

Below we will dwell on this in a little more detail. Here we emphasize that the entire service of flash agents was closely intertwined with the foreign policy of that

the state from which they were seconded, and therefore their activities had to take place in close contact with the embassies. Such

308

op schschsch[//

the position was, as a rule, recognized everywhere, and military agents were even listed as part of the diplomatic mission, but at the same time they enjoyed and strove for a certain independence in their work.

"Military attachés are under my jurisdiction and I am responsible for them," Konrad wrote in the heat of anger at the foreign minister. Such a statement by the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff fully corresponded to the actual state of affairs. In all states, military agents were subordinate to the corresponding chief of the general staff - land or sea, as bodies primarily interested in collecting information about the armed forces of foreign states and the state of their defense. There can be no two opinions on this matter, and the subordination of military agents exclusively to the chief of the general staff must be recognized as quite normal and vital.

Another question is what tasks were given by the General Staff to their military agents. The collection of information about the armed forces of states, the study of his military line of conduct, was undoubtedly within the terms of reference of the general. headquarters, and therefore military agents were to receive assignments along this line from the general staff and report to it on the results achieved. .

But we said that war is an instrument of politics, that the service of military agents is closely connected with foreign policy, and therefore military agents to a large extent deepened their work in the political field, for which there were, in fact, special organ of the state - its diplomatic missions. .

In modern conditions, the preparation of war is the duty of the military. agents will include orientation and study by them also of the economic preparation of the state for war,

According to Konrad, military agents¹ could lead an independent line in foreign policy, and we have noticed more than once how the head of the Austro-Hungarian. of the General Staff, with a bold hand, sketched out instructions to military agents on foreign policy, far from corresponding to the line of conduct of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. True, Konrad made the reservation that this was his personal opinion, etc., but it is well known that the personal opinion of a superior is understood by subordinates as an order and is carried out, often unconditionally, into practice. In a word, the General Staff in Vienna considered it possible to conduct its foreign policy through military agents.

Obtaining such freedom, the military agents of the Danube Empire, of course, did not fail to make extensive use of it. We have already drawn the reader's attention in its place to the proposals by the military agents of the paths which, in their opinion, the foreign policy of Austria-Hungary should have followed. It suffices to recall the reports of a military agent from Bucharest or Constantinople to be convinced by the mouth.

In a word, bypassing the representatives of foreign policy by the general

headquarters and his organs, represented by military agents, created their own external policy.

Of course, Austria-Hungary was no exception in this. This can be found in the service of military agents of other countries, if you delve into the reports of military attachés to their chiefs of general staffs.

309

[WITH

Such political activity of military agents, even according to Conrad, was a private matter.

But in the historical part, we also had to face the form of this activity. As is known, with the permission of Franz Joseph, the Austrian military agent in Romania was entrusted with helping the Austrian ambassador in Bucharest Czernin in drawing Romania into an alliance with the monarchy. The military agent received orders to this effect not only from the chief of the general staff, but followed them to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Such an assignment of a diplomatic nature, although not included in the terms of reference of a military agent, can still be recognized as possible, and its execution is correct.

Here it is necessary to note the role played by military agents in 1912 in the formation of the Balkan federation. The beginning of the formation of the union was laid by awards to military agents. In the conditions of mutual relations between the Balkan states, this is quite normal, because they could rather come to an agreement on the basis of a military alliance than to regulate their supra-national aspirations through the efforts of diplomats. Indeed, as long as the cannons spoke in the Balkans, the Federation was alive, but as soon as diplomats gathered around the green table, disputes and strife arose again, ending in the second Balkan war,

As for the independent actions of the military agents in the diplomatic field, even on the instructions of the chief of the general staff, they should be considered penenormal. The well-known line of foreign policy pursued in another state is the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its local bodies - diplomatic missions. Therefore, any private speeches of military agents in foreign policy, without coordinating them or receiving appropriate directives from their ambassadors or envoys, cannot take place. Likewise, we believe that the assessment of foreign policy given by military agents in their reports to the chief of the general staff should be strictly coordinated with diplomatic representatives.

Meanwhile, something else had to be observed. In their assessment of the political situation, the military agents strove to be independent and, giving it, supplied the chief of staff with documents, based on which he could not agree with the conclusions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We may be told that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not infallible and may be mistaken in assessing future events. This is what Konrad tried to prove to us; we can find similar conclusions in modern military literature in Germany. We will not argue that mistakes can be made on the part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and such were on the verge of a world war, but from here it is far from the recognition of the need to have a second body for foreign affairs, but only consisting of leaders in military uniforms. It must never be forgotten that war is an instrument of politics, and not vice versa.

If we recall, Conrad was very offended by the Roman ambassador, who allowed himself to give a different assessment of Italy's military preparations than the chief of the general staff did. The latter, to prove his innocence, indignantly exhibited his 39 years of service in the military department and called almost

310

ii whether

not the boy of the Roman ambassador. It is entirely possible that any ambassador of Austria-Hungary, especially from such an honored one as Lallavichini, could do the same, if he knew that his line of conduct in foreign policy finds a different interpretation in the mouths of newly-minted, but unrecognized by law, diplomats in military uniform. Erenthal was right, standing up for the Roman ambassador.

Ultimately, we must establish that military agents were entrusted with: 1) purely military tasks and 2) diplomatic missions.

Military agents were the official representatives of the state and as such had to keep within the framework of maintaining "friendly" relations.

Thus, their work should have a purely official, open character. In other words, acquaintance with the defense of the state to which the military agent was posted should be based on the study and receipt of those data that would be provided to him in a legal way. Such collection of information could only take place when they visited the units and institutions of the army, as a result of personal impressions, or through the study of official regulations, instructions, military literature, or, finally, a wide circle of acquaintances, especially in the military environment.

Conrad briefly talks about the methods used by his military agents in collecting information he received. According to Conrad, the military agents drew up their reports only on the basis of personal impressions, the study of official sources and the press, as well as those exchanges of opinions that they had to conduct openly in society.

His subordinate, the head of the intelligence bureau, Urbansky, in the article we mentioned above, testifies: "From my personal long-term experience, as the head of the intelligence bureau, I can say that military agents in their study of foreign armies have never been based on human intelligence. A well-educated officer in military affairs, with a clear military judgment, had at his disposal other rich means that allowed him to study the military power of the state. Official communication with military central offices, observation of the maneuvers to which he was invited, study of military literature and the daily press, study of meetings of government offices gave military agents a much clearer picture of the defense of the state than the reports of obscure personalities, which were often dubious. and erroneous."

My: for the time being, let's not object to Urbansky in his defense of the ingenuity of military agents in undercover intelligence, for we will do it in our own place.

Let us now turn our attention to the epic life of these organs of the General Staff. |

We noted above that military agents, being attached to diplomatic missions, enjoyed a certain independence in their work. We will not find a direct subordination of military agents to diplomatic representatives anywhere since the time of the elder Moltke himself. When Bismarck made an attempt to lay his hand on military agents, he met with the same fierce rebuff from the Chief of the General Staff as he had

311

[ii]

later Konrad, who declared the direct subordination of military agents only to the chief of the general staff.

Thus, military agents had only to establish contact in their work with diplomatic representatives. If this can be recognized as fair in a purely military field, and even then with certain reservations, then it must be pointed out that in purely diplomatic speeches, military agents were supposed to receive orientation from the embassy and report to it, and not be guided by their General base.

Urbansky now declares that in military policy the military attaches acted as advisers to their ambassadors. We told Vyila how independent such advisers turned out to be in their political activities. We cannot imagine that Urbansky did not know about the political instructions given to military agents by the Chief of the General Staff. It remains to be assumed that now Urbansky broadly interprets the role of an adviser, which a military agent should have been after, not thinking of subordinating him to the diplomatic line even in matters of foreign affairs.

politicians.

The question arises to what extent foreign policy representatives on the ground could demand an account from military agents in their purely military work. Thus, before us was the participation of a military agent in Rome in a discussion together with the ambassador of Konrad's data, which the chief of the general staff was then offended by. The German nosol in Vienna expressed his displeasure when a German military agent did not warn him in time about Konrad's departure from the post of chief of the general staff. In a word, local diplomats claimed to be well-informed about the military work of an attaché, not to mention the misunderstandings that occurred in their undercover intelligence, which only representatives of foreign policy had to clear up.

While recognizing as normal the line of direct subordination of military agents to the chief of the general staff, we still cannot deprive diplomatic representatives in the field of their legitimate desire to be oriented in military matters, especially those closely linked by politics. It should not be forgotten that the diplomatic representative blames the foreign state as a whole, and therefore cannot ignore its defense. If military agents did not consider it necessary to orient the ambassador in the development of the state's defense affairs, then the latter would probably have to carry out parallel work on orientation in this matter.

In view of the foregoing, we do not find reprehensible the participation of a military agent in Rome in discussing the degree of readiness of Italy for war, just as we consider it a mistake of a German military agent that he did not

guided the ambassador in changing the top of the general staff, for such a change was also of great political significance.

Our contemporaries like to draw lines of subordination vertically and horizontally. We are not fans of such bureaucratic geometry, but if you like, we draw a vertical line of subordination from military agents B to the chief of the general staff, and from the horizontal line to the diplomatic representative on the spot - we abstain and replace it with a dotted

312

SOAO UDS PIIIIIIIOOOIIIVIOOOOOOO

”

And

rum, i.e., only orientation in military work. The final linking of these two lines occurs at the top, not at the bottom. —

As indicated above, military agents were official representatives and as such were received by the Chief of the General Staff, and with his permission were given access both to institutions and to military units.

Depending on what diplomatic relations the states were in, various relations of military agents were established. with representatives of the military department of the state where they were sent.

In the union state, military agents, with or without invitation, quite often visited the office of the chief of the general staff, conducting conversations with him on various issues of both military and foreign policy. The reader, of course, remembers all those intimate conversations that Konrad had with the German military agent, as a representative of the allied state.

The same Conrad's conversations with the Italian military representatives breathed more restraint, although they were also allies. Their appearance at the chief of the general staff was always associated with the solution of some important military issues, for example, according to the war plan.

Military agents of neutral states, for example, Turkey, dropped in on Conrad in order to probe the foreign political situation in moments of crisis and find out the position of Austria in them. The same can be said. and about the visits of the Romanian military agent.

Finally, the appearance of Russian military agents in the chief's office. The Austro-Hungarian General Staff was also more political. character than military. It was associated with crises in the diplomatic relations of these states. At a time when the diplomats of both countries, as, for example, in the crisis of 1909, ceased to negotiate, military agents appeared on the scene to alleviate the crisis, trying to continue diplomatic negotiations.

Of the same nature were the visits by the German military agent to the Russian Minister of War Sukhomlinov and the butcher of the General Staff Yanushkevich on the threshold of the World War. Despite the fact that the conversation was about mobilization as a military phenomenon, the visit had a political character. Russian military leaders tried to prove to the military

agent "peacefulness" of Russia and the lack of preparation for war. True, in Berlin these tortures were recognized as nothing more than a "lie".

In a word, important political events rather than orientation in the state of military affairs led military agents to the office of the chief of the general staff of a foreign state.

With the permission of the chief of the general staff, military attachés were allowed to inspect units and be present at exercises and maneuvers. Of course, there were far fewer restrictions on this for the military agents of the allied states than for the rest. An Austrian military agent in St. Petersburg complained to Konrad that he was not allowed to maneuver in the inner districts, that is, exactly where the inquisitive gaze of this agent wanted to penetrate, hoping to see the units in their natural form, and not specially trained for inspection, which were in St. Petersburg

military.

313.

ii via

district. And in the latter, as well as, for example, in Germanpi, military agents during maneuvers did not enjoy absolute freedom of movement and observation, but were kept by a special group, moving at the direction of representatives of the general staff attached to it. The offended Austrian military agent suggested to Konrad that he drastically limit the admission of Russian military agents in Vienna to the inspection of units and to maneuvers.

Typical in this regard is the case with the restriction of the freedom of movement of military agents by the Italian General Staff during the attack on Tripoli. As you know, the Italians left them on the ship, while the troops were on land and fought for the possession of Tripoli. Conrad sharply protested against such a "pleasure trip" of Austrian military agents (land and sea), but we think that he himself would have acted in the same way. In other words, the personal impression of a military agent about military units, their combat training and even combat operations has always been and will be limited.

We have already said that he also drew his personal impression of the development of military affairs in the state in which the military agent was located from that wide circle of acquaintances, both in the diplomatic and, mainly, in the military environment, in which the military agent was operating. Every military agent strove to establish this circle of acquaintances, since at various evenings, dinners and balls, that is, in the atmosphere of the usual pastime of bourgeois society, military attachés received the information they needed. A conversation with this or that diplomat or a high-ranking military leader often provided valuable material for orienting a military agent.

Here it is interesting to note another source of information that was often used by military agents - this is an aristocratic women's society with its inherent loquacity. It is known that the "weaker" sex of bourgeois society, especially its upper classes, very often burned with the desire to play a role in politics and to carry on conversations on this topic. Suffering at the same time from the "incontinence" of the language, the ladies-politicians often frankly expressed what they knew and was a secret.

Suffice it to recall the reports of military agent Conrad about his conversation with the wife of the German ambassador in Paris, born Russian, who boiled with anger at Austria and predicted that Russia would not go to

concessions. Pourtales was guided by women's sources during the mobilization of Rossip. The wife of the chief of the general staff, Italip Pollio, created a policy of rapprochement with Austria-Hungary, paying special attention to the family of an Austrian military agent.

These are only a few facts of "women's politics" and although, of course, conversations with ladies should not be relied upon in particular, it is necessary to take them into account, because very often they are nothing more than the opinions of husbands holding responsible positions, or conversations in general. and the conversations of politicians and vociferous figures, who lost sight of the inappropriateness of discussing important issues in the circle of limes, are completely unintended for this.

zacheptyh.

We may be reproached for anti-feminism, but we make the reservation that the term refers to the women of bourgeois society, and not to those who are called and prepared for state work.

314

o rshschschshchshchshchi [—(ShmmenkhTsFP @ P) › BI " m Sh

We are not going to make rules from what has been said, but we cannot hide the fact that the role of Bismarck in a skirt is very tempting given the ambitious women of our day. The artistic pen of Leo Tolstoy captured the face of Anpa Pavlovna Sherer in "War and Peace" the appearance of such a woman - diplomat and

her "salopa".

On the threshold of the Second World War in St. Petersburg, there were well-known "salon" Kleinmikhel and Ignatieva. A visit to such "salons" can give a military agent and sometimes chain data on his service, because in them the state secret is usually the "highlight" of the meeting and appears in the same nakedness in which bourgeois women fill the halls and drawing rooms like the soiree.

The commonality of the type of service is usually the link between people. Therefore, in the historical part of our work, we noted the connection that military agents maintained among themselves, especially those of the allied states. Naval military agent Rossny in Constantinople spoke quite frankly with an Austrian military agent about Russian policy in Turkey. Austrian and German military agents in Cheterburg exchanged information they had received about the Russian army. The military attachés of the neutral states, who were drawn together by their orientation towards one or another large state in foreign policy, willingly approached in military work with the military representatives of these large states. One must always keep in mind the well-known exchange of information and conclusions from one's work between military agents, especially those states that are in an alliance or on the way to it.

Such are the ways of officially informing military agents that we have been able to trace in the historical part of our work. Perhaps there are others in life, but we will study those whose traces were left to us by the writings of the former chiefs of the general staff.

In his memoirs, the former butcher of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff denies the participation of military agents of Austria-Hungary in the secret collection of information about the armed forces of those states to which they were seconded. Koprak points out that, despite the fact that the military agents of Russia and Serbia conducted undercover intelligence, the military agents of Austria-Hungary were strictly forbidden to take such a path in order to

do not shake your position.

His subordinate, Urbaisky, in the above article on military agents testifies to this. Pointing out that the duties of military agents are also defined differently in different states, Urbansky says: "Only bastards can consider "espionage" as the first duty of military agents, which in most states is a fable. During the five years before the war, when it was my duty to communicate with military agents in Vienna, especially during maneuvers, political tension led to the recall of only two military agents of the Russian embassy. Both were engaged in active leadership of secret intelligence. All other military attaches preferred to be completely loyal guests of the state to which they were accredited. Austro-Hungarian military agents were strictly forbidden any work in secret intelligence. Urbansky even points out that the Austrian attaches are very

315

PONED II often received offers of various secret information, very often with a provocateur, but all of them were rejected and they were reported to the relevant institutions of the state.

It would seem impossible not to believe such chastity of the Austro-Hungarian military agents, but ... this is an unfortunate "but": the chief of the general staff, Konrad, says otherwise. In the first volume of his memoirs, on page 209, Konrad conveys the essence of his conversation with a military agent from St. Petersburg about a possible change in the Russian strategic deployment plan. "Grah Spanochi (a military agent in St. Petersburg - B. Sh.), writes Konrad, "thought that for 50-60 thousand rubles one could find a person who could. to deliver data on the deployment plan, to which I objected that, at the very least, 100 thousand rubles could be allocated from the Intelligence Fund for this, but if you need more, you can beg from the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Grah Spanochi believed that it was too early to look for such a lido, since the change of the plan in Russia had not yet been decided on.

Thus the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff refutes both himself and his former subordinate.

The official military representatives of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff were not limited to legally obtaining the data they needed, but also conducted undercover intelligence.

The former head of the intelligence department of the German army command, Nicolai, in his work "Hidden Forces", throws light on the work of military agents of various countries in undercover intelligence. By. For understandable reasons, Nicolai also passes over in silence the activities of the military attachés of Germany and Austria-Hungary. But what is important for us, in general, is the fact that such work is common to all military agents, among whom, of course, are military attachés of the middle states, as we have just been. heard were no exception.

Speaking of Russian intelligence, Nicolai points out that "the leadership of intelligence was in the hands of the general staff in St. Petersburg." "From there, in contact with the military attaches and consulates, the processing of Berlin, Vienna and abroad in general ... The military attaches also worked in Germany against Austria."

As proof, Nicolai points out that the Austrian spy known to the reader, Redl, "was recruited from Berlin through a Russian military officer. agent." On the eve of World War II, in April 1914, the Russian military agent in Berlin, Bazarov, was caught by the German government in undercover intelligence, and it demanded his immediate departure to Russia. "The attache," writes Nicolai, "denied any participation in this case and considered it an insult to his position and his personality that the fact that his statement was opposed by the testimony of some one: FeldfVeibel. It took another message to the Russian embassy ... After this message, the Russian military attache left Berlin and his post on the same day. Op went, therefore, along the same path as his predecessor Michelson, who was convicted of complicity in the case of high treason.

Reporting on the same Russian intelligence in Austria-Hungary, Nikolap notes: "Over the past 30-40 years, almost all the military accredited in Vienna.

316

w

Russian attachés were forced to leave their posts as a result of their espionage activities that were discovered. Colonel Marchenko, who had to leave the post of military attache, had, by the way, an Austrian serviceman who had been spying for Russia for more than 20 years. Colonel Zankevich, who left in 1913, was especially compromised by his connections with one chief lieutenant of the military school, with another officer, and with several military men.

French intelligence, according to Nicolai, was also supported abroad by military and naval attachés and consulates.

As for Italian intelligence in Austria, "since then," Nicolai writes, "as Major Delmastro, compromised by espionage, was forced to leave Vienna in 1906, the Italian military attache no longer took part in intelligence; this ban did not apply to the Italian maritime attache.

Such are Nicolai's testimonies about the intelligence activities of military agents of former enemies and the stubborn suppression of similar work by the military attaches of Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Those restrictions in the collection of information by legal means, which we spoke about, confronted military agents with the task of transferring the center of gravity of their work to undercover intelligence. At the risk of their official position, military agents of all countries organized and directed undercover intelligence even in the state where they were accredited. More modest was the way of exploration through other states.

Needless to say, of course, that the view of such "official" and "friendly" representatives in the state where they were accredited was established quite definite and far from flattering, introducing even more wariness in the treatment of surrounding military and civilian state representatives.

The exception was the military agents of the allied states, and even then a certain caution was required in communicating to them the information that was needed in all-allied interests.

Therefore, the frequent changes of military agents who compromised themselves by disclosing their undercover intelligence are quite understandable. Each such case inevitably led to the rapid departure of a military agent and the appointment of a new one. The slippery slopes of "friendship" have their victims.

Naturally, the question arises of the possibility of avoiding such a compromise of military agents and the organization of intelligence in addition to them. According to Nicolai, since 1906 the Italian General Staff took the wrong path in relation to Austria-Hungary. We do not know how true this is. Theoretically, it can be considered undesirable to involve military agents in undercover intelligence in the state in which they are accredited, but in practice this has rarely been observed. Military history marks units of "Tolstoy" military agents, since, frankly, it is most convenient to direct intelligence through a military person who is directly sitting on the spot, and the very circle of his duties requires such work.

317

[Schl YilD

We noted that the military agents of the allied states used great confidence in the states where they were accredited. Military agents of the allied states served as a link between the generals' headquarters in the most important questions of defense, such as: a war plan, in political orientation, combat training, etc. Through them, the chiefs of the General Staffs conducted their top secret correspondence, they were also the bastard transmitters of the views of the brain centers of the military machine of the state on this or that issue. In a word, the military agencies of the allied states were the closest confidants of the chiefs of the general staffs. True, their powers depended on the strength of the union, which was established at a certain time between the states. If we recall, against the backdrop of the Franco-Russian alliance, distrust and doubts about its strength were more than once observed on both sides, and therefore the Minister of War Sukhomlinov (albeit a supporter of the German orientation) expressed unambiguous dissatisfaction with the fact that in the affairs of the defense of Russia; The French were perhaps better oriented than the Russians themselves. Before coming to the post of Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff Konrad, relations between the Austro-Hungarian and German General Staffs were relatively dry and distant, and therefore the orientation of military agents was also not complete. It must be said that, in general, the German General Staff had little confidence in the restrained language of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff and tried only to orient it in general terms in its war plan. The German ambassador in Vienna, after the incident with the departure of Konrad to the post of army inspector, sharply also made it clear by diplomatic lip that, in view of the talkativeness of the responsible persons of the Duval Empire, one had to be restrained with them.

As intelligence agencies of the General Staff, military agents kept a regular report on their work to the chiefs of staff. The report consisted: 1) in regular reports and 2) in personal reports of the beginning. nickname of the General Staff in the circle of his work.

Reports, usually in the form of letters, were often addressed by military agents to their boss, and, frankly, with the increase in tension, such reports became more frequent. The letters, according to their content, were divided into two parts: 1) political and 2) military. In view of the role

which military agents played or tried to play in the course of diplomacy, the political part of their reports occupied a fairly large place, guiding the chief of the general staff as fully as possible in the political life of the state to which they were accredited. Giving an overview of the foreign policy of the state, military agents did not limit themselves to a simple one: fixing the situation at a certain time, but they allowed themselves to sketch out foreign policy lines, which, in their opinion, domestic diplomacy should have adopted. The lessons of diplomacy, various projects of military alliances, and similar proposals, often of a subjective nature, constituted the political part of the reports of military attachés. We have expressed our definite opinion on this issue, and here we will neither repeat our opinion nor endorse such creative activity of the military agents in the diplomatic field. We believe that in this their role should have been reduced only to fixing the existing political

318

PONY US PIN

situation without their own, perhaps ingenious, proposals to change the conduct of foreign policy.

The military part of the reports dealt mainly with the state of defense of the state to which the military agents were seconded. Questions of the war plan, the concentration of armies, their readiness, organization, organization, combat training, etc., were discussed by military agents before the chief of the general staff, to the extent that the military agent was able to have information about this. The top command staff of the army did not leave their point of view, to whom they gave a description corresponding to their understanding.

It hardly needs to be said in particular that the reports of military agents are documents so important in the orientation of the General Staff that military assumptions are built on them of great importance, and therefore the most attentive and thoughtful rebuttal should be shown from the side of military agents to their written reports. It is known that the optimistic from the Russian point of view reports of the Russian military agent in Japan Vannovsky before the war of 1904 of the year on the state and combat readiness of the Japanese army played an important role in Russia's superficial attitude to the preparations for the war with Japan, in a fabulously funny Kuropatkin's plan, painted up to the moment of captivity of the Mikado, inclusive, and, finally, in the defeat that Russia suffered in 1904 of the year. A good lesson for military agents of all countries and all times ...

As for the personal reports of military agents, they were made periodically, on important occasions, especially in a tense political situation. These reports dealt with the same questions as in the official reports, but with greater depth, thanks to the personal exchange of notes. However, no matter how full the reports of military agents are, but they can never replace personal reports, and such must be mandatory in the service

military attaché.

The arrival of military attachés for personal reports was also used by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 1) for orientation and 2) for special assignments to military agents along the political line, as we have said above.

Finally, it should be noted that with laconic reports, military agents

appeared in the offices of the supreme power, here again giving their personal assessment of the current and military situation of the state to which they were accredited. Such reports cannot be considered the rule, but they are not useless for the top leadership of foreign policy and the war. Noah in the state, and therefore in life will always take place. Usually military agents! visit mainly the office of the chief of the general staff, whose collaborators are by nature and

appointment.

Above, we noted for what purposes the military agents looked into the office of the chief of the general staff of the state to which they were accredited.

For the present, let us take the liberty of focusing the reader's attention on the character that these conversations between the two representatives of various general staffs acquired, mainly on the character that the chiefs of the general staffs gave to these conversations.

319.

diode

Since the military agents were involved in politics, the tone of the conversation with them had to correspond to the general tone of the foreign policy of the state, and therefore it should be recognized as quite expedient to ask Conrad of the Minister of Foreign Affairs about those political lines that the Chief of the General Staff had to adhere to. in conversation with military agents. Such an orientation is necessary for the chief of staff.

In the absence of it or unwillingness to reveal political moves, the chiefs of general staffs usually resorted to their favorite trick, namely, to point out that they were not involved in foreign policy, that the chief of staff was a "soldier" who was not called to lead foreign policy. that he is not the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

True, such a tone was not always maintained by the chiefs of staff, especially by Konrad, who moved on to discussions of purely political topics. Now under the guise of a "private" fake, now under the guise of a friend talking with a friend in a "café", the chief of the Austro-Wepger general staff gave this or that advice in the field of foreign policy, which, in Conrad's opinion, should, in the opinion of Conrad, correspond to the guidelines. policy lines of Austria-Hungary. We will ask you to recall Konrad's conversations with the military agents of Turkey, Bulgaria and Russia, so as not to give detailed proofs of what was said.

It is interesting to note Konrad's advice to the Russian military agent - to bite the tail of the so-called Russian "public opinion", which, according to the agent, was in favor of the war with Austria-Hungary.

A certain restraint in conversations with military agents on semiotic topics on the part of the chief of the General Staff manifested itself when he needed an op.

When the chief of staff, on the contrary, wanted to pursue his political line, then, despite the fact that two "soldiers" were talking, the conversation took on the character of negotiations between diplomats.

Montonari, embarrassed, listening to Conrad's promises that a close alliance with Austria would secure a large territorial gain for Italy.

at the expense of France. The Romanian military agent, on the other hand, was the head of the Austro-Hungarian general chitab, who came on a visit, put a number of demands on Romania, which were to be brought to the attention of its government.

It was not a "soldier" but a "diplomat" who spoke in such tones, but with a military fold, and not with the usual manners of representatives of foreign policy, especially from the banks of the Danube, who were always distinguished by the well-known ambiguity and vagueness of their promises. ,

In a word, in the political part of the conversations in the office of the chief of the general staff, military agents more often met with more restraint and evasiveness in answers than frank confessions of the head of the brain of the army.

It must be said that the military agents themselves took this into account well, and, as is known, all the statements of Sukhomlinov and Yanushkevich to the German military agent in the July days of 1914 were regarded in Berlin, according to the reports of the military attaches, as a complete lie. Even the "word of honor" of the Chief of the Russian General Staff had no value either among military agents or at the General Staff in Germany.

320

Pony AS PO,

R

Every conversation with a military agent, if it touched upon political questions, was immediately reported by the Chief of the General Staff to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was taken into account by the latter in the course of political relations with the state from which the military agent was from. Such a procedure for orienting the minister of foreign affairs about conversations with military agents must be recognized as quite correct, because the minister of foreign affairs was responsible for the direction of foreign policy, who had to be aware of all conversations about the foreign policy of states, even if they were conducted in a military cabinet and "soldiers".

If we noted the restraint of the chief of staff in conversations with military agents on political topics, then no less evasiveness is noticed in conversations about purely military matters. In this area, the chief of the general staff did not go beyond the framework of general discussions on this or that issue, because, orienting himself through his military agents, he did not intend to give strangers any data in excess of what the interests of the defense of the state allowed. Of course, a complete refusal to answer the questions posed by the military agent would not only be unfounded, but would be harmful for maintaining friendly relations with the state represented by the military attache. In every military question there is a general, purely theoretical aspiration, which does not constitute a military taipa and is known to everyone who studies military affairs. Avoiding talking about this part of the question would be ridiculous and would only show the hostile attitude of the chief of staff towards the official representative, and not the desire to protect the interests of defense. The chief of the general staff is such an experienced and responsible "man of state" in military affairs that he can and must always determine the limits of his silence and reticence, not to the detriment of international relations.

We have characterized the service of military agents of the past. We pointed out that it is necessary for military attaches to draw up a catechism, because all their activities require an individual approach in each individual

case and in different states. From what has been sketched above about the service, one can glean only a general attitude, but there are no immutable rules. We hope that the one who leafs through this book will critically review our conclusions and sketch out the paths he would take if fate put him in the place of a military agent.

The collection of information for orientation in the development of military affairs abroad was also carried out by officers commissioned for grants for other purposes, as well as spending their holidays in other countries.

True, the chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff was forced to resort to such a measure because of the lack of appropriations for undercover intelligence, and he used such trips of officers as an additional source of information for this intelligence.

Being legally in another state, the seconded or vacation officers collected information by personal observation of certain or other branches of military affairs, and sometimes sought to obtain them in secret ways.

The Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff attached special importance to such trips of officers for the Grappets. Only from direct visits to foreign countries and acquaintance with them

21 The brain of the army. Book. 3.231

POSHUK OI,

the composition, especially of the general staff, in Konrad's opinion, could get an exhaustive idea of the mouth state and its lines of communication. No book descriptions could, according to Conrad, replace with the same benefit a personal impression of the country that was being studied.

One cannot, of course, disagree with such arguments of the Chief of the General Staff and not recognize all the benefits that business trips of military personnel, especially the General Staff, bring to neighboring countries for direct acquaintance with them. Departing either for the purpose of studying a foreign language or simply on vacation abroad, the command staff takes out a lot of valuable knowledge from the knowledge of the state that they visit.

Often such business trips were associated with the collection of secret information. Koprad did not combine them with undercover work and, on the contrary, as we know, he proved that such tasks had never recently been assigned to officers going abroad. If a certain officer Raikovich went to Serbia on reconnaissance assignments, then this was entrusted to him by the military geographic bureau. The General Staff not only did not give him any secret instructions, but even specifically warned Raikovich about this.

Such statements by the General Staff were not believed by the Foreign Office in Vienna; all the more, she did not have confidence in this, but, on the contrary, used the diplomacy of those countries to which the paths of these chipers led to arouse public opinion.

In fact, as we know, not only diplomatic tensions between countries but also a whole series of misunderstandings between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Staff in their own state arose on this basis. Representatives of foreign policy in Austria-Hungary indicated

It was said that the participation of command personnel in the secret collection of information leads: 1) to conflicts with neighboring states and 9) to the impossibility of guaranteeing security for military personnel going abroad. As a result of all this, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs put up all sorts of obstacles in issuing permits for the travel of command personnel abroad, and then embarked on the path of a final ban.

The Chief of the Austrian General Staff resolutely opposed such steps of the diplomats. |

There are no words that foreign trips of officers, especially the general. Headquarters, they gave additional data for orientation, but we should not forget that, even with the full legalization of the visit, foreign states looked at them as disguised agents, © with the corresponding conclusions. Officers who received intelligence assignments could rarely stay within the confines of private citizens, outside observers, without arousing suspicion in themselves, for the desire to expand and deepen. their personal impressions impelled them to take such steps that led to the violation of the rules on security established by a foreign state. military secret.

The various camouflages of such trips, such as the trip of Raikovich we have mentioned, were an open secret and, on the contrary, aroused much more suspicion in themselves than an open trip of a military man.

322

Nikolap writes in his book: "Before starting work (intelligence and counter-intelligence against Russia - B. Sh.), I made a trip to Russia, which was still under the influence of the 1905 revolution, to get acquainted with the country and the people whom Until then I had not yet fallen into it—without this awareness my task seemed to me insoluble. I had no reason to hide my title of German officer in Russia. As a result of this, however, I came across everywhere the conviction that I had arrived in Russia for the purpose of military intelligence. During my stay in the fortresses, I was placed under surveillance. In one large city, they were quite surprised by my stay in it, since the city was not at all a fortress. One of the top officials, to whom I conveyed greetings from his relatives living in Germany, immediately took me in a hurry and asked what I would like to know ... Everywhere in Rossip it seemed self-evident that an officer travels abroad only giving espionage " .

Nicolai speaks somewhat differently about his trip to France in 1913. "Before taking up a new position (chief of the intelligence bureau of the large general staff - B. Sh.), - he writes, - I went to France for a short time, wanting at least to have an idea about the country and the population, before I will also close the borders of this state, against which, along with Russia, intelligence was organized by the General Staff. Especially conscientiously carried out by me, the Francoise prescriptions for the registration of German officers attracted such attention of the authorities to me, even approximately the same as was not shown in Germany to foreign officers. My rank of Officer of the General Staff further increased this attention. With a mouth, the authorities did not cease to be exquisitely polite.

Nicolai does not add that the reason for such sophistication, apparently, was the complete orientation of the Khranpuz authorities, according to Nicolai's previous intelligence work against Russia, that what kind of officer of the general staff was coming to France. Doubts and conjectures among the Fravpuz authorities in

As for the true intentions of Nicolai's trip, apparently, there was no one, but under the guise of courtesy and courtesy, a good one was hidden. awareness and appropriate action against such a Figure as was the officer of the German General Staff, Nicolai.

Such are the conditions for completely legal trips of representatives of the army, and of the general headquarters in particular, abroad, and the claims of representatives of foreign policy, who seek, on the basis of secondary facts, not to aggravate relations with their neighbors, must be recognized as fair. Of course, it is a long way from such claims to an unconditional ban on foreign trips of command personnel, and the latter measure should be considered as an undesirable extreme, applied only if relations between neighboring states are so tense that every appearance of a serviceman, at least as private person will be used for campaigning purposes as an indication of the neighbor's hostile intentions. -

We recognize all the usefulness of command personnel sent abroad for direct acquaintance with a foreign country, but it seems to us that entrusting them with instructions for obtaining information about the defense of the state and counting on obtaining especially valuable information of this kind is not

323

OFFICIALS SINGING

I agree. Such a private legal source of guidance for the General Staff will certainly be taken into account in a foreign state, and any of its awkward steps will only create unnecessary difficulties in diplomatic relations. We fully understand Konrad's desire to expand what is called "without spending from the treasury" the circle of his intelligence agencies, but we must also recognize the interest of diplomats in this issue. The General Staff should not throw small stones in its path.

Direct, open, legal ways for the general staff to study the matter of defense and develop it in other countries end with the mouth. But, as we have already pointed out, the orientation of the general staff can also come from the allied general staffs and other departments of their own state.

In the personal correspondence of the chiefs of the German and Austro-Hungarian general staffs, with which we have acquainted the reader in some detail in the preceding chapters, we can find quite a bit of mutual knowledge about the neighboring states, their foreign policy lines and war plans. The orientation in the letters of the chiefs of staff concerns major issues of defense of probable opponents, and this is quite understandable, because the correspondence of such high-ranking persons as the highest representatives of the brain of the army could only touch on the most important issues of strategy and policy, and not go down to petty study of opponents, — | give the sum of the conclusions from this, and not plunge into the work of subordinate bodies.

The exchange of detailed information in foreign states between allied states was carried out through the offices of the General Staff. 'In his memoirs, Konrad tells us that he received such information from representatives of the German General Staff, sent to Vienna to coordinate questions on the war plan, or through a German military agent. The information from Vienna to Berlin went in the same way.

True, the mutual exchange of information between the general staffs of the central states of Europe was not as wide as it might seem at first glance. Nicolai says: "Entente intelligence threatened in equal measure Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy. The common danger entailed a common defense. Between the Austrian and German general staffs since 1910 there has been an insignificant exchange of information coming from Russia. Relations between the German and Italian intelligence agencies were established, in relation to France, only in 191% of the year. In May of this year, at the invitation of the Italian General Staff, I came to Rome for talks on this issue. The reception given to me was proof of the honest friendship of the Italian General Staff. This point of view was most clearly expressed by the chief of the general staff, General Pollio, and the heads of his departments.

"On the contrary, relations between the Austrian and Italian General Staffs were strained and were always under the threat of intelligence led by both sides. Portom, - concludes Nikolai, - the unity of intelligence of the tripartite alliance, in comparison with those of the Entente, could not even be spoken.

324

iti piiiipianna no.

The intensity of the exchange of data on potential adversaries between the general staffs depends: 1) on the strength of the alliance and mutual trust in keeping the secrets of the information received, 2) on intelligence well organized by each of the states.

If we remember that against the backdrop of Austro-German relations there were more than once clouds of doubt about the strength of this alliance, that the German General Staff did not believe in the restraint of its Austrian colleague in keeping secrets, then it becomes quite clear why only since 1910 between These headquarters had a "minor exchange" of information. As for the relations between Vienna and Rome, Nicolai gave an exhaustive explanation of this.

Finally, the chief of the general staff expanded his orientation about other states with information received from other departments, mainly diplomatic, and from personal conversations with their representatives.

We know cases of Berchtold sending Konrad documents characterizing the policy of the countries neighboring Austria-Hungary and their personal conversations about it.

It should be noted that there was little military data in these arrangements, and they concerned mainly the political assessment of one state or another. This is quite understandable if we take into account the purpose of compiling these documents as a result of special, political intelligence, which we will discuss below. Military data in these documents came across by chance; political intelligence only with a special order, as, for example, on the threshold of a world war, failed to report military events in its reports.

The chief of the general staff did not receive any data on the economic development of foreign states from other departments, and we do not find traces of this in Conrad's memoirs. Such a phenomenon on the threshold of a world war we have already partly explained in the first book of our work,

when they spoke about the economic preparation of the world war.

Above, we noted the need for reconnaissance in general and the difficulties that accompany open paths to this. Therefore, secret collection of information, the so-called undercover intelligence, played an important role in the orientation.

In the historical chapters of this book, we have heard that on this basis, too, the General Staff found itself in conflict with foreign policy. It is our next task to analyze the reasons for this. Our description of the work of the General Staff in terms of agents in this work cannot cover the entire question in its entirety, for we would deviate from the program of labor outlined by the party. True, some of our reviewers consider it unsuccessful, but what can you do - we do not find it possible to correct this shortcoming in the course of our work, for there is nothing worse in life than crossing from one path to another.

In the beginning of this chapter, we noted that human intelligence was carried out on the threshold of the World War not only by the General Staff, but also by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and that in modern conditions the intelligence agency also captures the economic side of the life of the state being explored.

Nicolai writes that "already during the wars of Louis XIV and Napoleon-

325

and looking for Shch_Shch_shch_[____

epoch, intelligence also moved into the realm of politics ... and secret intelligence became an integral part of politics.

_ Pointing out that "France is the creator of permanent military-political intelligence," Nicolai notes: "Only when Germany had statesmen with political will. there appeared in it the rudiments of espionage working in the service of the policy. Such espionage existed in the era of Frederick the Great and Bismarck." Nikolai testifies that in the time of Bismarck in Germany "there was a complete agreement between military and political intelligence."

However, before the World War, "Germany's political intelligence was rotting in the hands of diplomacy, which was recruited and acted from the point of view of public considerations, strictly adhering to the correct paths and content with the fact that it walked along these paths" ... "Military intelligence lost its political leadership, and at the same time with that and pompmanyae and support of political factors. This could not be compensated for by the military attachés, included everywhere in the framework of diplomacy, nor by the fact that, together with the German Navy, the intelligence service of the Admiralty grew up "...

Nikolan points out that "the German authorities were more distrustful of the aspirations of the German general headquarters, the higher these authorities were; institutions subordinate to the department of foreign affairs were even treated negatively, since both their own intelligence and defense against foreign intelligence were considered as harmful to "Germany's friendly relations with other straps."

Nicolai describes the conditions under which the German General Staff had to deploy undercover intelligence behind the border. "Just as German intelligence had to do a lot in their homeland

efforts to defend at least the most necessary interests of the general staff before the political authorities," writes Nicolai, "so things were no better abroad ... The German Empire did not have a central intelligence agency. The General Staff therefore had to look for new ways of its own. Incessant political crises, beginning in 1912, prompted numerous trips to neutral countries in order to seek there, with the help of German representatives, contacts that would provide the General Staff during the war with reliable information about the world around. The reception I received from our representatives abroad was irreproachable in social terms. But the serious purpose of my visit seemed to have a negative effect on them. In any case, in fact, the General Staff was left almost without any support. While the intelligence of Applia, France and Rossin around Germanpi was supported by all the official institutions, the German intelligence had to bake its own assistants abroad on its own. But our official representatives spoke to me about this as something hopeless and advised me not to do it, so that the Germans would not be placed abroad in a difficult situation, since the general headquarters could not think that the Germans abroad would stake swap business interests."

"Since," Nicolai continues, "in the field of military intelligence, the gene-

326

Ho

If the central headquarters could independently deploy its activity, then there, despite all the obstacles and restrictions, success would be possible.

Nikolai emphasizes more than once that, on the contrary, "in Russia all the authorities were at the service of intelligence", "Russian missions abroad ,Participated in supporting their own intelligence", that in Austria, "along with Russian military agents, active centers of espionage were also Russian consulates, it was proved that both priests and other employees of the embassy took part in espionage.

The editor of the Russian translation of Nicolai's book "Secret Forces" believes that "Nicolai is far from frank, sincere and objective." "Nicholas," he says, "inflates and praises to an incredible extent the organization and activities of the intelligence services of the Entente, in particular Tsarist Russia, and deliberately, to the point of naivety, overemphasizes that of the Germans."

We also do not consider it possible to unconditionally recognize as true all the revelations of Nikolai about the intelligence service of the German General Staff that he once led, and if they were brought, then with the aim of "showing that some of the conditions in which the German intelligence was, were characteristic and intelligence of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff.

First of all, we must note that this state also had two intelligence agencies abroad, political and military, and then that both of them were not only not linked, but, on the contrary, were often on different paths.

If we recall, the Roman ambassador of Austria-Hungary was very dissatisfied with the expansion of intelligence of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff in Italy, and in particular with its unsuccessful steps, which, in his opinion, which fully corresponded to the views of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, led only to conflicts. with Italy, to the suspicion of the latter. Both diplomats came to

We have already pointed out that not a single state can do without reconnaissance of its neighbors and is forced to conduct such, knowingly undermining the basis of "friendship". Thus, in essence, all states are "playing" friendship, and the issue becomes more acute only when violations of this "friendship" become: 1) obvious and 2) too frequent. In fact, the Roman ambassador of Austria-Hungary protested only against the frequent unsuccessful actions of the agents of the General Staff, and did not think to challenge the need for secret intelligence in the main. Conrad referred to a much larger number of disclosed violations of "friendship" by Italy and based his defense on this. There are no words that the argument is weighty, but I think that it is also impossible to deny the validity of the statement of the Roman ambassador. Secret

intelligence is a delicate business, and it should be conducted in such a way that it remains secret. Any discovery of agents gives the state, in the person of its diplomacy, a reason to speak, when necessary, about the hostile position of the neighbor and, on this basis, to arouse public opinion against him. The point is not the long-suffering of the "friendly" government, but not to give evidence of the violation of "friendship" into its hands, thus strengthening the positions of this government in the "philistine" environment. Without these facts, the government will also have to resort to false documents, to fabricating cases of violations of "friendship" and similar provocative actions.

Thus, the foreign policy has the right to demand from the general staff that its agent network does not undermine "friendly relations"; in other words, it would work secretly, without revealing itself to the security agencies of the state in which it is located.

As regards the assistance from the diplomatic bodies to military intelligence, which Nicolai demanded and the absence of which Conral also spoke about, we think that foreign policy could speak of the same assistance to military intelligence, and with all the more right that "war is a weapon politics, not the other way around.

In some states political intelligence came to the aid of military intelligence, but nowhere was military intelligence subordinate to political intelligence.

328

CV \$

Everywhere the agents of the General Staff followed an independent path and did not want to combine it with the path of political intelligence. Nicolai points out that during the time of Bismarck such a situation was observed, but we know that in the matter of the subordination of military agents to diplomatic representatives, the chancellor found himself in a sharp conflict with Moltke the elder and was forced to yield to the "demigod".

As stated above, Nikolai subpoenaed questions: 1) about the political leadership of military intelligence and 2) about the centralization of intelligence.

If we take into account that economic intelligence is now joining all intelligence services, then the unification of all intelligence services in one special organization can be recognized as quite rational, but at the same time difficult to implement in practice due to purely technical conditions.

As for the political leadership of this or that type of agency, then it should be considered especially necessary, and in this respect, since the agency was conducted through military agents, the organs of diplomacy and the frontier were the most appropriate for this task.

With such a formulation of the matter, in all likelihood, it would be possible to avoid those conflicts that, like the incident with the letter of the Roman ambassador and resentment against him Conrad, arose between the general staff and diplomacy not only in Austria-Hungary, but also in other countries.

In fact, various types of intelligence collected information 06: from the same source from parallel sources and then, when comparing the data obtained, they came not only to different conclusions, but even, with hot paths, like Conrad, to conflicts. Calculus appeared instead of a calm discussion and verification of the obtained information.

his merits and the longevity of his experience with references to flint weapons, from the time of which this experience should be taken into account. Life clearly revealed the shortcomings of the organization and created obstacles to the correct course of orientation of state bodies in the position of their neighbors.

It is possible, of course, to hear the judgment that the parallel collection of information by various types of intelligence is a guarantee of its completeness, it seems to us that such parallelism and verification should be carried out in each field of intelligence in the very process of selecting its sources, and not as a result of enter into competition between different types of intelligence among themselves. Fashionable trust is not useless in this area either.

The depentrachisadium and the independence of the various lines of intelligence led to the dissipation of monetary holidays for the agency, creating on this basis: friction between the various organs of the state conducting intelligence.

We know that the Austro-Hungarian General Staff received this money. puzhly 150,000 kroons (about 50,000 rubles), and Koprad petitioned for bringing this amount to 9,500,000 kroons (about 150,000 rubles) at the expense of leaves for agents to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In order to judge the validity of the petition of the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, we will compare the appropriations for reconnaissance to the Austro-Hungarian General Staff with similar holidays in other armies.

Nicolai says that "the German Reichstag annually provided the General Staff for all intelligence and counter-intelligence with only 300,000

339.

And

rock" (about 150,000 rubles)... "Introduced in January 1912 under the personal influence of Colonel Ludendorff, the proposal spoke of an increase in funds assigned to the intelligence department of the general staff. 450,000 marks (about 220,000 rubles) were provided for the year instead of 300,000. |

We do not know how much was allocated for intelligence to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vienna, to which Conrad asked for a cut in appropriations, but in Berlin, according to Zvonarev, the editor of the translation of Nikolai's work, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs "received a year for secret needs about 1,500,000 marks" (about "750,000 rubles).

Nicolai claims that "Russia spent about 13 million rubles on its intelligence in 1912, and in the half-year preceding the war, 191% of the year, up to 26 million."

Zvonarev refutes these pihrs and points out that until 1905, 113,650 rubles a year were allocated to the military ministry, excluding the naval department, for secret expenses, and from the sum of the sum, starting from 1885, it was issued with the "highest permission" to full and direct disposal Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasian Military District, for intelligence in Turkey and Persia 56,890 rubles, i.e. 50% /, of the total amount. The rest of the amount (56,760 rubles) was released to the disposal of the main department of the general staff and was distributed as follows:

to the headquarters of the military districts ... eeee 51,000 rubles. consul in

Bombay..... yen ... 1200 "› for the maintenance of a military dovecote in Denmark 3000 "› for the acquisition of random information 1560 ›

In 1913, the secret estimate of the military ministry under the article "for the use known to His Imperial Majesty" was approved in the amount of 1,947,850 rubles.

Of this amount, about 180,000 rubles were spent on reconnaissance against Germany and Austria. It can be assumed that approximately the same amount was spent on counter-intelligence against these countries.

If we add up the entire leave for reconnaissance and counter-intelligence in Germany and Austria, this will amount to 270,000 rubles, while Russia alone spent 360,000 rubles for the same purpose on these states, that is, it surpassed Germany and Austria.

The figures given for appropriations for intelligence by Germany and Rossini speak in favor of the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, and we by no means can recognize his petitions for an increase in sums without foundation.

If in Germany the intelligence of the General Staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, according to Zvonarev, maintained "the closest contact", then in Vienna, pabborot, both these lines of intelligence were in sharp contradiction, weakening the already frail military intelligence of Conrad.

To these sums it is necessary to add those funds, which should also be spent on economic intelligence.

Thus, the funds spent by the state on all types of intelligence are significant, and therefore their spending must be subject to strict rationalization.

330

CHEN AS IIA

Here we return to what was said above - to Nicolai's opinion about the centralization of intelligence, expediency. which we also theoretically acknowledged, but at the same time pointed out that, technically, this is rarely feasible.

Indeed, each intelligence project requires work in special areas, sometimes distant from each other in nature, which seemed difficult to combine.

We have seen that Conrad counted on the verification of his data on Italy by the bodies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the basis of information obtained directly by these bodies, i.e., in other words, the chief of the Austro-Hungarian general staff considered it normal for the Roman ambassador to independently collect information of a military nature.

It is by no means possible to agree with such views of Conrad, and his bitter resentment towards the Roman ambassador, who used the data of the military and naval attache for his letters, is the fruit of those abnormal relations that existed between the General Staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the banks of the Danube.

The separatism of the intelligence of the General Headquarters went so far that it

intelligence already in peacetime took active forms. In the historical part of this book, we showed the participation in the assassination of Franp-Ferdinand of the Serbian General Staff. History is still silent, but it does not refute the fact that the gun was put into the hands of Princip by none other than the Russian General Staff. Nicolai, in the work we have cited, testifies that the Serbian General Staff relied on various societies that waged a political struggle with the government of Austria-Hungary.

True, it must be admitted that the Serbian government was informed of the impending assassination attempt in Sarajevo and tacitly agreed to this, leaving its general staff to carry it out without tarnishing the name of the government authorities of the state.

The active forms of reconnaissance of the Serbian General Staff are not something supernatural, and they must be reckoned with in the conditions of modern warfare.

The Austro-Hungarian General Staff took an equally active part in the chorus and active actions of the Albanian bands, and the Austrian-Hungarian Foreign Minister considered it necessary for his part to keep Konrad in this.

Of course, it was not the Tolstoy's motives that played a role in this, but the responsibility that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has to shoulder for the active intelligence of the General Staff.

This circumstance must always be taken into account and it is not useless to know every general staff, whose hand is drawn to active actions against the neighboring state, with which pre-plomatic relations have not been interrupted. If the General Staff, in active intelligence, puts diplomacy in front of a fait accompli, this is a disservice to the entire state as a whole, because it puts its relations with other states, as the Germans like to say, "on the edge of a knife." Such a "service" must be agreed in advance: one must remember that sometimes "a helpful fool is more dangerous than an enemy."

331

REASON CHO

That political control over intelligence, the absence of which Nicolai mourns in Germany during the World War, is especially necessary if the intelligence of the General Staff is embarking on independent paths of active action.

In this chapter, we have tried to highlight the dependence in which. the intelligence service of the General Staff is placed in relation to the foreign policy of the state.

"The World War," writes Nicolai, "proved that the struggle between peoples grew out of the narrow framework of solving the case with weapons and became a struggle of popular forces in the political, economic and military fields, and not least in the field of the moral state of the people. Military intelligence was replaced by intelligence of the state against the countries surrounding it. It spread equally to all areas in which a stronger state could operate - to the economy, to politics, to the armed forces. Intelligence was no longer content with the purely official work of informing, but moved on to positive action in the economic struggle, as well as in internal and external political affairs.

propaganda."

"War in peacetime" is the best definition of the current role of intelligence in the competition of peoples," says Nicolai and predicts: "Since future wars will take place only between large states, for which the ties of the League of Nations, which bind only small states, do not matter. they have - the more time is required for the preparation of war, the greater will be the outcome of these wars for all peoples; the larger their military equipment will be as a result, the more difficult it will become for a given time to bear the heavy burden of armaments, the easier technical progress can give one a stunning advantage over the other, the less it will be possible to get by. without "peaceful" intelligence work."

"For its future," Nikolai continues, "only that state can be calm, whose political, economic and military leaders, and in the field of intelligence, perform their duty jointly."

However, Nicolai does not stand up and again deviates from the path he has drawn. "According to the essence of intelligence, we see," he says, "that its execution is in the hands of the military, but the leadership is in the hands of

political."

The recognition of political leadership in intelligence marks a great shift in the brains of the representative of the German General Staff, which, in the person of Conrad, his former colleague, the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, did not reach.

Finding no political leadership over German intelligence, Nikolai attributes it to the intelligence of the Entente states before and during the World War.

To what extent this was so, we will not go into an analysis here, because for us the statement that "military intelligence was replaced by the intelligence of the state" is sufficient for us.

There is no need to talk about any independent intelligence of the General Staff in modern conditions, and the "brain of the army", which

332

he would have tried to stay on this path, he would have discovered either his defectiveness or senile insanity.

Either one or the other does not adorn a true military man, especially a "statesman", which each of the representatives of the modern general staff should be.

Modern warfare is the essence of the state, and not the individual "brains" of its control machines...

TT

CHAPTER X. THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER

Clausewitz on foreign policy and war. —Moltke's theory of "military success". - The struggle of the General Staff with diplomacy for power and the grounds for it. — Bodies of foreign policy and their role in the preparation of the war and its conduct. — Diplomacy in matters of the beginning of the war. - Her

participation in defense matters in general. - Bodies of the military department and their range of activities in the preparation and conduct of war. - A special line of the General Staff and its strength. - The role of the supreme power in the unification of the preparation of the war and its conduct. — Triumvirate. - Clausenitz on the collective management of the war, - The power of the General Staff in the management of the war. - Revelations of the German military! about a pen about the struggle of the general staff for power during the world war. — Types of communication between the headquarters and diplomacy. - Personal conversations of the Minister of Foreign Affairs with the Chief of the General Staff. — Their content, tone and place. — Letters, reports, certificates and inquiries. - Drawing up diplomatic notes by the General Staff. — Conrad's clerical errors. — Information through responsible employees. — Communication through the Minister of War. — Bodies of the General Staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which were in charge of the correspondence of both departments. — Intimate circles of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Staff. — Special Representatives of Diplomacy at the Headquarters of the High Command during the World War. — Their evaluation by Conrad. — Management of modern warfare. — The role of diplomacy and the General Staff in this. - Their mutual communication in our days. - "Versailles" - "Cannes" for the General Staffs of Germany and Austria-Hungary.

In the previous chapters, we have covered Clausewitz's position with sufficient completeness that "war is a continuation of politics, but only by other means."

Contemporaries now agree that war is a political act, and by no means by its nature dominates the policy of the state, in particular foreign policy.

In proof of what has been said, we cited Clausewitz's judgments textually and, using examples close to our time, tried to show how deeply politics penetrates into the cause of war.

In the chapter VG of this book, within the framework of the work, Clausewitz's theory of war and foreign policy is developed, from which the reader can see how far the Philosophy of War was ahead of its time. He clearly subordinated the military to the political view and did not even think of separating the war from the foreign policy of the state.

In the same place, we cited arguments on this subject by another coryphaeus of military affairs, Moltke the Elder, who regretted—it must be said sincerely—that military affairs are inseparable from politics. Moltke in the war put military success above all else; for the duration of the hostilities pushed the political face of the war into the background. The theory he created

334

Zeya UDS II,

military success, based on a biased interpretation of Clausewitz's thoughts, aimed at emancipating war from politics, giving freedom of action to the commander as the sole manager of war, and subordinating it to the laws of other branches of state life.

If we look into the annals of Prussia in the middle of the 19th century, we will find the gradualness with which the Prussian Field Marshal built his theory. The "Demi-God" very carefully - openly opposing Bismarck only in the second half of the war of 1870, when the shadow of the victorious Prussian banners created a reliable veil around the Chief of the General Staff - put his theory into practice. The Silent understood that forcing

could ruin the whole thing. With the end of the war, when the authority of the chief of the German General Staff was firmly established not only in his own country, but also abroad, Moltke openly spoke out with the innovation of his ideas, finding numerous and ardent admirers among the general staffs of various countries. In the first book of our work, we introduced the reader to the struggle of the General Staff for power in the interpretation of its opposite side - the "iron" Chancellor Bismarck himself. |

Before our eyes, the same struggle took place on the banks of the Danube, where the chief of the general staff, Koprade, blindly followed the precepts of the German Field Marshal. In the previous chapters, we have covered all this struggle with sufficient completeness and we will not repeat it. In other countries, the chiefs of general staff were less ardent and more restrained in their dealings with diplomacy than could be seen in Vienna. However, in other capitals one could also find a hidden distrust of the general staff in the foreign policy of the state. We have heard the younger Moltke say that diplomacy always throws stones in the path of Sollat. Such benefits of the General Staff were by no means an exception. |

We pointed out above that disagreements between strategy and foreign policy have simmered: 1) on fundamental views on war and politics, and 2) on personal relations!. Differences in principles, as we have just noted, originated from the false theory of Moltke the elder 'and in previous chapters we outline! with sufficient completeness and clarity. As for personal relationships, life usually takes its toll, and although, in essence, there should be no place for such aggravations of relations, in reality one has to deal with them all the time. This aggravation of relations on personal grounds can often reach such limits when one of the parties is ready to go even to self-harm - in a figurative sense, of course. If the right hand of Konrad, who did not want to write an apology letter to Erentazy, remained with him without beheading, then nevertheless, to defuse the atmosphere, the chief of the general staff was forced to leave his post.

1 The editors believe that the question of the relationship between the general staffs and the government authorities of Austria-Hungary and Germany throughout the entire work of Comrade Shaposhnikov is not sufficiently motivated from the point of view of the socio-political and historical characteristics of these former monarchies.

Editor's note.

335

osh

Such frictions in the machine of administration, of course, did not signify the health of the state organism, and urgent measures had to be taken to eliminate them.

In the previous chapters, we have considered the fundamental side of the joint work of foreign policy and war, trying to understand the limits of the power of one and the other. For now, however, let us focus on the purely formal aspect of the question, which follows, of course, from one or another understanding of the principles of military affairs.

It is clear that none of the parties (foreign policy and strategy) thought to exclude each other from the leadership of the preparations for war or its

conducting. The essence of the question was to determine who gives the directives for this training.

For a correct understanding of this, we will turn to an examination of those bodies that conducted the foreign policy of the state and were directly in charge of preparing its armed forces for war.

On the threshold of world war in each of the capitalist states, the direct leadership and direction of foreign policy was in the hands of the minister of foreign affairs, who was constitutionally responsible to the parliament or to the supreme authority in such, for example, a state with a pronounced moparchic system, such as the former Parskaya Russia.

In order to harmonize the activities of various ministries, to determine their guiding lines and to take important, subordinate decisions on the department of one or another ministry, in particular foreign affairs, a council of ministers met. His decisions in constitutional countries were of great importance and in some of them were decisive in their final form. Even in the former parish Russia, the decisions of such a council of ministers, with the strong will of the prime minister, were binding on individual ministries. However, with the exception of France and England, the decisions of the council could be changed by the supreme power of the state, and this circumstance allowed individual ministers, in particular those of foreign affairs, to give their activities the direction that was desirable, contrary to the decisions of the council. Considering that foreign policy issues in the life of the state played a very important role, then in the meetings of the councils of ministers of most countries one could observe a certain hegemony from the side of the body in charge of foreign affairs.

In Germany, the constant unification of the activities of various ministers was achieved by the presence of a special official leader - the chancellor, responsible to the representative institutions for the entire government as a whole. The Chancellor firmly held the reins of foreign policy in his hands, and in fact the Minister of Foreign Affairs (the so-called Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) was his assistant. In any case, the most important questions of German foreign policy were in the hands of the Chancellor.

Nakopepp, in the majority of capitalist states, the final approval of questions of foreign policy was in the hands of the supreme power. To one degree or another, depending on the individual, the supreme power either took an active part in foreign policy, or was limited to approving the proposals of the Council of Ministers, the Chancellor and the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

336

with []

strange things. Even in such states as France, where, according to the constitution, the rights of the supreme power were severely curtailed, even there, with such a person as Poincaré, the supreme power exerted strong pressure on the decision of the council of ministers.

These were the two statutory lines that guided foreign policy. In essence, they should represent one channel, but quite often foreign policy overflowed its banks and spilled over these two arteries, losing its power and edipsia. Often, the opinions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Chancellor turned out to be in conflict with the views of the supreme power, and we could observe on the threshold of a world war those

friction, which in the critical days of the state took place in the control machines of Germany and Russia. If in the first these frictions resulted in Wilhelm's personal indignation at Bethmann, in his regret that he, the Kaiser, could not immediately part with the chancellor, but nevertheless foreign policy, in the final analysis, was directed by the hand of a responsible chamberlain, then in Rostov - these, with the stubbornness of Nikolai Romanov, the supreme power could decisively influence the course of foreign policy. Foreign Minister Rospi, in order to prove the correctness of his lipia of behavior, had to use special methods in order to weaken the monarchical veto of the Eastern despot. The dynastic line in directing foreign policy was stubborn, for it was well aware that when foreign policy was turned to arms, the fate of the dynasty itself was at stake. Not only in monarchical Russia, but also in Austria-Hungary, there were such unrestricted methods of supreme power in directing foreign policy. The decrepit Franz-Joseph, gathering all his strength, © with anger pointed out to Koprad that, in the end, he, the bearer of supreme power, was in charge of politics, and he alone steered the state ship along peaceful routes. The heir, Franz Ferdinand, made it quite clear that the fate of the Habsburgs was at stake with the war, and therefore did not consider it possible to let foreign policy out of his hands, being a substitute for supreme power.

Both in the historical part of our work and in subsequent chapters, we emphasized especially the views of diplomacy on the war as one of its means, its participation in the preparation for the war and the role that it intended to take in the leadership of the war itself.

From the lips of Erenthal we heard quite definite statements that the decision of the question of war or peace is in the hands of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and this diplomat, in confirmation of the correctness of his arguments, even referred to Clausewibe. Other foreign ministers (of course, the chancellor as well) were less radical in influencing the strategy, but they, too, felt that the turn to war should not have taken place any better than their own decision. In a word, in the matter of the beginning of the war, the foreign policy bodies defined their rights with sufficient clarity.

It was different with preparations for war. We have heard Conrad complaining about Erenthal that foreign policy does not contribute to the development of the armed forces, cares little about the preparation of the state for war and looks at the army as a zoptic, under which he intends to take refuge when military storms illuminate the outer horizon. Partial justice cannot be denied to the statements of the chief of the general staff, because diplomacy often does not

22 The brain of the army. Key. 3.337

UAS-II ZONE

was aware of the readiness of the armed forces of the state for war. But, on the other hand, we must also recall the joint reports of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Chief of the Naval General Staff on the necessary development of the Russian Navy. If foreign policy, represented by diplomats, more often looked at the army as an umbrella, then this must be explained by the role that strategy theoretically assigned to it in directing the war. The Prussian Field Marshal Moltke Sr. himself preached that diplomacy plays a leading role at the beginning and at the end of the war. Even in our contemporary treatises on strategy, we can still come across chapters on the special role of foreign policy in the aftermath and at the end of the war, that is. with nothing more than a belch of the views of the elder Moltke, condemned somewhat higher by the authors of the same works. The desire of the General Staff to limit the dynamacy in the leadership of the war and

Moltke's theory corresponding to this - all this did its job, and indeed the organs of foreign policy did not consider themselves responsible for preparing for war in its military part to the same extent as they were responsible for what was a direct duty. Konrad was harvesting fruits from a field plowed and sown by the hands of the Chief of the German General Staff.

As for the participation of diplomacy in leading the war, in the historical part we did not give examples of this, because the course of events was brought to light only in the first 40 days of the war. However, from the history of the war of 1870, and the past world war, we know very well how diplomacy was first included in this manual and how it was then put in its place in these things. In any case, it can be said that Conrad, although indignantly, allowed the Viennese diplomats to hide under an umbrella and did not think of pulling them out of there for independent existence, because, according to his theory, one military success was decisive in a war and diplomats had nothing to get confused on ways to achieve it. In peacetime, we know how jealously the chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff protected his operational leadership from the encroachments of diplomats, and during the war he was very indignant at them, when, at the initiative of Berchtold, the Serbian Front was withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the Austrian headquarters and subordinated directly to Franco-Joseph. According to Konrad, the leadership of the war should have been in the hands of the General Staff and diplomacy was obliged to follow the lead of the latter. In its place, we noted the bifurcation in Conrad's mind of Clausewitz's theory of politics and war. This duality manifested itself most clearly in the course of life itself: theoretically, the chief of the general headquarters recognized the leading role of foreign policy in preparing for war, but in practice he made such demands on diplomacy that nullified the entire theory of the Philosopher of War .

Thus, we must establish that on the threshold of the world war, diplomacy, as an organ of the state's foreign policy, did not closely approach the issues of the country's defense, remaining in the roles of the arbiter of the question of war or peace, only as a Fact, relieving itself of any responsibility for the consequences of such a decision.

It cannot be denied that diplomacy had in mind war as one of its means, that certain negotiations with other states

338

[1

about the joint conduct of the war were fought and poured into the Form of alliances. However, in the state mechanism of government, diplomacy was still not the body that would be called upon to lead the war. Representatives of foreign policy brought the matter to war and considered their task over, waiting for the moment when the scales of military happiness would tilt in one direction or another in order to come out either with their own demands, as victors, or to stand up for the defeated army.

The matter of preparing for war and its conduct in all states was in the hands of the military department.

According to the constitutions of almost all states, and in Russia according to the established procedure, the minister of war was the responsible leader in the military department for preparing for war. Since in most states the naval armed forces constituted a special part, then, along with the land minister of war, responsible for the state and readiness of Flot,

the Minister of Marine also fell. In other words, it is necessary to note the bifurcation of the state's defense organs.

In our days, this duality has a further tendency to develop with the advent of a powerful weapon of struggle - the military air fleet. In some states, it is separated from the military department.

Such a dispersal of defense cannot, of course, be regarded as quite normal, as it does not ensure the concentration of all forces and means at the right time in a certain direction. Meanwhile, the basic principle of military affairs, as well as any struggle, lies precisely in striking with concentrated forces. We have no right to expand on this organizational theme and confine ourselves here to a brief presentation of our views.

However, in the hands of the military and naval ministers, the whole matter of preparing for the war was not entirely concentrated. Its ideological part and the development of specific military preparations were everywhere transferred to the hands of the general staffs, which in some of the states were removed from subordination to the military minister. |

In accordance with the division of the armed forces, in most states the division of the general staff into land and sea was also carried out.

Thus, in this area, the matter: preparations also went along the line of bifurcation, and quite often both divisions of the general staff were sharply contradictory.

We have just pointed out that in most states the general staff was removed from the subordination of the corresponding minister and in its work was accountable only to the supreme power, without being answerable to the representative institutions of the state.

This position of the "brain of the army" in the matter of defense created that special line of the general staff, which we spoke about in the first book of our work and mentioned in this one. At the same time, it should be pointed out that direct subordination to the supreme authority put the General Staff in the position of a strong arbiter of affairs not only in the military or naval departments, but also beyond them.

Not being a constitutional body, the General Staff at the same time had or arrogated to itself such rights, which in everyday life gave it the opportunity to claim the role of the "brain of the army."

339

S nnainnoninnninnie Xx

This provision determined the role of the council of ministers or the chancellor in the defense. These organs of the state, having rather limited rights in this area, were responsible for the defense as a whole to the representative institutions of the state. The General Staff, in any case, was not subordinate to them. Only in France and England is the Council of Ministers the decisive body in the defense of the country.

According to the constitution of most states, the supreme authority in the defense of the state was the supreme power. The dipastic nature of this power created its bifurcation in the presence of an energetic and mature heir. We had to meet with such a situation in Austria-Hungary, and there were signs of it even in Germany, where the growing crown prince was not averse to

express themselves in the affairs of state administration.

The supreme power was supposed to unite the entire control machine, one of the wheels of which was the military department.

However, it is well known that by the mid-50s of the last century, such an association even in one matter - in the defense of the country - was recognized as beyond the power of one person, often illiterate in public affairs, but "noble". Starting from the era of Moltke the Elder, we ascertain the presence of a triumvirate in the management of the war.

The triumvirate in Germany was composed of the supreme power, the chief of the general staff and the canpler. The latter represented mainly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

With this Form of management of the preparation and conduct of war, the states of Europe: went to the world war and entered into it.

In the first book of our work, we spoke in detail about the advantages and disadvantages of this management system, and we will not repeat ourselves here. Let us recall that it raised doubts about the tactlessness of its action even in Schlieffen.

In its composition, the triumvirate represented three lines: dynastic, military, or rather, the general staff, and diplomatic.

If we delve into the essence of the triumvirate, and especially if we take into account Moltke's interpretations of the management of the war, built on the sole will of the commander, then we can note the superiority in the triumvirate of the line of the general staff. History clearly confirms what has been said.

We are familiar with the struggle of the General Staff with Bismarck, the semblance of which we observed in Austria-Hungary on the threshold of a world war. No matter how fair Conrad's theoretical arguments about the primacy of foreign policy in managing the war, it turns out that in reality in this area he put forward the lip of the General Staff.

Below we have said a little more about this, but for now we should only note that the triumvirate, as a system for managing the preparation and conduct of the war, did not provide the true direction of affairs and, leaving the primacy in the hands of the general staff, walked with sure steps towards defeat.

In its place we have given Clausewitz's views on this. Proceeding from the correct understanding of war as a political act, the philosophy of war transferred its management into the hands of a collegiate government, and from the monarch it was required

340

SOOO' China

a wave of one - healthy brains, which, by the way, were not among the representatives of dynastic lines in some of the states on the threshold of a world war.

In our days, they try to do without dynastic chines completely, considering that their brains are atrophied and therefore should not be. rely on degenerates, at least of "divine" origin, and one of the German authors is Kurt Liebmann, who is now the head of the department

ministers of defense, agrees to the necessity of transferring the management of the war into the hands of the council of ministers, recognizes the superiority in mouth during the world war for the states of the Entente and thus completely rejects both the Hohenzollerns and all the teachings of the elder Moltke. With the publication of Liebman's article, a tremendous shift in the thinking of German military leaders must be recognized.

The vanquished always tend to find superiority in the enemy. In fact, as we know, not everything went smoothly in the management of the war in the Entente countries either. In the first book of our work, we characterized the special line of the French General Staff (the headquarters of Joffre), which intended to exile the government of the republic in the colonies. Parliamentary control, which marked the destruction of a special military line, the line of the general staff, was born in pain. - the French leadership of the war in France, which is attributed to it by a German writer of the post-war period, was not immediately won over by the French government. 'Only the elimination of Joffoff, a representative of the line of the General Staff, allowed the Frappese government to embark on the right path of conducting the noina. It is known that on this road it stood firm and rejected the candidacy of the Marshal of France, hero of the Marne, put forward by the Americans, to command all allied forces on the French-bellied Front. It is possible that the government of the republic was afraid to go into exile in the colonies!

One way or another, but we must establish that both in preparation for the war and in its conduct, the General Staff strove to keep the reins in their hands and not let go of them. As indicated above, the reasons for this were: 1) Moltke's false theory of the decisive importance of one military success in a war, and 2) the subordination of the chief of the general staff directly to the supreme authority.

Throughout many pages of this book we have seen Conrad's vigorous struggle for hegemony in the direction of the war. The same covert struggle was waged by the Chief of the German General Staff, who by nature was incapable of openly speaking out against the Chancellor. The nephew, unlike his famous uncle, preferred to cry alone rather than sharply oppose the false, in his opinion, direction of Germany's foreign policy on the eve of World War II. We heard Joffre pushing the "peace-loving" government of France into the war.

The theory of "military success" allowed the General Staff to set its own demands on the foreign policy of the state, and not receive directive instructions from it. We have given a lot of evidence for this both in the historical part of this book and in our reasoning.

341

The Liebman we mentioned, examining the question of the relationship between politics and strategy in managing the war in the middle states, comes to the conclusion that in Germany "already in peacetime there were disagreements between the bodies that were primarily called upon to prepare for war." "There was no close connection between the chancellor and the general staff. Attempts by the General Staff to establish such contact did not achieve the desired result. Although the operational plan of the General Staff was in general terms known to Candler, it was not discussed with the latter from the political side and from the side of possible political consequences. Just as superficial was the acquaintance of the chancellor and the general staff with the assumptions and plans of the Navy for waging war at sea ... It is significant that all the bodies did not have guiding lines that should

would they be given by the head of the government; that our armed forces did not develop in accordance with the world situation of Germany and that nothing was done to prepare the people inwardly for the inevitable war for existence. Whether the errors of the political leadership are primarily to blame here, but, on the other hand, the severity of responsibility also falls on the military organs - the army and the Navy, which left the question of how, from a purely military side, the war against France was to be carried out unexplored, Russia and England". |

Liebman considers it a great mistake on the part of the middle states to try to substantiate and carry out the management of the war by a purely military method. Analyzing the events of the world war, from the point of view of managing it, Liebman finds not only dissension, but also the struggle of the General Staff with politics both in Austria and in Germany. |

"Under Conrad," he says, "the attitude of the high command towards the political leadership was the same as in Germany: with all the decisive questions of the war, military interests were put forward in the first line, which pushed political interests into the background. On the contrary, with the advent of the new chief of staff Arp, who kept away from any politics, to replace Konrad, political interests were put forward to the detriment of the military.

Liebman comes to the conclusion that "in Germany, under the first high command, the view prevailed that in time of war politics should be silent; in the second case, joint or discordant work of the military and political leadership; under the third - an open struggle between the military and the political." "In Austria-Hungary under Conrad, the picture is the same as in Germany; under his successor, complete self-isolation of the military leadership from politics."

With sadness, Liebman states these Facts, frankly confessing the sins of the German general staff. The truth will always tell, no matter how undesirable it may be for many people, a whirlwind all the way to the Hindenburg. In modern German military literature, we rarely come across such frank articles. On the contrary, in most literary works we hear complaints about the poor political leadership of Germany on the part of the Chancellor. We have already cited in its place the judgments of Clausewitz on this subject, who believed that in such cases one does not say what one should have said. It's useless to remember

and now.

343

w

In the preceding chapters we have dealt in detail with those questions which served as a link between the General Staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Basically, they concerned the political grounds for specific military training, the military assessment of the line of political behavior in relation to certain countries. From this followed private questions, which were jointly dealt with by the General Staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

We observed how the General Staff either worked in contact with the foreign policy organs, or, on the contrary, found itself in sharp contradiction with them. The reasons for the latter were purely fundamental questions, and sometimes turned out to be petty, of a formal nature. The last circumstance must be borne in mind in those states where, how,

for example, in Austria-Hungary, the bureaucratic regime has built a solid nest for itself.

The communication of the General Staff with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs resulted in personal conversations between the Chief of Staff and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in official messages and inquiries, in the exchange of opinions on various issues through employees; when relations deteriorated, relations between the minister of foreign affairs and the chief of the general staff were either directed through the representative of the military department in the office - the minister of war - or finally interrupted.

In the historical part of this book, we have given quite a few personal conversations between the Chief of the General Staff and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and in some of them we tried to preserve the tone left to us by their memories. Strictly speaking, this kind of communication between politics and strategy would have to be recognized as the most normal, if a certain stability in the expressed judgments appeared on both sides. The fear that his interlocutor did not have this, the desire to record on paper the whole conversation that took place and his judgments in it, were the reason why the chief of the general staff, cautious in bureaucratic battles, preferred on matters of principle or resort to written communications, or to consolidate the conversation with a letter sent after it to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. We by no means want to recommend such a method as a model and consider it a feature of the official life of Austria-Hungary, which was not observed in other countries. With honesty in the judgments expressed, such personal stenography of conversations should disappear, although, no words, it is useful for the historian. However, life is not guided by documents.

In view of the busyness of both "statesmen", in the ordinary course of business, personal conversations were rare. But as soon as clouds appeared on the outer horizon, such conversations became more frequent, and in the critical days before the war they took place almost every day. This is quite understandable and does not require much explanation.

We must also point out that such conversations did not always take place face to face, but were also conducted in the presence of employees of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the most responsible and closest to the Minister, as well as in the presence of persons who were strangers to both departments. Konrad rightly protested against the witnesses, although they were close to the court, but far from official, state deh in general. You can only join

343

ani inainnaninannainiya to join such protests of the general headquarters, pursuing the preservation of state and military secrets.

The written form of communication between the chief of the general staff and the minister, as we indicated above, was used in major issues of fundamental importance, and in Austria-Hungary, in general, it was considered normal on the part of the general staff, stockpiling documents. Letters were mainly chosen as the form of this communication, but along with them special certificates were sent to orient the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

In its place, we pointed out that the Chief of the General Staff of Austria-Hungary sent the Minister of Foreign Affairs the first, political, part of his annual memoirs, and Berchtold, with whom the Chief of the General Staff immediately established friendly, private

"Notes" - when Conrad was in the army. inspector.

The exchange of various documents of a political nature was widely practiced by both the General Staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, when a black cat did not run between them. |

Then we observed the parallel compilation by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Naval General Staff of reports on the same question, sent simultaneously to the supreme power. In its place, we celebrated the commonwealth of Russian foreign policy and the naval general staff, striving for the same song - the strengthening of the Russian military Fleet on the Black Sea.

We consider it necessary to pay attention to the special work of the General Staff, which had to be observed both in Austria-Hungary and in Germany - these are rough drafts of diplomatic notes to various states. Insofar as the matter concerned military requirements, the bold hand of the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff sketched draft notes, offering them to the attention and editorial staff of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. We have acquainted the reader in their place with these examples of Conrad's diplomatic art and we will not repeat them here. The well-known ultimatum to the Belgian government, with the clarification of all violations by this ultimatum of the position of a neutral state, also appeared from the pen of the Chief of the German General Staff. Drafts of diplomatic documents drafted by the General Staff were edited in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then sent to the address. Pourtales advised Sazonov not in vain not to let the general staffs speak, for, obviously, he knew that the latter were not averse to preparing diplomatic documents corresponding to their desires. True, the German ambassador, unaware of the truth, handed over to the Russian minister documents that had been sketched by the hand of the chief of the Austro-Hungarian general staff. Such a course of events points, firstly, to the recognition by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of its weakness in drawing up documents that contained military demands, and secondly, to the desire of the general staffs not to let go of that special political line for which they fought in almost all states. We do not at all want to deny the ability of the General Staff to present masterpieces of diplomatic documents, even in draft form, but we believe that this is still none of its business. The General Staff can and should transfer to the ministerial

3%

It is up to the organ which is called upon to guide and guide the foreign policy of the state, to express its military demands in foreign affairs, but to give them a written form. An illiterate person in military affairs (in the general fundamental part) cannot manage foreign policy either, because "in any case," said Yoklauzevid, "the art of war is not a decree for politics."

If the General Staff before the World War and even today practiced and continues to practice in drawing up diplomatic documents, then we believe that a crooked mirror does not embellish a clean-shaven diplomatic linden.

In the previous chapter, we established that the Chiefs of the General Staff sent reports on the results of their trips abroad and on conversations with military agents and personally guided the Minister of Foreign Affairs. One could talk about the special insult of this method of written communication.

for the chief of the general staff. However, in essence, this is necessary, and Chinese ceremonies would only lead to unnecessary and harmful bureaucracy.

In passing, let us dwell on one characteristic trifle, which, in the strained relations of the General Staff with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, can only spoil them even more. As is well known, Conrad's habit of putting harsh resolutions on paper, without considering whether it was his own departmental paper or whether it should be returned to the department that sent it, served to aggravate relations between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Chief of the General Staff. Helpful people who played on a quarrel between two statesmen immediately delivered the real resolution of Konrad Ehrenthal. People, and especially those with a bureaucratic fold, are very sensitive to their paper creations, and any criticism of them causes a painful feeling of resentment in them. On the other hand, we often see service leaders who are not shy about expressing their feelings and opinions in a harsh manner in imposed resolutions. Conrad received a good lesson for this, which he considered it his duty to note in his memoirs for the edification, in general, of all the chiefs of the general staff, saving us from unnecessary conclusions on this score.

The communication of the Chief of the General Staff with the Minister of Foreign Affairs through responsible employees was used only in exceptional cases, when, being both busy with the service, the Minister and the Chief of Staff were not able to see each other in person, and meanwhile time did not allow postponing mutual information. So, in the critical days before the World War, the office of the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff was very often visited by Berchtold's responsible assistants. At the same time, Sazonov was informed, on behalf of the chief of the general staff, by the quartermaster general of the same headquarters, Danilov. Of course, it is not the solution of fundamental questions that can be achieved by this type of communication, but only mutual information, and moreover, when visiting by responsible, and not ordinary employees.

Finally, communication through a third party—the minister of war—should be taken as an indicator of an unhealthy relationship between politics and strategy. We observed such a picture only in Vienna at a time when Conrad's struggle with

345

RS

Erenthal reached its culminating point. Erenthal chose the minister of war as mediator: 1) because the war minister, and not the chief of the general staff, was responsible for the military department according to the constitution; 2) because Schoenich was an associate of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and 3) because of the unwillingness, in general, to continue communication with Konrad, against whose appointment as chief of the general staff, Ehrenthal immediately objected. If the last two reasons were of a personal nature, then the minister could play the first as legitimate. Indeed, the law did not oblige Erenthal to communicate with the chief of the general staff as a member of the government, and even in the days of normal relations, a special order from the supreme authority, Franz Josef, was required, proposing to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on all foreign policy issues affecting the - specific military training, communicate with the chief of the general staff. This was how the rights of the latter were determined in the general structure of state administration, which were not provided for by law.

The elected chargé d'affaires, the Minister of War of Austria-Hungary, turned out to be

not only not among friends, but in the camp of genuine enemies of the chief of the general staff, sending Erenthal the latter's harsh replies in the original, and thus only adding fuel to the fire of the flaring up struggle. Direct ways of communication are the most correct and acceptable for both sides, even at the moment of irreconcilable enmity.

We indicated above that in most cases the communication of the General Staff with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was carried out through their responsible leaders - the Chief of Staff and the Minister.

While conducting conversations or exchanging letters, these "statesmen" were the authors of these letters, or the corresponding documents were drawn up according to their instructions by subordinate bodies.

At the General Staff, correspondence with foreign policy agencies was concentrated in the Operations Bureau, where rough drafts of letters and other documents were prepared, which were then corrected by the hand of the Chief of the General Staff.

In the first book of our work, we pointed out that in the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, this correspondence was served by an assistant to the chief of the operational bureau, a member of the "intimate" circle around Konrad - Slamechko, who was specially selected for this. The peculiarity of this employee was: sharpness of thought, bureaucratic gloss of language and broad acquaintance with the foreign policy of Austria-Hungary. Konrad lamented that Slamechka's virtues were not clothed in political circles, among which Slamechka was not popular. Slamechka was a negative representative of the "brain of the army" and was the henchman of the chief of the general staff in his struggle with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The real Physiognomy of the intriguer was firmly attached to Slamechka by political circles.

In all general staffs, correspondence with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was included in the scope of work of the operational bureaus, and this should be recognized as normal. We have already talked about Vienna. In St. Petersburg, at the Naval General Staff, as we indicated in our place, communication with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was maintained through operational units, and the representative of one of them, Nemits, was a frequent visitor to the establishment at

346

TTT tt

Singing bridge. Foreign policy was closest to concrete military training, the principal and general work on which was carried out in the operational organizations of the General Staff, and therefore it is quite natural that these organs turned out to be the executors of the plans of the chief of staff in connection with foreign policy bodies and the custodians of the relevant documents.

In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, correspondence with the General Staff was concentrated either in the office of this institution or in the corresponding departments, depending on the countries that these departments were in charge of and for which the correspondence was conducted.

In the historical part of this book, we drew the reader's attention to the activities of intimate circles under the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

In the first book of our work, we talked about similar circles around the boss, not established by law, but brought to the stage by life.

general staff. In the same place, we pointed out that these circles were formed only under bosses who were weak-willed and fell under the influence of their subordinates, who sought to "make history" behind the backs of their superiors.

The same picture can be observed in the ministries of foreign affairs of some of the states on the threshold of a world war. Secondary characters of diplomacy, irresponsible for their speeches and actions, hiding behind the name of the minister, weaved diplomatic intrigue and played behind-the-scenes games.

The "omnipotence" of such circles was duly appreciated by the former Quartermaster General of the Russian General Staff Danikhov, who in his memoirs told us how he tried to prove to the head of the Chancellery of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Basili, the necessity of a general Russian mobilization. There is no need to explain that Danilov counted on the well-known pressure from Basili on Sazonov. Frankly, the path was not false.

Usually the commonality of the crime binds criminals, and the reader could observe how, on critical days in Petersburg, the intimate circles of the General Staff and foreign policy united in a united attack on their patrons. Secret powers! the bureaucratic structure of departments, with weak-willed people at their head, came into action in the July days of 1914 on the banks of the Neva. While those responsible for the decisions of the lyre, with "bags under their eyes" from sleepless nights, as, for example, with Yanushkevich, gave birth to these decisions in heavy agony, behind their backs, the secondary characters of history, thirsting for glory, directed it along the bloody path of war.

It is hardly necessary to dwell on all the harm that such intimate circles have brought in the history of bourgeois politics and strategy. These malignant growths must always be removed, if necessary, even by surgery. Such operations must first of all be monitored by the statesman around whom irresponsible diplomats and strategists from the category of Herostratus of our days are trying to unfold their dark work.

In order:1 to put an end to those bodies that tied up foreign policy and strategy on the threshold and in the first period of the world war, we must

347

PI OIDEOOOOOINIA SHS BEER

to say a few words about the special representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the headquarters of the high command of most of the armies.

If in 1870 the triumvirate in full force went to the theater of operations and Bismarck found himself close to the chief of the general staff, always ready to take part in solving various problems, then in anticipation of a world war and with its outbreak, the chancellor in Germany and the foreign ministers affairs of other countries did not want to share the hardships of the war with 60 headquarters of the high command, but preferred to remain in their offices. For communication with the general staff, or rather, with the supreme command, special representatives were assigned from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a permanent residence at the headquarters.

The absence of foreign policy leaders in the theater of operations

in some states it is explained by the fact that the supreme power itself remained in the capitals. However, even in Germany, where the high command, in the person of Wilhelm, went to the Front, and there a member of the triumvirate for foreign affairs - the chancellor - remained in Berlin and was a rare guest at the headquarters of the high command.

Our old friend Konrad, with his usual harshness, attacks the special institution of diplomatic representations at the headquarters of the supreme command. The Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff believes that with the availability of modern means of communication it is always possible to be in close contact with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, even if it remains in the capital. Conrad considers the existence of a special intermediate body for the company to be superfluous and indicates that, having learned all the harm it could do with the beginning of the war, he entered with the idea of destroying the special diplomatic mission at headquarters, but met with a sharp rebuff.

Konrad frankly says that he, and not only he, but the entire apparatus of the high command, saw in this political body a secret agency of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a detective bureau at the headquarters of the high command, created to monitor the latter. The Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff explains further that such a diplomatic body at headquarters, not limited to collecting information in an official way and from official sources, sought to obtain it in a roundabout way and, of course, reported it uncontrollably by telephone to the ministry: in Vienna. Konrad accuses the diplomatic representative of disseminating in Vienna false, panicky information about military operations that came out of the walls of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and became the property of various clubs, cafes, restaurants and, in general, private civilian circles.

"It is clear," says Konrad, "what little sympathy such irresponsible agents enjoyed among the high command apparatus, which was working with a sense of heavy responsibility."

One cannot, of course, disagree with the arguments of the Chief of the General Staff of Austria-Hungary, and one cannot but admit that the institution of diplomatic bodies for communication with headquarters cannot replace the Minister of Foreign Affairs himself, only whose personal participation in the solution of urgent military questions can be necessary. Of course, if the General Staff began to hide the true picture of the situation at the Front, then the Foreign Minister

348

t

In many cases, one would have to make an erroneous decision under such circumstances. But it is impossible in advance to deprive such a high body in the military department as the "brain of the army", and establish a special diplomatic search apparatus to monitor it. |

If the diplomatic bodies at the headquarters of the high command were engaged in agents among the headquarters itself, then this serves. an indicator of: 1) the false line of conduct that, in general, was taken by the General Staff in relation to foreign policy, as we spoke about above, and 2) the lack of mutual trust in foreign policy and strategy, which is an echo of the struggle between the General Staff and foreign policy agencies were carried on even under the elder Moltk, continued uninterruptedly until the World War and during it, having reached our days, if not in full yet, then still to a fairly significant and clearly visible extent.

The struggle for power led on both sides to the creation of special bodies that, in addition to open and official work, also secretly collected information about the opposing side. Various Slamechki, Basili, etc. creatures of the General Staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs found a wide field for their meager, full of intrigues, activities, introducing only friction into the management of the war. The bourgeois machine of state administration began to creak even more, and precisely in those days when only the coordinated work of all its wheels could lead to the victory of the war ...

In a word, the "brain of the army" was taken under suspicion by foreign policy, which even such an ambitious representative of it as the chief of the Austro-Hungarian general staff, Koprad, does not hide.

The March War in its course led to the final denouement of the struggle between the organs of foreign policy and the general headquarters, deciding it not in favor of the latter.

In modern conditions, on the question of managing the war, no one talks about the prevailing role in the mouth of the General Staff and even foreign policy. In the first book of our work, we have covered in detail the question of the integral commander of our days, who is none other than the government of the state waging war.

Modern warfare is the business of the entire state as a whole, and the preparation for it, as well as the management of the war itself, is the duty of the entire government, whose constituent parts are the organs of foreign policy and the organizations of the military department.

In the first book, we have clarified the importance in modern warfare of the interrelation of these in the state and its economy, and therefore it is not necessary to speak of the management of the war by one person, a duumvirate or a triumvirate. War is a collective matter, and its management passes into the hands of such a collective body as is the government of most countries.

Only one government gives directive instructions on preparation for war to various organs of government, in particular, to foreign policy. Therefore, today the role played by diplomacy on the threshold of a world war is significantly reduced. The military department in its preparation for a war on one front or another, in determining the position of that

349

PO LLC - AS PE

or any other state in it receives directives not from foreign policy, but from the government itself.

True, even on the threshold of a world war, directive instructions on the work of the military department should have come from the supreme authority, for whose approval the developed variants of specific military training were submitted.

However, due to the incompetence of representatives of the supreme power, the military department, represented by the General Staff, had to request and receive stable directives for its work related to foreign policy from the diplomatic bodies of the state. Not United

above, both of these bodies were part of the struggle that we observed throughout our second book in almost every of the states we examined.

Only with such a course of affairs in foreign policy could the three special lines of conduct that we spoke about above be formed. If you delve deeper, then the division of foreign policy went even further, because the maritime department, in the person of its general staff, tried to direct foreign policy. policy in the direction that was desirable for him.

We have already noted that today the dynastic line is outliving its days, and if it still exists somewhere, then as a traditional Form, which is entirely in the hands of the bourgeoisie of this state. Today, the dynastic line cannot exert any independent influence on foreign policy, and the lines of conduct of this policy are entirely in the hands of the diplomatic bodies of the state and its collective government. |

As regards the line of conduct in the foreign policy of the general staffs, first of all it is necessary to note the duality and the threat of turning the entire military department into a triumvirate of the general staffs (land, sea and air), which we observed on the threshold of the world war and during it. We cannot go into depth on this issue, but we must clearly express our view on the need for a complete unification of the armed forces in the person of the body in charge of them, which would represent them not only in the government, but also in discussions with other state bodies on questions of principle. importance. Only with such an organization will it be possible to avoid those frictions that were observed in the military department in its communication with the foreign policy bodies, to which the land and naval general staffs, military and naval ministers went for directives and proposals independently.

A single body of foreign policy must have communication with the same unified body of all the armed forces, and not with its various subdivisions, even if they are the "brains" of these forces.

This provision also determines the role of the general staff (land or even naval, if such existed), as a body subordinate, but not dominant in the military department in general, but in matters of external

politicians in particular.

If we indicated above that directive instructions for its work on the war plan in the part relating to foreign policy are received by the military department from the government, this does not mean at all that

350-

66666666666666

We want to cut off all communication between the military department and foreign policy agencies.

Each directive is not exhaustive, but establishes only general reference data, the work on which is specified in detail by the bodies that received this directive.

Thus, diplomacy remains in constant communication with the military department, and in particular with its body - the General Staff - on all questions relating to the preparation of war.

In the previous chapters we outlined these issues and the role of both diplomacy and the General Staff in them, and therefore we will not repeat them.

Our judgment boiled down basically to the fact that politics plays a leading role in the preparation for and conduct of war, that war is not decided by "military success" alone, for war is primarily a political act.

The relationship between politics and strategy in our day should also follow from this. Under a sane and strong government, there can be no question of disagreements in matters of foreign policy between the agencies representing it in the state and the general staff. The struggle for power in this area, which history marks throughout the 20th century and the first quarter of the 20th century, should serve as a vivid example of the harmful consequences with which it ended. A bad legacy was left to the German and allied Austro-Hungarian general staffs by their prophet, the Prussian Field Marshal Moltke Sr., ending the struggle for power with foreign policy. The struggle ended in complete defeat, and "Versailles" turned out to be "Cannes" for the general staffs of the middle states.

Political death is more painful than natural...

CHAPTER XT,

COALITION WAR

Choccal character of the wars of the middle and end of the 19th century and the reasons for this. — Imperialism and coalition war. — Topicality of the issue of waging a coalition war. - The possibility of local wars at the present time. - Kzausewitz's doctrine of coalition war. — Napoleonic coalition war. — Coalition and imperialism. — The study of the coalition war on the threshold of the world war. - The main principles of the coalition: political, military and economic unity. — Political unity among the states of the triple alliance and triple agreement. — Lack of agreement between them on common policy objectives. - State egoism. - The structure of government and its impact on the conduct of a coalition war. — A special line of the General Staff. - Federation of Workers' States. - Political leadership of the war. - The unity of the coalition in matters of peace. — Military unity of the coalition. - The use of forces and means of the coalition. — General plan of action and conditions for its creation. - Unified military administration in the era of Napoleon. - The question of a unified military administration before the world war. - Its solution among the states of the tripartite alliance. - Conrad's explanations on this matter and his post-war proposals. — Liebman on managing a coalition war. - The question of a unified management of the war among the states of the Entente and its resolution in the course of the world war. - Only political unity creates a unified management of the coalition war. — Economic unity and its conditions. — Form of agreements: a) political acts; 6) military conventions; c) exchange of letters. — Political acts and their strength. — Exchange of political letters. — Non-aggression pacts. — Activities of diplomacy and the General Staff in concluding political alliances. — Military conventions and their force. — Exchange of letters from the General Staffs. — Contents of military conventions. — Special acts '06 management of war and conclusion of peace. — Economic agreement. - The scope of activities of the General Staff in the conclusion of military conventions. - Participation in the mouth of diplomacy and ratification of military conventions.

The war of 1870-1871 was not only the last war for national

unification of state formations in Europe, but it was also the last local, limited combat clash between the two struggling states.

Since the conpa of the Napoleonic era, all major wars of the 20th century have been predominantly local in nature, and the art of diplomacy has been considered the reduction of armed struggle to that extended duel, in which the war poured out in the old days of history.

An explanation for the localization of war must be sought in the policy of national unification of states (Germany, Italy, the small Balkan states) that was unfolding on the map of Europe in the second and third quarters of this century.

The colonial wars of France that took place at the same time, without significantly affecting the interests of the other major capitalist states,

352

Jo

powers, did not take the war out of its limited framework and did not give this scope to the Napoleonic era that had just passed.

In the HS chapter of this book, we noted that by the end of the 20th century, with the development of imperialism among the large states of Europe, the war was to lose its local character and the future promised a revival of coalition wars.

It cannot be said that by the beginning of the world war its coalition character was not foreseen. The clear judgment of both the political and military leaders of the 20th century and the beginning of our century lauded with complete certainty such an armed struggle in Europe, in which not two states, but many of the large states would be drawn. If the reader recalls at least the judgments of the Chief of the Russian General Staff, Obruchev, about the nature of the upcoming European armed clashes, expressed by him during the discussion of the draft Kharkiv-Russian military convention in 1892, then he can free us from the evidence of what was said

higher.

Another question is to what extent the states of Europe, which in 1914 found themselves in the course of events in an armed struggle, were prepared for waging such a war. We will talk about this in more detail in its proper place.

The wide scope of the European, and then the World War that took place in our memory, attracted the attention of political and military figures of our day, who now devote a significant place in their literary work to issues of the coalition war.

The question of its role in the military art of our days is undoubtedly of great topical importance, but mainly for states with a capitalist structure.

Nevertheless, it must be said that the cooperative character of the past world war by no means signifies the final disappearance of local wars. Indeed, the cannons of the two capitalist coalitions, huge in size in terms of the forces and means they had put up for armed struggle, had not yet died down, when we again faced the Khokalpa wars. Our civil war, the war with the Poles in 1920, the Turkish war with Greece

- are not, in a broad sense, coalition wars, but should be called local wars.

In the UT chapter, we noted that Lenin looked at the evolution of wars in this way, pointing out that in our days the latter may take on the character of a local war, that in modern conditions wars of small states with large ones are by no means excluded.

Thus, we do not intend to categorically admit that a coalition war is a firmly established type of war for our states and for the near future. However, we must note that we may meet again there, and therefore we consider it necessary to stop closer attention on studying the experience of the past imperialist war.

The coalition war, as a special kind of it, was touched upon by the Philosopher of War Clausewitz, who personally observed it, in his practical military activity.

"It never happens," he says, "that a state acting

for the benefit of another; I would take them as seriously as my own."

23 The brain of the army. Book. 3.353

E ,YydfZUu, U ta ttt

"It is accepted in European politics that states are bound together by alliances that oblige them to mutual support; however, not in the same way as if the interests and enmity of one became the same for the other. They guarantee each other the support of known fighting forces, for the most part very moderate.

"The ally of the belligerent, in fulfilling his duty, does not consider himself actually waging such a war, which should begin with its declaration and end with a peace treaty. However, in practice it is different.

"The theory of war: this question would not be at a loss if the allied contingent were completely placed at the disposal of the belligerent so that the latter could dispose of the contingent at his own discretion; then it would be something like a mercenary army. But in reality, this is far from the case. The allied contingent usually has its own commander, who depends only on his court, who indicates to the commander a goal that corresponds to his own half-hearted intentions.

The Russian translator Clausewitz Woide explains in a footnote: "This was the situation in the time of the author, or rather before him. Now the political situation in Europe has changed. Alliances are in the form of major goals that require commensurate efforts."

However, Clausewitz did not stop at the one-sided Form of Coalition, when one of the parties puts its army at the disposal of its ally. The philosopher of war says: "Even when two states are really at war against a third, they will not always say to themselves: we need to look at this third, as our enemy, we must destroy it, otherwise it will destroy us. In fact, on the contrary, they often look at it as a commercial deal; each, depending on the expected benefits and the threatening danger, gives his contribution to 30,000-40,000 people, considering his loss as his only risk.

"Things are looked at in this way not only when one state helps another in a matter that does not particularly concern it, but even when both are connected by an important interest. And in such cases diplomatic restraint will not be dispensed with. The contracting parties promise themselves the mutually insignificant support indicated by the treaty, bearing in mind the rest of their forces to be used for special considerations, to which politics can bring with time.

"So," continues Clausewitz, "usually they looked at the allied war. Only in modern times has an extreme danger pushed the people! on natural paths, as, for example, against Bonaparte, or Bonaparte's boundless violence compelled his allies to do the same. The former state of the allied war was half and an anomaly, because the concept of war and peace at its core does not allow for their different degrees. However, the other understanding was not only something accepted by diplomacy; on the contrary, it is deeply grounded in natural limitations and human weakness."

"A political reason," Yola\zevid comes to the conclusion, "significantly influences the conduct of a war... If, once again, such an influence on the war of political goals is allowed, then we will no longer meet limits, so that

354

SSOO AS OOO

one will also have to stoop to wars that are limited to simply threatening the enemy, being reduced in essence only to the desire to support one's demands during negotiations.

There is no doubt that Clausewitz in his theory proceeded from the experience of coalitions during the armchair wars and wars of the Napoleonic era, far from the days that we lived through. However, as we shall see below, the main milestones in the conduct of the coalition war by Philosophers are set so faithfully and reliably that they can serve as starting points for our days as well.

Clausewitz sees the basis of everything in the "political reason", and only it alone can give strength and strength to the coalition. Without the political unity of the allies, a lasting military agreement between them is unthinkable. The "political reason" also determines the mutual relations of the allies. Clausewitz emphasizes the completely natural state egoism of each of the allies, points out to us the difficulties in resolving the issue of a unified command, for the army of each of the allied states is, first of all, the armed force of this state, acting in its interests.

The experience of coalition wars before Bonaparte, when not all allies entered the war for a "political reason", but limited themselves to sending an armed contingent to help their ally, is recognized by Clausewitz as "half and anomaly". Already in the wars of the coalitions of the Napoleonic era, he sees the return of war to the natural paths that it follows in our days. It is true that in the era of Napoleon, various contingents of his allies gathered under his hand, if you can call those vassals of the little corporal, who were led along the paths of war by his strong hand. Such participation in the war of 1812 of the Prussian and Austrian troops was conceivable only if the governments of these states completely lost their political face. As soon as the military glory of Napoleon weakened, as soon as Prussia and Austria felt the ground under their feet as political organisms, cracks immediately began in the coalition created by

Napoleon.

The middle of the 20th century was filled with local wars, because the "political cause"—the national unification—led the war along the other path.

From the end of this century, the major European states embarked on the path of imperialism and with it entered the era of coalition wars.

In our place we have spoken in more or less detail about what imperialism is and what its influence on the war is. It was pointed out that in the epoch we are experiencing, on the basis of economic relations, states either enter into alliances or are in sharp contradiction with each other: The economic dependence of some states on others leads them to close political unity, creates common "political interests" for allies. ranks", which are the foundations on which their military agreement rests and grows stronger. Already on the threshold of the World War we could observe this process in some of the states of Europe. If at the beginning of assuming the post of Chief of the General Staff of Austria-Hungary, Konrad dreamed of the possibility of waging a local war with Italy or Serbia, then, as he became familiar with the political relations developing in Europe, he abandoned this and admitted that a future war - it is possible only as a coalition war.

355

HER VRU "II AND] 37 OOOESOYU V tov 6 \$

Of course, Konrad was not a prophet in this, because such a nature of the future war, as mentioned above, was foreseen by many political and military leaders of various states. Coalition warfare, as the coming form of warfare, was legitimized even by the relevant political and military agreements. But it must be said that at the beginning of the 20th century there was no in-depth study of the issue of managing such a war in any state. Oddly enough, on the eve of the world war, when the course of history states united in hostile military trusts, coalition war as such was recognized as a weak form of warfare. The military literature of those times spoke only of the weakness of the coalitions, composing hymns to the glory of a local war, in which the united will of the commander receives the most vivid display. We find an explanation for this in the study of the experience of the Moltke era with its famous *trepumvirate* and the localization of wars, and in a rather superficial study of the management of coalition wars in the era of Frederick, the Khranpuz revolution and Napoleon.

The World War immediately raised the question of directing a coalition war, letting all the states go in this bluntly, and did not bring it to a final resolution even at Versailles.

In order to properly approach the resolution of the management of a coalition war today, we must focus on the basic principles on which alone a coalition can rest.

In a brief analysis of Clausewipia's theory on the influence of "political causes" on war, it was already noted that only the political unity of the members of the coalition is a guarantee of its strength and strength. In the absence of contradictions in policy, or when these disagreements between the allies are regulated by mutual concessions, one can also count on their unity in a military effort.

Political unity makes it possible: 1) to establish the common political goals that the Allies intend to achieve by war, 2) to organize the political management of the war, and 3) to establish the issues of making peace.

Simultaneously with political unity in a coalition war, there must be military unity of all members of the coalition. It consists: 1) in the use of all armed forces and means to achieve common goals of the war, 2) in the organization of military control of the war.

Finally, the economic unity of the members of the coalition, helping each other in economic life, is of particular importance today for the conduct of war, enabling the weaker allies in this respect to withstand the brunt of the economic struggle that now accompanies the war. |

These three basic unities provide that genuine unity for the coascini, which it needs to wage a victorious war, and in the absence of which, in former times, lay its weakness, noticed by the military theorists of the last and present century.

In what follows, we will turn to the consideration of the main principles of coalition building that we have outlined.

We have repeated more than once that "politics penetrates the whole cause of war", and

356

d

Therefore, it is clear that the unity of the coalition must begin precisely with its political unity.

On the threshold of world wars! we observed two unions: a triple alliance and a triple agreement.

If we recall, then in both of them there was not that political unity that is necessary for waging war by a coalition. The policy of Germany and the policy of Austria-Hungary not only were not coordinated, but even in some countries they began to intersect. Conrad complained more than once about the latter and grieved that the policy of Austria-Hungary did not find a response in Berlin. On the contrary, German diplomacy and the General Staff were sometimes indignant at Austria, which, by its aggressive policy, threatened to draw Germany into a European war. Every time a crisis arose in Vienna, she had to check Germany's loyalty to the treaty of alliance and Os0bo to stipulate armed support. If we recall Likhnovsky's memoirs on Austro-Hungarian foreign policy, we will find the same distrust in German political circles that was in Vienna in relation to Berlin. A characteristic indicator of such inconsistency in the policies of both countries is the suppression by Austria of the true goals of the war at a time when its breath was already engulfing the European continent.

Italy was even less sincere in her political sympathies for the middle states and pursued, in essence, a dual policy. To reconcile her political aspirations with those of Wen! was an impossible dream. A healthy assessment of this cannot be denied to Konrad, Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff.

If we turn to triple agreement, we can observe the same picture. Political contradictions engulfed this coalition more than once.

threatening to disrupt the French-Russian alliance. There was no political agreement between France and England at all. The islands sought to maintain freedom in their foreign policy. True, it should be noted that the economic dependence of Russia on France subordinated to some extent the policy of Russia to French desires, but nevertheless Petersburg tried to maintain its independent line of behavior. The most difficult thing was to reconcile the political aspirations of England and Russia, but such, under the threat of an impending war, led: 1) to the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 and 2) to the close cooperation of British and Russian policy in preparing for a world war. However, a sore point for Russia—the question of the straits—remained open even by the beginning of the World War.

Thus, it can be said with certainty that political unity before the World War was not achieved either by the tripartite alliance or the tripartite agreement. In each of them, the states were independent in their foreign policy and did not agree on those common political goals that it was decided to achieve by war. The regulation of this important question in the days of peace proceeded from case to case, and continued in the same order during the world war. "It was only through sacrifices and intense struggle that the Entente reached the end of 1917 to the need to form a special political coalition body, and the middle states did not resolve this issue until their collapse.

357

SONY S IIA

We have already cited Zlausewitz's judgment that no state will defend the interests of another as well as its own, and the state euism of each of the allies is one of the main causes of political disagreement among the members of the coalition. Such egoism has been characteristic of every state formation of a canitalistic society at all times in history, and, in particular, with the development of imperialism, it has taken on the sharpest forms. The Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff was a vivid exponent of the state egoism of Austria-Hungary. The "prestige" of the Danubian Empire was one of the main engines of Conrad's political aspirations. In states with a capitalist structure, we will always meet with heightened state egoism, backed up by evidence of the peculiarities of their economic, cultural and national development. It is extremely difficult to agree on the lines of political behavior of such states, because economic competition underlies their relations. Imperialism is fraught with contradictions in itself.

Some of the modern German military writers, finding that the Entente had more political unity than in the camp of the middle states, attribute this to the homogeneous democratic structure of government of these states. The dynastic lines of the middle states turned out to be a big, in their opinion, brake in achieving the political coherence of the allies. There is no doubt that dynastic lines influenced the policy of states, but not to the extent that contemporaries think about it from our pen. The pernicious influence of former emperors was noted more in a country like Russia, and was limited to hype in states like Germany. It goes without saying that it is much more difficult to establish a unity of policy in a coalition of countries with different forms of government than in those where they are related. We know that the monarchism of the former Russia more than once created friction with Republican France purely for internal reasons, but it is also known that these frictions were smoothed out by both sides when foreign policy interests coincided. "Scarecrow" -

Alexander Sh, bareheaded, listened to the Marseillaise aboard the Khran-Puz battleship, and the F-Khran-Puz socialists and left-wing radicals gave money for loans to the despotic government of Russia. A common danger united opposites.

As a matter of fact; The superiority on the side of the Entente in political unity consisted in the fact that in the structure of its states in wartime there was no triumvirate with the main line of the general headquarters in it, as we established in the previous chapter. Thus, not the dynastic, but the line of the general staff, which diverged in the middle states from the line of foreign policy, created those frictions in achieving political unity, which the tripartite alliance lacked. Whereas the general staffs of Vienna and Berlin agreed before the war—rather vaguely, to be sure—up to coherence in military operations, in political views they stood on different paths. Although Konrad tries to prove to us complete unanimity with Moltke in politics, we know from the latter's letters that he far from approved of Wen's lines of political behavior. German authors, without speaking openly, precisely

358

GSTU © Ya iya

they reject the glorified triumvirate, giving preference to the cabinet of ministers as the body that manages politics and, at the same time, war.

In essence, the question of the political unity of the coalition loses its urgency for states with a truly socialist structure, for such states pursue the same common goals—the fight against capitalism—and are led by one party—the communist party—leading the proletariat of all countries along one common path in building socialism. In such states, from the moment of their formation, not a Coalition, but a federation arises.

° Since in both coalitions there was no political unity in setting common goals, there could be no question of a single political leadership of the war.

In none of the coalitions, because of the fear of diminishing the prestige of its member states, the question of a single political leadership was raised. Each of the European states, even such enslaving as Russia, defended its prestige. We said above that under Napoleon, Austria and Prussia, having lost their political face, turned out to be dependent on Bopaparte in their politics. However, secretly both of these states continued to communicate with their actual enemies and put up only allied contingents, the price of which was determined by Eklausowitz, but did not participate in the war.

In both hostile coalitions during the imperialist war, it was thought that the political direction of the war would be achieved by timely and appropriate diplomatic negotiations. However, the experience of the World War shows that this method from the very first periods of the war failed in both camps. Most likely he was once. resolved in the camp of the Entente at meetings of the Allies, in which the leaders of the foreign and domestic policy of individual members of the coalition took part, with a decisive vote, and, conversely, it not only did not find permission from the middle states at all, but by the end of the war even divided Austria Hungary with Germany. Due to the size of our work, we are not at liberty to go into a detailed analysis of this phenomenon during the world

war.

The absence of a unified political leadership of the war in both coalitions has now forced the statesmen of the warring countries and military writers to pay great attention to this issue.

Marshal Haig comes to the conclusion that a coalition for the unified leadership of the war must not only organize a unified military command, but also nominate a single politician for the general direction of the policy of the coalition. Neither before the World War nor during its course did the two coalitions come by experience to such a proposal, and it is practically unrealizable. In the first book of our work, we noted that under modern conditions one can only speak of collective leadership of a war even in individual states, and even more so when the struggle is waged by a coalition. The methods of command—orders—are completely inapplicable in the higher side of war, that is, in politics. History gives us an example of how Napoleon tried to manage the politics of, in essence, vassals, Prussia and Austria, and ultimately did not succeed in this. In the ledger of the Entente, the desire to find a common line of political behavior during the world war was not directed

359

a „ - ŷ „, EEEEE - ŷ - ŷ - ŷ-ŷ

on the way of transferring political leadership into the hands of one person, for example, Poincaré or Lloyd George.

The well-known German author Liebman, taking into account the state egoism of individual members of the coalition, especially in its painful manifestations in Austria-Hungary, dwells on the implementation of the general political leadership of the war exclusively in the form of a special council of representatives of the governments of the states included in the coalition, in particular their ministers of foreign affairs, convened on a partisan basis. Only in such an organ is it possible to find a common line of political conduct for the entire coalition during the war, and, consequently, in preparation for it. Trying on this uniform for the states of the tripartite alliance, Liebman finds

that such a council was to meet in Berlin under the chairmanship of Wilhelm himself.

—

In essence, the management of war as a political phenomenon in states with a capitalist structure can only be thought of as collective, carried out by a collective body in the form of advice proposed by Liebman.

In countries where the working people are in power, this question is resolved much more easily, because the basis of leadership is one line of political behavior and all work, as a rule, proceeds in a collective way.

The next main condition for the strength of the coalition is unity on the issue of concluding peace. Insofar as the common political aims which the coalition seeks to achieve by war have been established, insofar as a common political leadership of the war has been established, it is easier to foresee and stipulate the obligations of the members of the coalition to agree on the issue of concluding peace. Friction in this creates the danger of a separate peace, the threat of which hung over both coalitions more than once during the world war and resulted in a gradual split in the tripartite alliance. Before the world

During the war, the issues of a separate peace were not envisaged by any of the coalitions, and only during its course, by a special agreement, did the Entente try to insure itself against it, without ultimately achieving real results. On the side of the tripartite alliance, the guarantee against disintegration consisted only in oaths of allegiance to the common cause of war. In essence, all this was illusory, and no paper could prevent the coalition from disintegrating at a time when the vital interests of this or that state were so shaken by the war that the only way out was to conclude a separate peace. True, this way out of the war is not so easy for the state, which decided on it: 1) due to the resistance of part of its population to this; 2) due to the pressure of the allies, and 3) due to the unwillingness to admit defeat to the enemies, who, of course, will not miss the opportunity to increase their demands. The separate conclusion of peace in modern conditions is accompanied by such upheavals for the statehood, which, in terms of the severity of the consequences, are not much inferior to the hardships of the war itself. The consciousness of this kept many of the bourgeois governments from concluding a separate peace; on the contrary, in the opinion of the party which sees the true path to victory in the collapse of the bourgeois government, leaving the imperialist wars and turning it into a civil war can be considered the only correct move.

360

[And _]

Thus, what has been said above allows one to come to the conclusion that on the threshold of a world war, both systems of alliances of capitalist states in Europe were not prepared for a single political leadership of the war and, with its outbreak, entered a period of crises arising from the absence of this unity. We have heard that in theory both military leaders and "statesmen" recognized the primacy of politics in the cause of war, but in practice the line of the General Staff tried to isolate itself from the influence of politics and be independent both in the preparation and conduct of the war. The "prestige" of individual members of the coalition as independent political states repelled large states from subordination in politics to any one of these states. Another thing is such vassals as Belgium, Portugal, Serbia, Montenegro, who fell under the influence of the Entente states. It was difficult to reach parity with the Soviets, because all diplomatic conferences in the years of peace were a vivid indicator of how difficult it is to reconcile the contradictions of different states.

A unified control of the war was thought to be achievable along the military line. The war was regarded as an exclusively military phenomenon, but not as a political act.

Above, when considering military unity, we planned to pay attention to two questions: 1) about the use of the forces and means of the coalition and 2) about the organization of military command and control.

In the theory of Clausewitz we have cited, it was indicated that in the coalitions of his time, the states that entered into an alliance looked at it as a commercial deal, and either put up a certain contingent to help their ally, or, when they themselves waged a real war, then use - Called their armed forces for the common goals of the coalition with great prudence.

Indeed, if we look back at the time of Frederick, the French

revolution and Napoleon, then we will just find examples of either the deployment of auxiliary contingents, or the participation of states in a coalition by forces predetermined by special agreements, far from exhausting all their capabilities.

But even on the threshold of the 20th century, when the alliances have changed their character and become stronger, when the states that are part of them, in the event of a war, are involved in it by virtue of protecting their own interests, and not just the interests of their allies, and then we are faced with as Clausewitz said, "with diplomatic restraint" in this matter.

If we recall the distribution of the Austro-Hungarian forces according to the theaters of operations or the grouping of the Russian armies along the Fronts, then we can say that they corresponded to the political and military goals of these states to a greater extent than were aimed at achieving the general goals of the coalition. Konrad, the chief of the Aust-Hungarian general staff, was well aware of the secondary military importance of the Serbian front and thought to limit himself to it with minimal forces. However, the political significance of the war with Serbia pushed him to increase these against her, and in the August days of 1914, the Austro-Hungarian army found itself in the Serbian theater of operations instead of being in Russian. Moltke

361

CHELA UDS ARIES

Vieste and Wilhelm loaded telegrams out of fear that Vienna would not be carried away by the Serbian front and would not concentrate excessive forces there to the detriment of the Russian theater.

The Russian concentration, as is known, was not carried out solely in view of the commonality of actions with the guards, for which the forces were sung according to a special agreement. Obruchev, at the conclusion of the Franco-Russian Convention, pointed out with complete certainty that Russia cannot bind itself by an agreement in the grouping of forces without taking into account its other political tasks. France followed the same path, not wanting to get involved in the war between Russia and Austria. Finally, the British armed forces, by convention with France, were sent to the mainland of Europe for joint action only in the form of an expeditionary corps.

The German armed forces were deployed also taking into account, first of all, the interests of Germany, and no matter how Konrad asked Moltke to increase the German troops on the Russian front, his arguments remained in vain.

In a word, no matter what they say about the fact that Clausewitz's theory of the influence of police singing on war is outdated in our two countries, we must testify that in modern coalition wars we have to meet with the use of coalition members of their armed forces, first of all, in their own interests, because, despite the fact that in our days, - as Clausewitz says, - "both (states) are connected by an important interest", and in such cases "diplomatic restraint will not be dispensed with".

In other words, the military coalitions were planned taking into account the political goals of individual members of the coalition, and, despite preliminary agreements, the commonality of these goals was difficult to achieve. True, on the French Chronicle, the presence of one enemy, in the person of Germany, led to a single

the military goals of the Allies, but already in the Russian context, both in Russia and in the states of the tripartite alliance, the military goals were bifurcated. We heard Conrad's detailed accounts of this and spoke in passing of the efforts made by the French general staff and diplomacy to induce Russian strategy to direct its main efforts against Germany.

The military agreements that were available in Europe on the threshold of the world war, in considering the question of a common plan of action, did not go beyond the definition of: 1) the main enemy; 2) the number of forces deployed (from Russia - against Germany); 3) the end time of their concentration

cheniya.

For the rest, each of the members of the coalition was free to choose a method of action, in accordance with the structure of their armed forces, with the means and theater of military operations. The general plan of operations was not developed by any of the coalitions, and such (for example, between Germany and Austria-Hungary) was discussed only in general terms, and even then it left many puzzling questions, the failure to resolve which promptly affected from the very first days of the war.

Despite a preliminary agreement between the Khranpuz and English general staffs on the actions of the British Expeditionary Force on the mainland, no general plan of action was worked out, and French

362

p[p[k

was free to make certain operational decisions, which would correspond more to the interests of the British than to the all-Union ones.

Here, naturally, the question arises: can and should the preparation and conduct of a coalition war stop at establishing only the most important starting points in the general plan of action, or is it necessary to strive for a more detailed specification of the latter?

The course of the imperialist war, especially on one front, has clearly shown that the concretization of the general plan of action must go further than it actually did. It is necessary to strive to direct the main efforts of the coalition towards achieving one common goal, but at the same time, it is necessary to carefully weigh all the features (political, economic and military) of each of the members of the coalition. Mistakes in the mouth will only lead to ruin. We will not talk about the hijacking overstrain of Austria-Hungary: we will only point out the deadline for the end of the concentration of Russian armies on the German front, adopted by the Russian general staff at the insistence of the French, in essence, horsed for the Russian armies and led, ultimately, to the defeat under Tannenberg.

The general plan of action is the result of a unified strategy of the Coalition, and the tabular one is conceivable only with the general lines of political behavior of the allies.

As noted above, on the threshold of a world war, in both coalitions there was no common political leadership in case of war, and therefore a single military administration could not be established.

History says that in the coalition wars of the past it was

It was carried out only by Napoleon, who, in essence, had at his disposal not the armies of his allies, but vassal contingents. Attempts by the GoF-kriegsrat in Vienna to implement such a unified command in relation to the allied armies, in particular, the Russian one led by Suvorov, met with a sharp rebuff and ridicule from the latter.

"The allied contingent," says Clauseville, "usually has its own commander, who depends only on his court, who indicates to the commander the goal corresponding to his own half-hearted intentions."

Indeed, in the war of 1813, in the coalition of Napoleon's enemies, the unified military administration was in the hands of Commander-in-Chief Schwarzenberg, who in this role turned out to be more of an extra than a sovereign commander-in-chief. All the allied states were infected with "prestige", they felt equal, and the appointment of Schwarzenberg as commander-in-chief did not at all signify any special role of Austria in the union. Members of the coalition insured themselves against possible attempts by a single ghavno-commander to exercise power, and the Allied agreement stated that "the allied commanders of the armies could turn to their rulers if the order of Schwarzenberg seemed inappropriate to them." In other words, freedom was left for the commanders of the allied contingents, for, as Clausewitz put it, they "depended only on their court."

From the point of view of Napoleonic warfare, such a limitation on the power of the commander-in-chief is, of course, harmful, but at the same time, we must

363

to el › me)e, URUSHN ii

to establish that it is natural, since there was no single political leadership of the war, but such was directed by special diplomatic negotiations of the allies. |

The presence in 1813 of a common commander-in-chief, at least with the rights and appearance of an extra, shows that already in those days it was recognized as necessary to organize a single military administration.

The realization of its theoretical necessity in a coalition war was also perceived on the gunpowder of a world war in both alliances, but it was not put into practice. In this all the general staffs were distinguished by that "diplomatic restraint" of which Clausewitz spoke to us.

In the camp of the tripartite alliance, in essence, the question of a unified command and ps was raised. The reasons for this lie both in the political independence of the states included in it, and in the distrust that they had for each other.

If we recall, Italy's loyalty to the tripartite alliance has long been questioned. Its policy followed independent paths and was in sharp, barely disguised, contradiction with the policy of Vienna. Conrad's secret plans to defeat Italy, of course, were suspected in Rome, and therefore not only could there not be any talk of any edipeia in the command during the war, but even the very participation of Italy in the war on the side of the middle states was called into question. In the same way, relations between Rome and Berlin were not clarified.

Since there was no political unity between Germany and Austria

364

strated its greatness in the union, belittling the merits of Austria. It is clear that with such thoughts of the Chief of the General Staff there was nothing to raise the question of a unified command. In any case, no one thought about it in Vienna, and they would be amazed if such a proposal came from Berlin.

But there were also: far from such projects, knowing the painful feeling of "prestige" of their ally. The alliance with Austria-Hungary was for Germany more of a military necessity than a political commonwealth. In the latter respect, the Danubian Empire was rather a heavy stone, and only the realization that without the assistance of the Austro-Hungarian Army Germany was not in a position to wage a war on two fronts forced Berlin to preserve this alliance. Distrustful of the active policy of Austria, which was far from meeting the line of political behavior of Germany, Berlin, in the person of the General Staff, also proved to be restrained in close military cooperation. In its place, we gave the reasons for this: the fear of the German General Staff for keeping their operational proposals secret if they were revealed to representatives of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff. In Germany, the Copecco, they were well aware of their military superiority, and in a report of 1912 Ludendorff wrote frankly about this, but from here it was far from proposals for unification of command under German rule. The rough patches of the "soldiers" in the general's uniforms were not suitable for the sluggish and gentle Austro-Wepgersklh warriors. It is known that the appointment of Mackenzep as the commander of the HG of the German army in 1915 was due in part to his court gloss, which was necessary for him. Austro-Hungarian army. From the history of the World War we know that only the hot head of Ludendorff followed the path of subordinating the Austro-Hungarian army to himself, and the rest of the chiefs of general staffs were

restraint in its imperialist aspirations.

Military unity among the tripartite alliance rested on the agreement of the general staffs or, as the Germans like it! say it happened on a case-by-case basis. The path, of course, is not very reliable.

In this book we have covered in detail the questions that were subject to a joint discussion by the chiefs of the general staffs of the two middle states. They concerned: 1) the definition of the main enemy, 2) the establishment of the main theater of military operations, 3) the number of troops concentrated in theaters, 4) the mode of action, and 5) questions of communication of allied command posts.

Koprade tells us that on all these questions he reached an agreement with Moltke with sufficient clarity and definiteness. Meanwhile, it must be firmly established that the talks were in the nature of general and rather obscure conversations, leaving many dubious places. It is known that Hermapia deployed fewer forces on the eastern front than Konrad expected, that these forces were engaged in the defense of East Prussia, while the chief of the Austro-Wepger staff was considering their attack on Sedled. In a word, even the first operation by both allied chiefs of the general staffs was not confirmed in terms of the unity of its conduct by both armies. As for the unified military leadership of the war as a whole, this is no longer necessary to speak of.

365

KR others

The middle states failed to achieve the unification of the military administration of the allied forces and on one "Front" - against Russia. The issue could be resolved: 1) by appointing a common commander from German generals, or 2) by subordinating the USh to the German army to Konrad. Neither one nor the other was done. With the superiority in numbers on the Russian front of the Austro-Hungarian troops, Moltke did not consider it possible to subordinate them to the German command, but, on the other hand, did not want to transfer the German troops of the US Army, and with them the fate of the eastern borders of Germany to Austrian hands, especially since Moltke's proposed course of action here ran counter to Conrad's intentions.

Unfortunately, we cannot dwell in detail on those frictions that arose between Germany and Austria-Hungary on the Russian Front during the World War in the conduct of operations by two independent commands, and on how the influence of the German command gradually expanded over the entire Front. Meeting Konrad's stubbornness and circumventing him by appointing German chiefs of staff to independent Austrian front commanders, the coalition, or rather, the German high command, tried to resolve the issue of a unified command on the entire Eastern Front. In fact, this union was also occasional, and it must be said that in this the tripartite alliance failed.

The issue of unified military command remained unresolved until the end of the war and was so painful that in his memoirs the chief of the Austro-Hungarian general staff Konrad pays special attention to it. Konrad finds that his permission could have followed not through the appointment of a single commander-in-chief, but through the creation of an allied council (collegium) of German and Austrian generals who could jointly discuss the plan of operations, their preparation and general features of implementation. It is possible that such a council would meet in one place, if the main

good apartments would be located nearby, but even if this were not the case, modern means of communication always allow this to be done through telegraph and written communications.

In this proposal, attention is drawn to the recognition of the council by the body of command, which was not only unusual for the German system of military administration, but constituted a well-known revolution, especially taking into account the views of Moltke the elder on military councils. It could only have come from a descendant of the members of the Hoffkriegsrat, and during the World War it certainly would not have found sympathy in Berlin with such firm "soldiers" in general's uniform as Ludendorph and Hindenburg. The latter conceived the leadership of the war not in the form of council resolutions, but in the form of an order, which always met with a rebuff from the chief of the Austro-Hungarian general staff.

The post-war literary thought of Hermapia is more inclined to make concessions and recognize Conrad's thoughts as worthy of attention. We noted above that Liebman, the political leadership of the coalition war of the middle states, thinks in the form of a union council on an equal footing. This same council should also be the highest body of the military command. The shift is not small in German military circles.

366

ZI UDS VIO

Liebman finds that such a council should have consisted of the chiefs of the general staffs of the allied armies, to whom and. naval forces, and which, moreover, would not be part of the command of certain fronts, so that in their judgments they would not give advantages to one or another Front, but represent the armed forces of their state as a whole. Then, as we have already indicated above, the German chancellor and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary were to be members of the council. Both the latter and the chiefs of staff would participate only in meetings that would be decisive, and for the current activities of the council they would be represented by special deputies. Chairman - Wilhelm and place of meetings - Berlin.

Liebman also outlines the tasks of the council, which would be reduced to the establishment by state leaders of political pellicles for waging war and the corresponding methods for achieving them, and "politics" would be taken into account in the broadest sense; then the terms of reference of the council would also include questions of the general economy and propaganda, since these had to be settled between the allies. In this council, the political leadership would receive not only a place and a voice, but would directly decide the questions of the war; he had a decision, and the chiefs of the general staff would be only military advisers. The Council, through the chiefs of general staffs, would establish the unified use of the armed forces of the coalition to achieve the political goals of the war and would determine their control on the front where the troops of the various allied states were assembled.

The German author of the present draft proves that in such a council all states would remain sovereign, there would be no diminishing of the "prestige" of the allies, and Germany's outward superiority would consist only in the fact that the meetings of the council took place in the German capital. The formation of such a council could have been carried out in the course of the war itself, if it had been agreed in advance in peacetime. No changes in the internal structure of the army of each of the allied states

no states had to be brought in, except that a coalition war required the formation of such a council and the release of the chief of the general staff from direct command of the front. Liebman does not exclude the possibility that when important questions are decided in the council, the commanders of fronts, naval forces and air fleets are invited to meetings.

As for the unification of the military command of the individual fronts, on which the troops of various members of the coalition are fighting shoulder to shoulder, it, according to the German author, should be resolved by the creation of a single military command, because the strategic and tactical conditions of the situation directly affect the Front. A single chief commander is appointed on the Front, and all orders must come from him alone. He was delivered on the eastern front of the central states.

Speaking in the literature with a similar project of unified war management, Liebman foresees objections that his project diminishes the importance of the individual, and his reasoning can be recognized as purely theoretical.

367

drörrH%o

However, he believes that in a future war, first of all, the entire state apparatus should work in concert for the war, and if a genius contributes to this, then his paths are not ordered.

In the first book of our work, we spoke in detail about the integral commander of our day and the collective management of the war, therefore we will not go into additional coverage of this issue here.

Thus, there was no unified, collectively based, management of the war in the coalition of the middle states of Europe during the world war, just as no steps were taken towards this in peacetime.

If we turn now to the Trinitarian Entente, then in the question of a unified command of the war we shall first find an apologetic phenomenon which, in the course of the war, underwent a more or less positive evolution.

Establishment. a unified command on the side of the Entente was complicated by the territorial division of the coalition, namely: Russia, Serbia, and then Romania left the sphere of constant personal communication with the governments of Western states.

We noted above that Liebman, whom we have mentioned more than once, sees the advantages of a similar state structure of individual members of the coalition, in which, already in peacetime, the army was closely soldered to the government by heading the army and the Navy by military and naval ministers who were members of the government. and responsible to the representative institutions of the states. In other words, the influence of the supreme power, the dynastic line, on the army and navy was limited in these states. According to Liebman's conclusion, even in wartime the actual management of the war was directed along the military line through these responsible ministers.

However, this was far from the case.

When examining the question of a unified control of the war on the side of the Entente, one must always take into account: 1) the separate position of Russia, Serbia and Rumania, and 2) the organization of this control on the eastern front of the Western states of the coalition.

There was no need to talk about the transfer of control of the war into the hands of any state before the world war in the countries of the Entente, just as in the middle states. Each of the individual states of the coalition was completely sovereign and considered its independence in its military structure. Despite Russia's economic dependence on France, the persistent influence of the Khrappuza general staff on Russian strategy still had its limits. Now it is indicated that the Russian general staff fell under the influence of Paris and was led by the brain of the French army. It cannot, frankly, be denied that many concessions had to be made, even to the detriment of our direct interests, to the Russian general staff in working out a joint concentration plan, but at the same time, for example, in the last railroad loan of France to Russia, the Francoise General Staff I had to make concessions in my project. Meanwhile, it was precisely here that pressure could be exerted most of all, for the matter concerned monetary assistance. Moreover, he did not rise

368

hy yy

the question of organizing a unified command of the war, as affecting the sovereign rights of Rossini, who, moreover, possessed an army that was numerically stronger than the armies of its allies. Although, it must be said, the French government pointed out the need to strengthen the military forces of Russia. Everything that was done in this area came down to establishing the main enemy, a certain number of troops deployed by Russia against this enemy, the terms for concentrating the methods of communication of the allied commands. Former Minister of War Sukhomlinov, in his memoirs, tells a rather characteristic detail about the establishment of common grounds for joint operations of the allies. Speaking about their conversation with the chief of the French General Staff, Geoffoff, in 1913 about the general plan of action of Rossini and France against Germany, developed and agreed upon by both general staffs, both interlocutors came to the unanimous decision that let, de, the staffs take care of this matter. , and they, the future commanders, will conduct operations at their own discretion.

In determining common military goals, France made pressure more along diplomatic lines than along military ones.

Since the beginning of the war, the unity in its conduct remained on the same road of political coordination and agreement between the two commands from case to case.

In a similar way, operations were linked with Serbia, but with great success, due to the political and economic dependence of this vassal on its capitalist allies.

The reader of our work knows that between the general staffs of France and England on the threshold of a world war there was an agreement in the event of possible hostilities. It provided, however, only a general deployment, according to which the British Expeditionary Force was concentrated in the area of Maubeuge-Le Cateau. This deployment was

worked in detail; everything else, in particular joint operations, was subject to further ^{plan} coordination with the outbreak of war. The question of a unified command, in any case, was not only not resolved, but was not even touched upon by the two states.

With the outbreak of war, the British cabinet asked for a military mission to be sent to London to establish an agreement on further actions. Both the commander of the British Expeditionary Corps, French, and the Minister of War Kitchener himself considered themselves completely independent of the French Command, and not only could there be no question of their subordination to the French Commander-in-Chief, but even the very coordination of joint military operations went on with great friction. We have already spoken of French's independent position in the first Marne operation and of the difficulties of the Allies in establishing common actions.

The English general received certain instructions from London: "You must be aware that, quite clearly, your position is completely independent and that you are never, in any case and sense, subordinate to the allied commander in chief."

We cannot consider this question in detail here, as we would go beyond the scope of our work. It should be noted that the independence of the British military line was ended only on March 25, 1918,

8424 The brain of the army. Book. 3.369

AU

and even then Foch's orders were of a diplomatic nature, v. e. did not differ in particular hardness. We will return to this a little later.

The success of the Marne eased the friction between the allies, as it created a certain authority for the French command, and further operations proceeded more or less in concert.

However, 1915 showed that the practiced system of managing a coalition war was not successful and should be revised. The entry of Italy into the war, the defeat of Russia, and the planned operations of the middle states in the Balkans in the autumn spoke of the need to develop a common plan of action for the allies. On July 19, 1915, a military council of political representatives of the Western states, representatives of their general staffs and commanders of the allied forces (British and French) in France met for the first time in Chantilly. At this council the first general plan of action was drawn up, good in itself, but belated in time. In any case, it was for the first time that politicians and the military discussed operational assumptions at the mouth council.

From July 1915, a period of Allied military councils began, the details of which we cannot go into. However, we must point out that there was still no unity in action. The British stubbornly defended their military independence. French was succeeded by Haig, who proved to be as ardent an admirer of independence as his predecessor, especially since Robertson, Chief of the General Staff at London, was in the same position. At one time, within 13 days, Joffre was appointed commander-in-chief of the allied forces in the East, but then, at the insistence of the French policy, he left the post of commander-in-chief altogether.

The Verdun failures and, in general, the events of 1916 led the British

politicians to the conviction of the need for a closer linkage of actions. At the suggestion of Lloyd George, after the meeting of the Allies at Calais on 26 and 27 February 1917, the British Cabinet undertook to 'order the Commander of the British Armed Forces to carry out the French proposals, except in cases where his (British) army is in danger.' A hundred years later, the Formulation of the subordination of the allied commander was renewed, similar to the subordination in 1813 of the allies to the general commander-in-chief Schwarzenberg.

However, Haig refused to become a subordinate and, despite the demands of French policy, continued to consider himself only an ally.

In the autumn of 1917, Lloyd George again approached the French government with a proposal to establish a common plan of action, but this time with more specificity in establishing a common body to manage the war from politicians and military allies. "On November 7, 1917, it was decided in Rapallo to form a permanent supreme military council, whose competence extended to the front in France and Italy. The council was to meet monthly in full force in Versailles, and its military members met constantly. The council was to establish the general management of the war, to coordinate the military operations of the allies, under-

prepare decisions for the allied governments and ensure their implementation

810

IEN - US 000 000

nie. However, there was no commander-in-chief yet, and the author of the project, Lloyd George, did not stutter about him, because the subordination of the British troops to the French did not yet meet with sympathy either in the British army or among the public opinion of England.

The "military committee" of the Soviet, of which Foch was a member, was soon transformed into an "administrative military committee" under the chairmanship of the same Foch. This body, although engaged in organizing reserves to repel the impending German offensive in the spring of 1918, did not have orders, but limited itself to requests. As you know, by March 20, there were no British troops in the reserve, and the French were far from the breakthrough site.

However, one way or another, the need for a common commander-in-chief was realized, and on March 25, 1918, under the threat of the developing German offensive, it was decided in Doullance to appoint Foch to this post. But, at his own suggestion, the new commander-in-chief was to coordinate the actions of the independent commanders of the French and English armies, which was far from a direct order. Foch himself was still afraid for his authority, although on April 14 it was announced to the whole world that the French and British governments were appointing Foch "commander-in-chief of the allied armies in France", which was soon joined by America and Italy.

Thus, under the pressure of politics and the difficult military situation, Avtanta broke the military independence of the allied commands and reached the unified command of the front, but not the entire war as a whole, and it should be noted that this was achieved at the cost of sacrifices: from the post of chief of the British General Staff Robertson left and Wilson, who sympathized with Foch, was appointed. Haig was left in command of the British armies, since, according to Lloyd George, the military reputation of the mouth of the general

ral in England was so significant that it was not necessary to think about it shift.

We do not say anything about the unification of the command of the Western states with Russia. This could not have been both in terms of distance, and especially because Nikolai Romanov became the head of the army. If, moreover, we take into account that in the person of Alekseev, the chief of staff of the Russian Supreme Command, the idea of unconditional subordination of the Russian command to that of the same Western allies did not find support and even met with rebuff and evasion from going to meetings of military councils in Chantilly and other places, then it is quite clear that the military unity of Russia with the Western states proceeded from case to case, with all the ensuing consequences.

Reminding the reader of Clausewitz's theory of the conduct of a coalition war, we cited the judgments of his Russian translator, who recognized the thoughts of the Philosopher of War for the 20th century as obsolete. However, what we have said above suggests that the starting points of his thinking are also valid for our days. It is possible to speak of a coordinated coalition strategy only when political unity has been achieved between its members and independent lines of behavior of the general staffs, as representatives of the supreme commands of various allied armies, have been overcome. Unity

371

rr... dts

The actions of the Coalitions must be achieved first of all in the political field, and the supreme command of the war is conceived in no other way than that of the collectively inter-allied organization with a political composition, and not exclusively a military one. The "brains of the armies" of the allies alone, even if they are coordinated in their activities, will not be able to solve the complex problem of managing a modern coalition war.

This is especially necessary to keep in mind, since the war of our days deeply intrudes into the economic life of the belligerent states and builds on

pepolzovaniye pkh economy.

Simultaneously with the political and military unity of the coalition, economic unity must be established in it. We spoke about the influence of the economy on the war in the first book of our work, and therefore here we will only indicate that the various countries of the coalition are at different stages of their economic development. This also determines their steadfastness in war. A coalition war requires an equalization of the economic resistance of states, and therefore entrusts the unified leadership of the war of the allies with taking into account the economic viability of individual members of the coalition, aligning not with the advanced, but with the lagging behind, and helping them in the economic struggle that accompanies today's hostilities. Failure to take this into account or refusal to provide assistance may lead to a premature withdrawal from the war of the weakest and economically most shocking members of the coalition.

Thus, the coalition war of our day requires its special economic preparation, thought out in advance by the allies, agreed upon and carried out by them before the start of the war. On the threshold of the world war, little was done in this respect in both coalitions. Some Russian-French loans! they showed France's help to their ally in preparing the war of the popes, or rather, they were in the nature of buying Russian blood to save the bourgeois republic. The course of the world war led both sides to this or that material assistance to their weak economic allies, although

It should be noted that this assistance was rendered taking into account, first of all, their own interests, with notorious "diplomatic restraint", as Clausewitz said about this.

The need for an economic alignment of coalitions requires, first of all, the political leadership of the war and by no means can be based on one single military command. An order here would be an invalid method of control. We believe that it is not necessary to give proofs of what has been said, because this can be done even without us.

We have broken up the question of a coalition war into its component parts and talked about them, perhaps in too much detail. Can. reproach us with excessive theorizing of the issue and complicating it. However, the experience of the world war shows that the coalition war of the capitalist states, in view of the presence of a mass of those contradictions that signify the relations of these states, is by no means as simple as it seemed to all the states of Europe before 1914, which were not prepared for its conduct and in trepidation, at the cost of sacrifices and defeats, giving birth to unity, so necessary for the conduct of any war.

In states where the proletariat is in power, the question of a coalition war is resolved more easily, for these states constitute a federation,

372

E 1

However, the questions of military and economic unity must be linked in advance, which is much easier to achieve with political unity, which forms the basis of the Federation, than in a coalition of capitalist countries.

We do not undertake to outline here the drafts of the governing bodies for the coalition war, for we consider this a matter of national importance, and not of private pursuits with a pen in hand. We have formulated the starting points for this: collectivism and the three pillars of uniting the coalition, taking into account the purely military features of the Front Office. We then give those who wish full scope for the preparation of various projects for the management of the war by state "men", including the highest representatives of the "Armenian brain", not at all wishing to dispute their merits and their laurels. We have been pointed out more than once to our excessive modesty, but we prefer to remain in the literary shadow than to be an importunate, uncalled and unrecognized "man of state." Private politics and strategy are a great temptation for the servants of the literary pen, but at the same time a great evil for practical activity and life. The capacity for temperance is sometimes a very useful quality of temperament...

In what follows, we will consider the Forms into which the agreements on establishing the unity of the coalition in the event of an armed struggle took shape.

Historical documents note two types of agreements: 1) political acts of alliances and 2) military agreements or military covenants.

— It was stated above that at the base of each coalition there should be political unity has been established, and therefore the acts that cement this unity are of great importance.

Both coalitions in Europe on the threshold of World War II were connected by such

political agreements on the provision of armed support in the event of an attack on one or another member of the coalition. The triple alliance was sealed by a treaty, and such an agreement considered the entry into the war of the entire alliance only in the event of an attack on one of the members of the alliance. If the state that was a member of the union turned out to be the attacking side, then the rest of its members additionally decided on their participation in the war. A similar interpretation of allied obligations was applied by Italy, which evaded the war in view of its beginning by Austria-Hungary. For the same reasons, Romania did not take part in the war on the side of the tripartite alliance. The treaty of alliance, however, was not considered firm even in Vienna, where every time a political crisis arose, they asked Berlin whether it would support Austro-Hungarian diplomacy in the event of resorting to war, or whether it needed to be restrained. . Distrust of the political loyalty of Berlin in Wep was so deep that even such an admirer of Wilhelm as Kopradsch was, and he advised taking from him a special receipt of readiness to fulfill allied obligations. There is no need to talk about the strength of the Austro-Italian alliance, because they did not believe in it either in Vienna or in Rome. In a word, the document that held the tripartite alliance together was a piece of paper of little value in the eyes of the allies, and if Austria-Hungary was supported in Berlin, then it was in military necessity, since without the arm of the Danubian Empire, war

pa

3173

HER W

two Fronts for Germany was unthinkable. The Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff quite rightly pointed out in his time that Germany, for fear of being isolated, could not fail to support Austria-Hungary. True political unity between the states of the tripartite alliance was not enough, and their lines of political behavior often not only diverged, but even crossed with each other.

In the opposite camp, political unity was fixed in various ways. There was a political agreement between Russia and France on the provision of armed assistance in the event of a German attack, and the armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Russia did not oblige France to join it.

England was connected with France by a vague obligation, in the form of an exchange of letters, which boiled down to the fact that the first would decide the question of armed assistance at the last moment, and we saw on the threshold of the world war what anxiety there was in Paris until the position of England was clarified.

Finally, Italy and France exchanged the same political letters in which the Roman government guaranteed its neutrality in the event of a Franco-German war. Letters, like the Form of Agreement, did not carry the same obligation as a political act of union, were not ratified by governments and, on the contrary, were documents of a secret agreement. Such a semi-official meaning of the letters was taken into account by both sides, who did not particularly trust their reality.

In essence, there was no particular difference, because the war of our day is such a grandiose phenomenon for a state entering into it that even a political act of alliance is not a guarantee of its unconditional fulfillment.

Political acts of alliances of the early twentieth century provided for the provision of armed support in the event of war, but they can also be concluded in the opposite sense, that is, take the form of a non-aggression pact. Such, in essence, were the letters of the Italian and French ambassadors on the threshold of the world war. Non-aggression pacts aim to reduce potential adversaries and reduce them to a limited number. In other words, these political acts also increase the strength of the state concluding them, as do treaties on allied armed support.

The political acts on alliances mainly provide for laying down the general grounds for the provision of armed assistance, that is, they establish its motives, but do not touch upon the details of the conduct of a coalition war.

Thus, the conclusion and formulation of these treaties is the direct responsibility of diplomacy. However, since these treaties assume obligations to provide armed support, the beginning of a coalition war is laid, then the political treaty must also be evaluated from the military side. Such an assessment is made with the close participation of the general staffs of the states concluding a political treaty. Normally, the development of a treaty on the political unification of the two states should be the conclusion of a military and economic agreement, which will already detail the conditions for waging a coalition war.

However, the history of the late 19th and early 20th centuries gives us reverse examples, when the unity of the allies began with the conclusion of a military

374

I am in inenanani agreement - a military convention - and then it was already sealed by a political act of alliance or even had no such.

The Franco-Russian military convention of 1892 was concluded 7 years earlier than the political treaty of alliance.

The Anglo-Kranpuz military agreement was not at all summed up by a political treaty.

In our theoretical discussions of a coalition war, it was established that the unity of a coalition and the coherence of its strategy could be achieved only through political unity, that is, through the conclusion of an alliance treaty. The existence of military conventions between states without the conclusion of appropriate allied political treaties can be explained by the unwillingness to bind oneself in advance with political obligations and the preparation of a coalition war just in case, without a firm decision to join it.

Although the military conventions concluded by the military representatives of the states, mainly the chiefs of general staffs, are sealed by the signature of the supreme authority, thus obtaining the force of a document, nevertheless, they do not yet constitute the same strong acts as political alliance agreement. Conrad was profoundly right in this regard when he declared that the agreements of the general staffs were of no value. His appeal to the Allied Chief of the Italian General Staff in the difficult days preceding the war is proof of what has been said.

In the siaw of the foregoing, we are not inclined to exaggerate the value of 060bo. military conventions without strengthening them by political treaty acts.

A military agreement may or may not have a Convention Form. We know perfectly well that in the alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary such an agreement was replaced by an exchange of letters from the chiefs of the general staff. Conrad preferred even this type of agreement and sought to extend it to other states with which a military alliance was planned. In essence, the letters of the chiefs of general staffs covered all the same questions as the special military conventions, fixing the agreement on them on paper, especially since they were written with the knowledge and editorship of both the supreme power and the minister of foreign affairs. . We cited a case where Erenthal delayed a similar letter from Konrad to the Chief of the Rumanian General Staff, not agreeing with its wording. However, the letters were less official than the military conventions and could not be considered documents of the Allied agreement. We find confirmation of what has been said: 1) in the fact that Moltke far from fulfilled his obligations to appoint the promised number of troops and concentrate them in East Prussia, and 2) in the fact that these important documents, if they were really recognized as such, before have not been found by the state archives of modern Germany, having become apocryphal, as we have discussed in detail in their place.

In our theoretical discussions about coalition war, we pointed out what military conventions should contain. They should stipulate and concretize the main issues of such a war:

division of the main enemy, operational directions, grouping of FORCES,

375

= nannies =

determination of their numbers, areas of deployment, terms of deployment, conditions for the organization of command on the fronts and communications of the allied command, conditions for material assistance.

As regards the management of the war as a whole, this goes beyond purely military agreements and must be provided for by a special political act, as well as the question of the obligation not to conclude peace separately.

One cannot, of course, sketch out a cliché for military conventions and foresee point by point all the questions that will be touched upon in them. They vary depending on the purpose of the convention. The theoretical justifications for Pami are given above.

Along with the military convention, an economic agreement should also be concluded that provides for and specifies the economic obligations of the contracting parties in the event of war.

Normally, the military convention is a continuation of the political act of alliance. If all the responsibility and burden of the work of concluding a political act lies with diplomacy, and the general staff only consults, then when concluding a military convention, on the contrary, the negotiating parties are usually represented by general staffs.

It is quite natural that the development of an agreement on a general plan of action is carried out through the intermediary of the general staffs, as organs responsible for the military plan of the war and able to most fully reflect and protect the interests of their state.

Negotiations on a military convention: 1) are of a secret nature and 2) are protracted, since both sides are cautious about assuming certain obligations.

We do not give here the details of those negotiations that take place during the conclusion of military conventions, because, of course, one cannot give crap for this. Usually the chief of the general staff himself takes over the conduct of negotiations, but it is not excluded that he may be represented by a special person, especially if the convention is not of an extremely secret nature. Military agents take a large part in the negotiations, as persons constantly representing the military interests of their state in the contracting states.

From the historical part of this book, we already know that the agreements of the general staffs in themselves have no force and must be ratified by the highest state power.

From what has been said in this work on politics and strategy, we think it is quite clear that the leadership of the war and the conduct of war must be carried out primarily by politics. Therefore, diplomacy must take the most active part in the conclusion of military conventions. Indeed, we saw how Ehrenthal kept the Chief of the General Staff firmly in his hands, delaying the beginning of the correspondence between Konrad and Moltke, or even rejecting the attempt of an agreement between the Chief of the Austro-Wepper General Staff and the Rumanian General Staff. The same can be seen in other countries. This is quite understandable, because besides the fact that war is a political act, and therefore an agreement on it must be verified and approved by representatives of foreign policy, any agreement, although

376

TR 6559027710110' is also military, imposes certain obligations on the state, that is, it is reflected in its foreign policy.

Finally, as we have just pointed out, military conventions are ratified by the highest state power. Usually, under the signatures of the chiefs of the general staffs who conclude the convention, the corresponding approving signatures of representatives of the highest state power follow at the bottom of the document. Even the Form of a military agreement by exchange of letters, such as, for example, Konrad with Moltke, hides the participation in this of the highest state power and its approval of the content of the letters. Both Conrad and Moltke, in their letters, invariably indicated that their contents were known to the Minister of Foreign Affairs or Chancellor, Franz Josef or Wilhelm, depending on who was the author of the letter.

Military regulations do not constitute inviolable acts of military agreement.

contracting parties, but are subject to constant development, concretization, and even change, if the political or military situation calls for it. Such a development of the conventions is worked out and adopted at periodic meetings of the chiefs of the general staff. Protocol: these meetings are reported to the highest state authority for approval. Such were the ways of the Franco-Russian military convention, which underwent considerable changes during the period from 1892 to 1913.

This concludes our discussion of the modern coalition war of the capitalist states.

Mankind is always squeamish about what is new in something that is firmly forgotten or deliberately bypassed by attentive sounding, but, in fact,

is not new at all.

In this chapter we have shown that coalition warfare is nothing new in the theory of the art of war, and if this has not been trodden on until now, then, as Clausewitz said, it is "deeply based on natural limitations and human weakness."

We think that it would be a big mistake to create something new, inherent only in our time, out of "human weakness".

America is open...

Brain armech. Neither. 3,

V S U O P

AFTERWORD

We lower our pen...

We will not repeat here all those conclusions to which we drew in the last chapters of this book - opi, probably, are still fresh in memory reader.

We have somewhat deviated from the scheme, which is different from our first book. We decided here to give historical material first, and then move on to the theoretical part. As a result, this book has expanded in size.

It is said that brevity is the expression of the mind, and our long narrative about the participation of the General Staff in foreign policy matters may not be in our favor.

The historical part of the present book, of course, does not pretend to give an exhaustive political history of Europe on the threshold of a world war. It is only a canvas for our main work and the study of the activities of the General Staff. Let's not argue against the fact that this canvas is rare, that some threads may raise doubts. In any case, we tried to give life the way it flowed, and not only according to documents, but also according to the memoirs of contemporaries.

Whether we succeeded in this is not for us to judge.

We have pointed out more than once that modern warfare has no limits, and we concluded that the scope of the "brain of the army", which we undertook to investigate, is just as extensive.

In the afterword to the first book, we invited the patient reader to open the second book of our work. Now it has been reviewed by the reader, but we are forced once again to abuse his condescending attitude towards our work and warn that the work of the bulletin will be continued further.

We have not yet delved into the details of the work of the General Staff on the war plan, work that forms the basis of all the activities of the "brain of the army". This task is still ahead of us.

ZORI oSmbOianir- dobysa at, A member0

E SING IIA Ye

SOURCES

1. Buchanan. - Memoirs of a diplomat (Russian translation). GIZ.
2. Re VgizsVep Atlyuveev YuoKitele@er del Yugzrgipya Eez Ue\Keve\$ 1898 - 1914. Vega (Veschsesre Achzsaye).
3. Memoirs of Wilhelm's bloodline. Keigoyzd. "Word". Burley, 1922
4. Witte. - Memories, vol. I, GIZ. Moscow - Potrograd, 1933
5. Osg U\U@schines 1914 - 1918. Vapa E. Vessarsmu. VegTsa, 192.
6. Danilov O. N. - Russia in the World War 1914 - 1915. Inigovzd. "Word". Berlin, 1934
7. Me daeshch5sVets Ookitepe chem Keesbaizgis. 1-GU, Sa onenigya, 1919.
8. Uuryutanzeye AKep\$sisKe hig Vogdezome Me 4ez Kueses 1314. MR. Keraik Oefetgasy. Winen, 199.
9. Lobrorolsky S. - Mobilization of the Russian army in {9, "Military collection". Belgral, vol. 1.
10. Zaionikiy. — Preparing Russia for the World War in an International Ethnomenia. Ed. Headquarters of the Red Army. 1926
11. Ziaionikoveyy. - Preparation of Russia in the war (plans of war). building Headquarters of the Red Army. 1926
19. Desirable 4. IN. - Remembrances (Russian translation). Publishing house "Petrograd". Petrograd-Moscow, 152%
13. Kauteiy Garl. - How the World War arose (Russian Hierevskh). "Krasnaya Nov", Moscow, 1924
14. Sopta@, Her Chtatuswa. — Ah\$ shesheg Puevzmen 1906 - 1918. Vata 1-U. Visaa-Ue[ag. Upen-Vegio, 1921 - 1925.
15. Kotlyarebekiy S. A. - Austria-Hungary during the World War. Moscow.
16. "Red Archive". Historical magazine, vols. `G-ush. Ceptroarchive, 1922 - 1925
17. Fenin WE. (V. Ulyanov). - Collected works. Volume HI GIZ. Her ed. Moscow.
18. 1.25 amteez {Hapsa!5e\$ Chaps 1a Opde viegge —T. 1. Mite 4e 1a caerge. Castaruge de Ramibe - zeguee M \$ south. Ra, MOSSSHKhN.
19. Redtal Sit. - Me Enbmsyumokh 9er Egaze sotez etNeiswep ObbeggeGe V! 1t\Weciese. \15\$el-ii@ \UeBeg-UMola (5peTse, 1927, Yon. 2 IP.
29. Gyudendorf. - My memories of the war 19 M -1918 tg. (Russian translation). Moscow, 1923
- 31, Glaey4ot G. - KmesGaygiyo ind Ronik, Vet, 1922.

22. Glöep4og/{. - StkKip4el 4er O'erzev Vegoeiniya. VegNo, 1922.
23. Materials on the history of Franco-Rues relations for 110-1914. Moscow, 1922
34. Mary Franu. - Essays on the history of war and military art. Ed. "Krasian Yov". Moscow. 1994.
25. Moshe Itii, Sepegaofetgs!. — Rpiegiikeo, Whoa. PokKitepe 1877 - 1916. Zivag, 1922, |
26. Golvsche, Foldmar, ital. - High instructions. S.-Leterburh, 1913
37. Nirolai. - Secret forces (Russian translation). Moscow, 19925
28. Noliy V. F. - World War 1914 - 1818. Campaign of 1914 in Belgium and France, Volume G, GVIZ. Moscow, 1996
29. Nablovin M. - Struggle for Asia and Africa. Moscow, 1925
- 379
- CALL ZIIIIII DS NIOD
30. Nablovich M. - World War 1914-4918. and future wars. Kharkov, 1923
31. Pereliska of Wilhelm I with Nikolai P. GIZ, Moscow, 1923
32. Petrov M. A. — Preparation of Russia for World War at Sea. Publishing house RIVER headquarters. 1926
33. Polivanov A. A. - Memoirs. Higher military redakp. advice. Moscow, 1924
G.
- \$44. Poyorobekiy M.P. — Ditsaomatia and wars of tsarist Russia in the ZhKh century. Nza. "Red New". Moscow, 19323
35. Pobrobsky M. - Russian history in a slim concise essay. Part III, issue 1-1. Ed. "Red New". Moscow, 1923
36. Poincare. - The origin of the world war (Russian translation). Moscow, 1924
37. Pourtales. — Between peace and war (Russian translation). GIZ. Moscow — Petrograd, 1924.
38. Runaways 4. - Strategy. Ed. 1st and 9th. Moscow, 1996 and 1927
39. Sutonlinov V. - Memories. Russian universal, ed. Berlin, 1924
40. Strategy in the writings of military classics, vols. Guy N. Moscow, 1922 - 1923
gg.
41. Falconine. - The High Command (Russian translation). Moscow, 1923
G.
49. Hyrpies. - From the memory (Russian translation) GIZ. Moscow - Levingrad,

1995

43. Ebegeg. - Cry ZeVlep io @ money UWayK tes. Vogip 199.

44. Khsheysh. — Yemen, u. EaKepWaup. Vegip, 1936.

45. Chernin. - In the days of the World War (Russian translation. GIZ. Moscow - Petrograd, 1923

46. 5. Sleep I. - \enKglzl\$ 19 - 19144. Gehry, 1924.

AT. beishate. - Osg Sgozze Kmes 1914 - 1918. Vapa 1, U. 1921-1923.

48. /Adoyu. VegNo, 1919.